Ammunition consumption in the Second World War and the balance between the number of barrels and the consumption of shells. Wehrmacht small arms. Wehrmacht small arms in WWII. Germany's small arms How many bullets were used during the years of WWII

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass small arms (photo below) of the German infantry from the Second World War is a submachine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth to this day is actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular assault rifle was never a Wehrmacht mass weapon, and it was not Hugo Schmeisser who created it at all. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of the German infantry on our positions. Good-looking blond guys walk without bending, while firing from machine guns "from the hip." And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone, except for those who were in the war. According to the films, the Schmeissers could conduct targeted fire at the same distance as the rifles of our fighters. In addition, the viewer, when watching these films, had the impression that the entire staff of the German infantry during the Second World War was armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not the Wehrmacht’s massive small arms, and it’s impossible to shoot from it from the hip, and it’s not called Schmeisser at all. In addition, to carry out a trench attack by a subdivision of submachine gunners, in which there are fighters armed with magazine rifles, is a clear suicide, since no one would have reached the trenches.

Shouting Myth: MP-40 automatic pistol

This Wehrmacht small arms in the Second World War is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the equally famous and talented master Heinrich Volmer. And why did the nickname "Schmeisser" so firmly entrenched in him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned a patent for the store, which is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to infringe on his copyrights, the first batches of MP-40 were stamped with PATENT SCHMEISSER on the store receiver. When these machine guns fell as trophies to the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly considered that the author of this model of small arms was, of course, Schmeisser. This is how the nickname was fixed for the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed with machine guns exclusively command staff. So, in the infantry units MP-40 should have been only at the commanders of battalions, companies and squads. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Massively, no one armed them with infantry either in 1941 or after. According to archives in 1941, there were only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles in the troops, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass weapon of the Second World War. In general, for the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were called up in the Wehrmacht.

Why weren't the infantry armed with the MP-40?

Despite the fact that subsequently, experts recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of the Second World War, there were units in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht. The explanation is simple: the aiming range of this machine for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m.This despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), whose aiming range was 800 m for group goals and 400 m single. If the Germans fought with such weapons, as shown in domestic films, they would never be able to get to the enemy trenches, they would simply be shot, as in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the go “from the hip”

When firing, the MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective firing it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, after having unfolded the butt. In addition, this machine was never fired in long bursts, as it quickly heated up. Most often they were beaten in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired a single shot. Despite the fact that the tactical and technical specifications indicate that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute, in practice such a result has never been achieved.

Advantages of MP-40

It cannot be said that this rifle was bad, on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. Also, they were often used by scouts of our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light fast-fire small arms in close combat gave tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular with criminals, and the price of such a machine is very high. And “black archaeologists” deliver them there, who excavate in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the time of the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can be said about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its aiming range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin rifle and SVT. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to streamline production. In addition, this Wehrmacht small arms was equipped with optical sights, and it was equipped with sniper units. The rifle of the Mauser system at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

In late 1941, the Wehrmacht's infantry units for military tests received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems. Their appearance was due to the fact that more than one and a half million of such systems were in service with the Red Army: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to concede to Soviet fighters, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized and adopted as the best. The rifle is equipped with a hammer trigger mechanism. Designed for firing only single shots. It is equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for aimed shooting at distances up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to pollution, it was released in a small series. In 1943, the designers, eliminating these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was released in the amount of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, the Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet-made (!) SVT-40 rifles.

And now back to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems that World War II could not do without.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the Schmeisser movie familiar to everyone: it had a handguard trimmed with wood, which protected the soldier from burns, was heavier and longer. However, this Wehrmacht small arms did not receive wide distribution and was not produced for long. A total of about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine in connection with a lawsuit by ERMA, which announced the illegal copying of its patented design. Small arms MP-41 was used by parts of the Waffen SS. It was also successfully used by units of the Gestapo and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

The next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) Schmeisser developed in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means "assault rifle" (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle in appearance, and in some technical characteristics, resembles (which appeared later), and differs significantly from the MP-40. She aimed fire range up to 800 m. The StG-44 even provided for the possibility of mounting 30 mm grenade launcher. For firing from cover, the designer developed a special nozzle that was worn on the muzzle and changed the path of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon got into mass production only in the autumn of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were shipped to elite units of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units. Subsequently, this Wehrmacht weapon was used in

Automatic rifles FG-42

These copies were intended for parachute troops. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The company “Rheinmetall” took up the development of weapons already during the war, when after evaluating the results of the airborne operations conducted by the Wehrmacht, it became clear that the MR-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was taken into service. In the process of using the aforementioned weapons, shortcomings related to low strength and stability during automatic shooting were revealed. In 1944, the upgraded FG-42 rifle (Model 2) was launched, and Model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for a standard Mauser cartridge of 7.92 mm. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used for firing special gun grenades. In order to increase stability when firing under the barrel fixed bipod. The FG-42 rifle is designed for firing at a range of 1200 m. Due to its high cost, it was released in a limited quantity: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now consider what types of pistols were in service with the German army. Luger, its second name, Parabellum, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the start of the war, there were more than half a million of these pistols in parts of the German army. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then it was replaced by a more reliable "Walter".

This gun was adopted in 1940. It was intended for shooting with 9 mm rounds, the magazine's capacity is 8 rounds. Sighting range at "Walter" - 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of issued P38 pistols was approximately 1 million units.

WWII weapons: MG-34, MG-42, and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and a manual one. They were supposed to shell enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and adopted in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the start of hostilities in the Wehrmacht, there were about 80 thousand units of these weapons. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous. To do this, he had a trigger with two recesses. When you click on the top firing was carried out by single shots, and when you click on the bottom - in bursts. For him, Mauser rifle cartridges of 7.92x57 mm, with light or heavy bullets, were intended. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing-tracing, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. From this the conclusion suggests itself that the impetus for making changes to the weapons systems and tactics of their use was World War II.

The small arms used in this company were replenished with a new machine gun model - MG-42. It was developed and adopted in 1942. Designers have greatly simplified and cheapened the production of these weapons. Thus, spot welding and stamping were widely used in its production, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun under consideration allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes adversely affected the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The range of aimed fire was two kilometers. Work on improving this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification, known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. Incidentally, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of a similar rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

  PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These weapons of World War II were used with relative success at the initial stage to combat tankettes, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, the English Matild and Churchilli, the Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, he was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and anti-tank rocket launchers, the PanzerShrek, Ofenror, as well as the famous Faustpatrons. The PzB-39 used a cartridge with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The firing range was 100 meters, penetrated ability allowed to “flash” 35-mm armor.

"Pantsershrek." This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the Bazooka American jet gun. German designers provided him with a shield that defended the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the nozzle of a grenade. The anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Jet guns were extremely powerful. The Panzerschreks were weapons for group use and had a crew of three. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, in 1943-1944, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades were fired to them.

Grenade launchers: Faustpatron and Panzerfaust

The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles could not cope with their tasks, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could equip infantrymen, operating on the principle of "fired - threw away." The development of a single-use hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943, mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered the army in August of that year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (smooth-bore solid-drawn tube) and an over-caliber grenade. An impact mechanism and an aiming device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and armor penetration - 280-320 mm. "Panzerfaust" was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, in which the trigger mechanism is located, a propelling charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the flight speed of the grenade. In total, during the war years, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured. This type of weapon caused significant losses to Soviet tanks. So, in the battles on the approaches to Berlin, they killed about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on the small, including the world, its development and tactics of use. According to its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of rifle units is not reduced. The experience gained in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development, as well as the improvement of small arms.

  Everyone knows the popular image of the Soviet "liberating soldier." In the view of the Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty overcoats, who are fleeing in attack following tanks, or tired elderly men smoking on a parapet of a cigarette trench. After all, it was precisely such shots that were mainly captured by military newsreels. In the late 1980s, filmmakers and post-Soviet historians put a “victim of repression” on a cart, handed a “three-ruler” without cartridges, sending them to meet the armored fascist hordes - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Now I propose to see what happened in reality. We can responsibly declare that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while being more suited to local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had greater gaps and tolerances than foreign ones, but this “drawback” was a forced feature - gun grease, thickening in the cold, did not remove weapons from battle.

  So, a review.

  N agan  - a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagans, which was in service and produced in several countries in the late XIX - mid XX centuries.


TC  (Tula, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925, the Dynamo Sports Society commissioned the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35 × 15 mm Browning for sports and civilian needs.

Work on the creation of a pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula arms factory. In the fall of 1926, the gunsmith designer S. A. Korovin completed the development of the pistol, which received the name TK pistol (Tula Korovina).

At the end of 1926, TOZ began production of a pistol, the following year the pistol was approved for use, having received the official name "Tula pistol, Korovin, model 1926."

TK pistols entered service with employees of the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior command staff of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.

Also, the TC was used as a gift or award weapon (for example, cases of rewarding him with the Stakhanovites are known). In the period from autumn 1926 to 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were released. In the period after the Great Patriotic War, TK pistols were stored in savings banks for some time as a backup weapon for employees and collectors.


  Gun arr. 1933 TT  (Tulsky, Tokareva) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by the Soviet designer Fedor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced with the aim of replacing the Nagan revolver and several models of foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. The German cartridge 7.63 × 25 mm Mauser was adopted as a standard cartridge, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service.

  Mosin rifle.  The 7.62-mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-ruler) is a magazine rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.

It was actively used in the period from 1891 until the end of World War II, during this period it was repeatedly modernized.

The name of the three-ruler comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (the old measure of length equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).

On the basis of the 1891 model rifle and its modifications, a whole series of sports and hunting weapons, both rifled and smooth-bore, were created.

Simonov automatic rifle.  The 7.62-mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system of the 1936 model, ABC-36 is a Soviet automatic rifle developed by gunsmith Sergei Simonov.

It was originally developed as a self-loading rifle, but in the course of improvements, an automatic fire mode was added for use in an emergency. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and adopted for service.

  With Tokarev self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of samples of 1938 and 1940 (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the sample of 1940 - a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle developed by F.V. Tokarev.

The SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for Simonov’s automatic rifle and on February 26, 1939, it was adopted by the Red Army. First SVT mod. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. On October 1, 1939, gross output began at Tula, and since 1940, at the Izhevsk arms factory.

Simonov self-loading carbine.  Simonov’s 7.62-mm self-loading carbine (also known as SKS-45 abroad) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, adopted in 1949.

The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of using a cartridge of 7.62 × 39 mm in World War II

  P Tokarev submachine gun, or the original name is Tokarev’s light carbine — an experimental prototype of automatic weapons created in 1927 under the modified Nagant revolver cartridge, the first of the submachine guns developed in the USSR. It was not accepted into service, was released by a small experimental batch, and was used to a limited extent in the Great Patriotic War.

  P machine gun Degtyarev.  The 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 models of the Degtyarev system are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.

Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. Used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of World War II.

  P Shpagin submachine gun.  The 7.62 mm submachine gun of the 1941 model of the Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G. S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. PPSh was the main submachine gun of the Soviet armed forces in World War II.

After the war ended, in the early 1950s the PPSh was withdrawn from the armament of the Soviet Army and gradually replaced with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, it remained in service with the rear and auxiliary units, parts of the internal troops and railway troops for a little longer. He was armed with paramilitary security units until at least the mid-1980s.

Also, in the post-war period, PPSh was supplied to a large number in countries friendly to the USSR, for a long time it was in service with the armies of various states, was used by irregular units, and throughout the twentieth century it was used in armed conflicts around the world.

  P Sudaev submachine gun.  The 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 samples of the Sudaev system (PPS) are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudaev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during World War II.

Often, the faculty is considered as the best submachine gun of the Second World War.

  P will understand "Maxim" of a sample of 1910.  The Maxim machine gun, model 1910, is an easel machine gun, a variant of the Maxim British machine gun, which was widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during the First World War and the Second World War. The Maxim machine gun was used to destroy open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m.

Anti-aircraft version
  - 7.62 mm quadruple machine gun "Maxim" on the U-431 anti-aircraft gun
  - 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the U-432 anti-aircraft gun

  P imelet of Maxim Tokarev  - Soviet machine gun designed by F.V. Tokarev, created in 1924 on the basis of the Maxim machine gun.

Dp  (Degtyareva Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial machine guns DP were made at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred to military tests, on the results of which on December 21, 1927 the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army. DP became one of the first examples of small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was massively used as the main weapon of fire support for the infantry of the platoon-company unit until the end of World War II.

DT  (Degtyareva tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev in 1929. He entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation "7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system arr. 1929 " (DT-29)

DS-39  (7.62-mm machine gun Degtyarev model 1939).

SG-43.  7.62-mm machine gun Goryunova (SG-43) - Soviet machine gun. It was developed by a gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Adopted on May 15, 1943. The SG-43 began to enter the troops in the second half of 1943.

DShK  and DShKM - heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7 × 108 mm. The result of the modernization of the heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Krupnokaliberny). DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation "12.7 mm heavy machine gun Degtyarev - Shpagin model 1938"

In 1946, under the designation DShKM  (Degtyarev, Shpagin, large-caliber modernized) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army.

PTRD.  Single-shot anti-tank rifle mod. 1941 of the Degtyarev system, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, guns could fire at bunkers / bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances up to 800 m and aircraft at distances up to 500 m.

PTRS.  Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov system) - Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, guns could fire at bunkers / bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances of up to 800 m and aircraft at distances up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. Shotguns are called Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R).

Grenade launcher Dyakonova.  The Dyakonov system gun grenade launcher designed to destroy live, mostly closed, targets inaccessible to weapons of wall fire with fragmentation grenades.

It was widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish war and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the staff of the rifle regiment in 1939, the armament of each rifle compartment was a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In the documents of that time was called a manual mortar for throwing gun grenades.

1941 mm ampoule launcher 1941  - the only model of an ampoule mass-produced in the USSR. It was widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-artisanal conditions.

The most commonly used projectile was a glass or tin ball filled with flammable liquid “KS”, but munitions included mines, smoke bombs and even artisanal “propaganda shells”. Using a 12-gauge idle rifle cartridge, the projectile fired 250-500 meters, thereby being an effective means against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the fact that in 1942 the ampoule was withdrawn from service.

ROKS-3  (Knapsack Klyuev - Sergeev Flamethrower) - Soviet infantry knapsack flamethrower during the Great Patriotic War. The first model of a knapsack flamethrower ROKS-1 was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of World War II, the Red Army's rifle regiments had flamethrower teams in two squads, armed with 20 ROKS-2 backpack flamethrowers. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers in early 1942, the designer of the Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Engineering M.P. Sergeyev and the designer of the military plant number 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced knapsack flamethrower ROKS-3, which was armed with individual companies and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war.

Flammable Bottles (Molotov Cocktail).

At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use flammable bottles in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the GKO adopted a special decree “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which obliged the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry to organize, from July 10, 1941, equipment for liter glass bottles with fire mixtures according to the recipe of Research Institute 6 of the People’s Commissariat for Ammunition. And the head of the Office of the Military Chemical Defense of the Red Army (later, the Main Military Chemical Department) was ordered to start "supplying military units with hand-held incendiary grenades from July 14."

Dozens of distilleries and breweries throughout the USSR on the go turned into military enterprises. Moreover, the Molotov Cocktail (named after the then deputy I.V. Stalin on the Goskomoborone) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where yesterday they poured citra, port and sparkling Abrau-Durso. From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to tear off “peaceful” alcohol labels. In addition to the liter bottles specified in the legendary Molotov decree, the cocktail was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.

The Red Army adopted two types of incendiary bottles: KS self-igniting liquid (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which are a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, thickened with oils or special curing powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov, - in fact, it was a prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation “KS” is deciphered in different ways: both “Koshkinskaya mixture” - by the name of the inventor N.V. Koshkin, and “Old Cognac”, and “Kachugin-Solodovnik” - by the name of other inventors of liquid grenades.

A bottle with a self-igniting liquid KS, falling on a solid, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000 ° C. At the same time, being sticky, it stuck to the armor or stuck sight slots, glasses, observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking it from the tank and burning everything inside the tank. Getting on the body, a drop of burning liquid caused severe, difficult to heal burns.

Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds with a temperature of up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. Bottles with gasoline were used as a cheaper option, and thin glass ampoules with KS liquid, which were attached to the bottle with the help of pharmaceutical gums, were used as an incendiary. Sometimes, ampoules were inserted inside the bottles before the throw.

  Bulletproof vest PZ-ZIF-20  (protective shell, Factory named after Frunze). He is also the CH-38 type of Cuirass (CH-1, steel bib). It can be called the first mass Soviet bulletproof vest, although it was called a steel bib, which does not change its purpose.

The bulletproof vest provided protection from the German submachine gun and pistols. Also, the bulletproof vest provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. The body armor was recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during cable laying and repair) and during other operations at the discretion of the commander.

Often there is information that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not the SP-38 (CH-1) bulletproof vest, which is incorrect, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to the documentation of 1938, and the industrial production was launched in 1943. The second point is that in appearance they have 100% similarity. Among the military search units it has the name “Volkhov”, “Leningrad”, “five-sectional”.
  Reconstruction photo:

Steel bibs SN-42

Soviet assault engineering and engineer guards brigade in steel bibs SN-42 and machine guns DP-27. 1st SISBR 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944

Hand grenade ROG-43

  ROG-43 hand-held fragmentation grenade (index 57-G-722) of remote action, designed to defeat enemy personnel in offensive and defensive combat. A new grenade was developed in the first half of World War II at the plant named after Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being adopted in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.

Hand smoke grenade RDG.

RDG device

Smoke grenades were used to provide 8-10 m curtains and were used mainly to "blind" the enemy in shelters, to create local curtains to mask crews leaving armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an unseen cloud of 25-30 m in length.

Burning grenades did not sink in the water, so they could be used to force water barriers. The grenade could smoke for 1 to 1.5 minutes, forming, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, dense gray-black or white smoke.

RPG-6 grenade.


  RPG-6 exploded instantly when it hit a hard barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, and could also ignite fuel and detonate ammunition. The RPG-6 grenade military test took place in September 1943. As a target, the captured Ferdinand assault gun was used, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and armor reservation up to 85 mm. The tests showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when hit by a head part against a target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.

Hand anti-tank grenade arr. 1943 RPG-43

1941 hand-held anti-tank grenade RPG-41 of shock action

  RPG-41 was designed to combat armored vehicles and light tanks with armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat bunkers and field-type shelters. The RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when it got into the vehicle’s weak spots (roof, tracks, chassis, etc.)

Chemical grenade sample 1917


  According to the "Provisional Rifle Charter of the Red Army. Part 1. Small arms. Shotguns and hand grenades ”, published by the managing director of the People’s Commissariat for Military Commissariats and the Strategic Missile Forces of the USSR in 1927, at the disposal of the Red Army for arming troops in positional battle was a chemical hand grenade mod. 1917 from the stockpiled back in the years of the First World War.

Grenade VKG-40

In the arsenal of the Red Army in the 1920-1930s was the muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

  The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant scope and served to destroy manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The barrel of the mortar had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw cuts, was rigidly fastened in a cup that was screwed on the neck, it was put on the barrel of the rifle, fixed on the front sight with a notch.

Hand grenade RG-42

  RG-42 model 1942 with a fuse UZRG. After adopting the grenade, the RG-42 index (hand grenade of 1942) was assigned. The new UZRG fuse used in grenade has become the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.

The RG-42 grenade was used both during the offensive and during the defense. In appearance, it resembled a RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. RG-42 with a fuse UZRG belonged to the type of fragmentation offensive grenades distant action. It was intended to defeat enemy manpower.

VPGS-41 rifle anti-tank grenade



VPGS-41 when using

A characteristic distinguishing feature of the ramrod grenades was the presence of a “tail” (ramrod) inserted into the barrel of the rifle and serving as a stabilizer. A grenade shot was made by a blank cartridge.

Soviet hand grenade arr. 1914/30 g.  with a defensive cover

Soviet hand grenade arr. 1914/30 refers to dual-type anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenades. This means that it is designed to defeat enemy personnel with shell fragments during its explosion. Remote action - means that the grenade will explode after a certain period of time, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.

Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive, i.e. grenade fragments have a small mass and fly at a distance less than the possible throwing distance; or as defensive, i.e. fragments fly to a range exceeding the throwing distance.

The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting a so-called “shirt” on the grenade - a cover made of thick metal, which ensures that fragments of larger mass flying over a greater distance during an explosion.

Hand grenade RGD-33

An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 grams of TNT. Between the explosive charge and the body is placed a steel tape with a square notch to receive fragments from the explosion, rolled up in three to four layers.


  The grenade was equipped with a defensive cover, which was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or shelter. In other cases, the defensive cover was removed.

And of course, Grenade F-1

  Initially, the fuse grenade F-1 was used fuse design F.V. Koveshnikov, who was much more reliable and more convenient to use the French fuse. The slowdown time of the Koveshnikov fuse was 3.5-4.5 seconds.

In 1941, designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. The poor people developed and put into service instead of the Koveshnikov fuse a new safer and simpler fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.

In 1942, a new fuse became the same for the F-1 and RG-42 hand grenades, it was called UZRG - "a unified fuse for hand grenades."

* * *
  After the above, it cannot be argued that only rusty three-rulers without cartridges were in service.
  About chemical weapons since the Second World War, the conversation is separate and special ...

Here is a small illustration:

Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 the ratio of forces on artillery guns and mortars on the Soviet-German front was 1.7: 1 (95.604 Soviet versus 54.570 opponents). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active areas it could be reduced to three times (for example, in the Belarussian operation 29,000 Soviet versus 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under the hurricane fire of Soviet artillery? No, an artillery is just a tool for consuming shells. No shells - and a tool is a useless toy. And providing shells is just the task of logistics.

In 2009, VIF Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum / 0 / archive / 1706 / 1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0 / archive / 1733 / 1733171.htm). I put everything together on a plate, supplemented it with rocket artillery, added the consumption of trophy calibers from Hann for the Germans (he often gives an indefinable additive) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. Laid out. Well, and grouped a little differently. It turns out pretty funny. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the shots were fired in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e., guns of 75 mm and higher, without anti-aircraft guns), the Germans have more:
  USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If translated into tons, then superiority is even more noticeable:
  USSR Germany 1942 446,113 709,957 1943 828,193 1,121,545 1944 1,000,962 1,540,933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the shell, not a shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives, falling directly on the head of the opposite side. I note that for the Germans I did not consider armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns (I hope it is clear why). For the Soviet side it is not possible to exclude them, but judging by the Germans, the amendment will come out insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.

In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired at a barrel of guns of 76.2 mm and higher than the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both in years and in caliber: in 1944, the average daily shot in all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122 mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regiment, division, tank) - 3.7. On the contrary, the average daily shot at the barrel of the mortar is growing year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.

For the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the army. But if we take the total availability of guns, then the average daily shot at the barrel of a caliber of 75 mm and higher in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105 mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) shot an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150 mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars shot 4.4 shells per barrel per day, and 120-mm mortars only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave an expense closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 shells per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).

Another instructive metric is the consumption of shells per division.

The division was the main organizational brick, but typically divisions achieved parts of reinforcement. It is interesting to see what supported the middle division in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had about 500 design divisions in the army (without RGKs) (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). In the ground forces of the army there were about 5.5 million, that is, the division accounted for about 11 thousand people. It was “natural”, taking into account both the composition of the division itself and all parts of the reinforcement and support that worked for it both directly and in the rear.

For the Germans, the average number of troops belonging to the division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, about 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. In this case, the average daily shot at the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and the German - three times as much (16.2 tons). If you count 10,000 people in the army, then from the Soviet side 5 tons of ammunition was spent per day on support of their actions in 1944, and 13.8 tons from the German side.

The American division in the European theater of operations in this sense stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet people: 34,000 (this is without the Supply Command), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times greater (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood but with a large expenditure of shells." You can compare - in June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and Americans also came to Elba at about the same time. That is, they provided the same speed of advancement. However, the Americans spent 15 tons a day on this route per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of the troops per month killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops advancing at the same speed spent (specific) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was provided by the consumption of manpower.

It is interesting to see the distribution of the mass expenditure of ammunition by type of guns:

I recall that all the numbers here are for artillery of 75 mm and higher, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber of 28 to 57 mm. In the infantry guns fall German guns with this name, the Soviet 76-mm regiments and the American 75-mm howitzer. The remaining guns with a weight in the combat position of less than 8 tons are counted as field. Here at the upper limit fall such systems as the Soviet 152 mm howitzer gun ML-20 and the German s.FH 18. Heavier guns, such as the Soviet 203 mm howitzer B-4, the American 203 mm howitzer M1 or the German 210- mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170 mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.

It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very insignificant role (in 1945 more, but not by much). In field artillery, efforts (by weight of projectiles fired) are approximately evenly distributed between the 76 mm cannon, 122 mm howitzer and 152 mm howitzer / howitzer gun. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of the Soviet shell is one and a half times less than the German.

In addition, it should be noted that the further the target, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most targets are dug / covered in one way or another, but in the depths such undisclosed targets as advanced reserves, enemy troops in places of concentration, headquarters, etc. appear. In other words, a projectile hitting a target in depth does on average more damage than a projectile fired at the leading edge (on the other hand, projectile scattering at long distances is higher).

Then, if the enemy has a parity in weight of the fired shells of the shells, but at the same time holds half as many people at the front, he thereby gives half the targets of our artillery.

All this works for the observed loss ratio.

(As a detailed commentary to

Universal low-ballistic shooting system for close combat infantry units of the Red Army

The available information on the Red Army ampoules is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, a description of the construction in the manual for the use of ampoules, and also some conclusions and common conjectures of modern search engine diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital plant "Iskra" named after I.I. Kartukova for a long time lay a dead weight of amazing quality in the species series of the shooting of the front years. Text documents to it are obviously buried in the bowels of the archive of the economy (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So when working on the publication, I had to summarize only known data and analyze the help and images.
The existing concept of "ampulometr" as applied to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of World War II does not reveal all the possibilities and tactical advantages of these weapons. Moreover, all the available information refers only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampulometers. In fact, this “pipe on the machine” was capable of throwing not only ampoules from tin or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost "on the knee", are undoubtedly worth much more respect.

The simplest mortar

In the flamethrower system of the Red Army ground forces, the ampulometer occupied an intermediate position between knapsack or easel flame throwers, firing short distances with a liquid flame mixture, and field artillery (barrel and rocket), which occasionally applied incendiary shells with solid incendiary mixtures of the type of military incendiary Grade 6. According to the plan of the developers (and not the requirements of the customer), the ampulometer was mainly (as in the document) intended to fight tanks, armored by assaults, armored vehicles and fortified enemy firing points by firing at them with any ammunition of a suitable caliber.

Experienced 125 mm ampoule during the factory test period of 1940

The opinion that the ampulometer is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples was exhibited at the State Memorial Museum of Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, ampoules were developed (as, incidentally, infantry flamethrowers) in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirova (chief designer of the plant - I.I. Kartukov), which is managed by the People's Commissariat of the USSR aircraft industry. Unfortunately, the names of the designers of ampullometres are unknown to me.

Transportation of an experimental 125-mm ampoule in the summer when changing the firing position.

It has been documented that with the ammunition load of the ampoules the 125-mm ampulometer passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the design of the ampoule, given on the Internet, is borrowed from the manual and only in general terms corresponds to pre-war prototypes: “The ampoule consists of a barrel with a chamber, a shutter-bolt, firing devices, sights and a gun carriage with a fork.” In the version that we supplemented, the barrel of a serial ampoule was a steel seamless pipe from Mannesman steel with an inner diameter of 127 mm, or rolled up from a sheet of 2 mm iron, plugged in the breech. The barrel of the standard ampoule freely rested with pins on the eyes in the fork of a wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical aiming mechanisms.

An experimental 125-mm ampoule with a rifle-type bolt in the chamber locked a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder sleeve and a 15-gram hitch of black powder. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the trigger lever with the thumb of the left hand (forward or down, there were different options) located near the handles similar to those used on machine guns and welded to the breech of the ampoule.

125 mm ampoule in combat position.

In a serial ampoule, the firing mechanism was simplified by the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under the thumb of the right hand. Moreover, the handles in serial production were replaced by steel pipes, bent like ram horns, structurally combining them with a piston lock. That is, now for loading the shutter was turned by both handles all the way to the left and pulled towards themselves with the support of the tray. The entire breech with handles along the slots in the tray moved to its extreme rear position, completely removing the fired cartridge case of the 12th caliber.

The sights of the ampoule consisted of a front sight and a folding sight rack. The latter was designed for firing at four fixed distances (obviously, from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate distances.
The photographs show that on the experimental version of the ampoule a crudely made wheeled machine was used, welded from steel pipes and a corner profile. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory stand. At the machine of the ampoule, which was put into service, all the details were more carefully trimmed and provided with all the attributes necessary for operation in the army: handles, openers, straps, brackets, etc. However, monolithic wooden wheels (rollers) were provided on both the experimental and serial models studded with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal sleeve as a sliding bearing in the axial bore.

In St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are late versions of the factory-made ampoule on a simplified lightweight wheelless non-folding machine with a support from two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden decks or oak crosses as carriages were adapted to ampoules in wartime.

The manual mentions that the ammunition carried by the calculation of the ampoule was 10 ampoules and 12 knockout cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule, the developers suggested installing two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each in the transport position. One of the fighters, obviously, carried two dozen rounds of ammunition in a standard hunting bandoleer. In a combat position, the ammunition boxes were quickly removed and placed in shelter.

On the barrel of the pre-production version of the ampoule, two welded swivels were provided for carrying it on the belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any "architectural excesses", and the trunk was carried on the shoulder. Many note the presence of a metal grid divider inside the barrel, in its breech. On the prototype, this was not. Obviously, the grate was needed to prevent a cardboard ampoule and felt wad of a blank cartridge from hitting a glass ampoule. In addition, she limited the movement of the ampoule to the breech of the barrel to the stop, since the serial 125-mm ampoule had a chamber in this place. The factory data and characteristics of the 125-mm ampoule differ somewhat from those given in the descriptions and application manuals.

Drawing of a serial 125-mm ampoule, proposed for serial production in 1940

Rupture of a 125-mm ampoule equipped with a self-igniting CS fluid in the target area.

Finished goods warehouse of the ampoule production workshop at the plant No. 455 of the NKAP in 1942

Incendiary ampoules

As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for the ampulometres was aviation tin ampoules АЖ-2 of 125 mm caliber, equipped with a self-igniting variety of condensed kerosene of the KS brand. The first tin spherical ampoules entered mass production in 1936. At the end of the 1930s. they were also improved in the OKO of the 145th plant (in evacuation, this is OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In the factory documents, they were called aviation liquid ampoules АЖ-2. But still
it is more viable to call tin ampoules, since they were planned in the Red Army Air Force to gradually replace AK-1 glass ampoules, which have been in service since the early 1930s. like chemical ammunition.

There have always been complaints about glass ampoules that they are, de, fragile, and having crashed ahead of time, they are capable of poisoning both the aircraft crew and ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and brittleness in use. The first, of course, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombing from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of unbroken ones. Theoretically, the solution could their tin thin-walled counterparts. As tests later showed, the aviators' hopes for this also were not fully realized.

This feature probably also manifested itself when firing from an ampoule, especially along flat trajectories for a short range. Note that the recommended target type of the 125-mm ampoule also consists of objects with strong walls. In the 1930s. aviation tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres of thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, in 1937 (with the beginning of austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), their transfer to tinplate 0.2-0.3 mm thick began.

The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, Ofitserov-Kokoreva’s design was proposed for the manufacture of AZ-2 from four spherical segments with two options for seaming the edges of parts. In 1937, even AZ-2 from a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere from four spherical segments consisted in production.

In early 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZh-2 from black metal (thin-rolled 0.5-mm decapitated iron) were tested. Since mid-1941, these technologies had to be fully utilized. During stamping, black tin was not as plastic as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel made production difficult, therefore, with the outbreak of war, AZ-2 was allowed to be made of 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as various combinations with hemispheres).

The unexploded or unshooted round glass ampoules AU-125 for firing from 125 mm ampoules have been perfectly preserved in the ground for decades. Photos of our days.
Below: experimental ampoules АЖ-2 with additional fuses. Photo 1942

Soldering seams of black metal products in the presence of special fluxes then turned out to be a rather expensive pleasure as well, and the method of welding thin steel sheets with a continuous seam was academician E.O. Paton introduced the production of ammunition only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, parts of the AZ-2 cases began to be connected by seaming the edges and suturing the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoules, the filler necks of metal ampoules were soldered outside (for use in aviation this was not so crucial), but since 1940 the necks have been fastened inside. This allowed to avoid the diversity of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.

The filling of AZh-2KS vials, the so-called “Russian napalm” - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ions in one of the metropolitan research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. She-velkina and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939, he completed the development of industrial production technology for the OP-2 powdery thickener. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air is still unknown. I’m not sure that the trivial addition of white phosphorus granules to a thick incendiary mixture based on petroleum products here would guarantee their self-ignition. In general, anyway, already in the spring of 1941, at the factory and field tests, the 125-mm AZh-2KS ampoule normally worked without fuses and intermediate ignitors.

According to the initial plan, AZh-2 was intended for infection from terrain aircraft with persistent toxic substances, as well as the defeat of manpower with persistent and unstable poisonous substances, later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - for the ignition and smoke of tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of military chemicals in ampoules against the enemy was not excluded by using them from ampoules. With the outbreak of World War II, the incendiary purpose of ammunition was supplemented by smoking manpower from field fort facilities.

In 1943, for guaranteed operation of the AZh-2SOV or AZh-2NOV during bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the ampoule developers supplemented their designs with thermosetting plastic fuses (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). According to the plan of the developers, such modified ammunition already affected the manpower as shrapnel-chemical.

Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal fuse of shock action) belonged to the category of all-hole, i.e. triggered even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on ADS smoke bombs, but it was no longer possible to shoot such ampoules from ampulometres: from overloads, an fuse of an unsafe type could fire directly in the barrel. In the war period and for incendiary ampoules in the Air Force, sometimes they used cases with fuses or with caps instead of them.

In 1943-1944 tested the ampoules AZh-2SOV or NOV, designed for long-term storage in running condition. To do this, their bodies inside were covered with bakelite resin. Thus, the resistance of the metal case to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were mandatory installed on such ammunition.

Today, at the places of past battles, “diggers” can come across in an air-conditioned form only AK-1 or AU-125 ampoules (AK-2 or AU-260 - an extremely rare exotic) made of glass. Thin-walled tin ampoules almost all decayed. Do not try to discharge the glass ampoules, if you can see that the inside is liquid. White or yellowish turbid is a CS, which by no means has lost its properties for self-ignition in air, even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent with yellow large crystals of sediment - this is COB or NOV. In glass containers, their combat properties can also be preserved for a very long time.

Ampoules in battle

On the eve of the war, units of knapsack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of the infantry regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using it in defense (the extremely short range of flame throwing and the unmasking signs of the Rox-2 knapsack flamethrower) they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoule guns and gun mortars for throwing metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, the ampoules also had significant shortcomings, and at the end of 1942 they were withdrawn from service.
At the same time, the refusal of rifle-bottle mortars was not mentioned. Probably, for some reason, they did not possess the disadvantages of ampulometres. Moreover, in the remaining divisions of the rifle regiments of the Red Army, bottles with CS were to be thrown at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle-throwers of the flamethrower teams, obviously, were told a terrible military secret: how to use the aiming bar of a Mosin rifle to aim the bottle at a given distance determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this “tricky business”. Therefore, they themselves adapted a three-inch sleeve to the cut of the rifle barrel, and themselves "outside school hours" were trained in targeted bottle throwing.

When faced with a solid barrier, the body of the AZh-2KS ampoule was torn, as a rule, by solder joints, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air with the formation of a thick white
th smoke. The burning temperature of the mixture reached 800 ° C, which, when it came into contact with clothing and exposed areas of the body, caused the enemy a lot of trouble. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky CS with armored vehicles - from the change in the physicochemical properties of the metal during local heating to this temperature and ending with the indispensable fire in the engine-and-transmission compartment of the carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clear the burning CS from the armor - only the cessation of air access was required. However, the presence in the CS of a self-igniting additive did not preclude spontaneous ignition of the mixture again.

Here are a few excerpts from military reports from the time of the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We used ampoules as well. From an obliquely mounted tube mounted on a sleigh, a shot of an empty cartridge pushed a glass ampoule with a combustible mixture. She flew along a steep trajectory to a distance of 300-350 m. Crashing during a fall, the ampoule created a small but steady fire spot, hitting the enemy’s manpower and setting fire to its dugouts. The combined ampulometrical company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, issued 1,620 ampoules during the first two hours. ” “Ampulometre also advanced here. Acting under the guise of infantry, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points. "

By the way, intensive firing of cartridges with smoky gunpowder inevitably created a thick layer of soot on the walls of the barrel. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampuleters would surely find that the ampoule rolls into the barrel with increasing difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits on the contrary would somewhat improve the obturation of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing the range of their shooting. However, the usual range marks on the bar of the sight, for sure, “floated”. About the banns and other tools and devices for cleaning the trunks of ampoules, probably, it was mentioned in the technical description ...

And here is a quite objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The calculation of the ampoule was three people. “Two people were loading: the first calculation number was inserted from the treasury with a high cartridge, the second was put into the barrel from the muzzle part of the ampoule." “The ampoules were very simple and cheap“ flamethrower mortars ”, they were armed with special ampoule-platoons. The infantry combat charter of 1942 mentions an ampulomet as a standard infantry firearm. In battle, an ampulometer often served as the core of a group of tank destroyers. Its use in defense as a whole paid off, while attempts to use it in the offensive led to large losses in calculations due to the small firing range. True, they were not without success used by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad. ”

There are also memories of veterans. The essence of one of them boils down to the fact that at the beginning of December 1941, on the Western Front, into one of the battalions of the 30th Army, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko delivered 20 ampulometres. The designer of this weapon came here, as well as the commander himself, who decided to personally test the new equipment. In response to the comments of the designer on loading the ampoule, Lelyushenko grumbled that everything was painfully cunning and long, and the German tank would not wait ... At the first shot, the ampoule crashed in the barrel of the ampoule, and the whole installation burned down. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampulometer. Everything repeated. The general "urchil", switching to profanity, forbade the soldiers to use weapons so unsafe for calculations and crushed the remaining ampoules with a tank.

Use of ARS-203 for filling ampoules АЖ-2 with chemical warfare agents. The bent fighter is pumping out excess fluid, standing near the tripod sets traffic jams on the AZh-2 filling necks. Photo 1938

A very likely story, although not very pleasant in the general context. As if the ampoules did not pass the factory and polygon tests ... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned it) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, a respected veteran did not specify what material the ampoules were from. The temperature difference of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is fired when fired by a flame of gunpowder of a high charge, may also have an effect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only with metal ampoules. But “in the hearts” the general could easily ride on ampoules!

Filling station ARS-203. Photo 1938

Frontline spill fire cocktail

This is only at first glance, the scheme for using an ampoule in the army seems to be primitive simple. For example, the calculation of an ampoule in a combat position fired a portable ammunition and pulled a second ammunition ... What’s easier - take and shoot. There, the senior lieutenant Starkov’s two-hour unit expenditure exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of troops with incendiary ampoules, it was necessary to solve the problem of transporting long distances from factories from deep rear far from the unsafe handling of incendiary ammunition.

Tests of ampoules in the pre-war period showed that these ammunition in its fully equipped form can withstand transport no more than 200 km along peacetime roads in compliance with all the rules and with the complete exclusion of “road adventures”. In wartime, everything was much more complicated. But here, undoubtedly, the experience of Soviet aviators was useful, where the ampoules were equipped at airfields. Before the mechanization of the process, filling ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and wrapping of the nozzle plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.

In 1938, the towed aircraft filling station ARS-203, designed on a single-axle semi-trailer, was developed and later adopted for the Red Army Air Force at the 145th NKAP plant. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 also entered service, but it was focused on servicing poured avionics, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for the filling of military chemicals into ammunition and insulated tanks, but to work with the finished self-igniting incendiary mixture proved to be simply irreplaceable.

In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment, a small unit for equipping ampoules with a mixture of KS was supposed to work. Without a doubt, it had the station ARS-203. But the cops also did not carry barrels from the factories, but prepared on the spot. For this, in the front-line zone any oil-distillation products were used (gasoline, kerosene, solarium) and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ion, was added to them a different amount of thickener. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Then it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the flame mixture was added.

However, the option of adding the component directly to the ampoules, and then pouring the CS liquid into them, is not excluded. In this case, the ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And the dispenser could serve as an ordinary soldier's aluminum mug. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time in the open air (for example, wet white phosphorus).

ARS-203 was specially designed to mechanize the process of equipping the ampoules АЖ-2 to the working volume in the field. On it, from a large reservoir, liquid was first poured simultaneously into eight measuring tanks, and then eight ampoules were immediately filled. Thus, in an hour it was possible to equip 300-350 ampoules, and after two hours of such work, the 700-liter tank of the station was empty, and it was again filled with CS liquid. It was impossible to accelerate the process of filling ampoules: all the flow of liquids took place naturally, without pressurization of the tank. The filling cycle of eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 l were pumped into the working capacity of the station using the Gard pump in 7.5-9 minutes.

The PRS station is ready for refueling four ampoules АЖ-2. The pedal is pressed, and the process has begun! Refueling incendiary mixtures allowed to do without a gas mask. Photo 1942

Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces was unexpected: the performance of the station, focused on the needs of the Air Force, was recognized as excessive, as, however, its dimensions, weight and the need to tow a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942 at the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant, Kartukovtsy developed a field filling station PRS. In its design, the measuring devices were eliminated, and the filling level of opaque ampoules was controlled using the Glass SIG-Extremely simplified version of the ORS of the tube. for use in the field. Working capacity
the tank was 107 l, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The ORS was designed in a “civilized” version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified way, with the installation of the working capacity “on the stumps”. The productivity of the station was limited to 240 ampoules of AZh-2 per hour. Unfortunately, when the PRS landfill tests were completed, the ampoules in the Red Army had already been withdrawn from service.

Russian reusable Faustpatron?

However, unconditionally reckoning a 125-mm ampoule to incendiary weapons will not be entirely correct. After all, no one allows himself to consider a barrel artillery system or a Katyusha MLRS as a flamethrower, firing incendiary ammunition if necessary. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant proposed expanding the arsenal of ammunition for the ampoule through the use of modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 of cumulative action, created at the very beginning of World War II.

In the book of E. Pyryev and S. Reznichenko "Bomber Armament of the Russian Aviation 1912-1945." in the PTAB section it is said that small bombs of cumulative action in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, it was possible to design, test and work out the full-weight 1.5-kg PTAB of cumulative effect. However, at the 145th plant, I.I. Kartukov dealt with this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5-kg munition was called an AFBM-125 high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.

Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled the high-explosive bombs of Colonel Gronov of small calibers during the First World War. Since the wings of cylindrical plumage were welded to the hull of the aviation munition by spot welding, it was not possible to manage to use the mines in infantry by simply replacing their plumage. A new plumage of a mortar type on air bombs was installed with an additional propelling charge mounted in it in a capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a 12-gauge idle rifle cartridge. Thus, as applied to the ampoule-gun, the system was obtained in a certain Stepemin fBM. 125 without additional active reactive. fuse for contact fuse.

For a fairly long time, the designers had to work to increase the reliability of cocking a contact mine fuse on the trajectory.

Mine BFM-125 without additional fuse contact fuse.

Meanwhile, the problem in the above episode of 1941 with the commander of the 30th Army D.D. Lelyushenko could have arisen when firing from ampulometres with high explosive armor-piercing mines FBM-125 of early models. Lelyushenko’s grunt indirectly points to this: “It hurts all slyly and for a long time, the German tank won’t wait,” because putting an ampoule and loading a cartridge into a regular ampulometer did not require special wisdom. In the case of using the FBM-125, before firing at the ammunition, it was necessary to unscrew the safety key, opening fire access to the powder mount of the safety mechanism holding the inertial fuse of the contact fuse in the rear position. To do this, all such ammunition was supplied with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription "Unscrew before shooting," tied to a key.

The cumulative recess in the front of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel cladding rather formed the desired configuration when filling the explosive, rather than playing the role of a strike nucleus when the ammunition charge accumulated. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when firing from standard ampoules, is intended to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (DOTov. DZOTovipr.).

An armored plate 80 mm thick, confidently pierced by an FBM-125 mine at field tests.

The nature of the outlet of the same broken armor plate.

The ammunition landfill tests took place in 1941. Their result was the launch of a mine into pilot production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers proposed, if necessary, to equip such mines with annoying chemical warfare agents (chloroacetophenone or adamsite), but this did not come to this. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant developed the armor-piercing high-explosive mine BFM-125. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in factory certificates.

Cover the infantry with smoke

In 1941, it passed field tests developed at the factory No. 145 named after CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADSH. It was intended for the production of vertical masking (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (fettering and exhausting the enemy combat forces) curtains when dropping checkers from an airplane. On airplanes, ADSs were loaded into ampoule-bomb cartridges, having previously removed the safety plugs of the fuses. Checkers were poured in one gulp when opening the shutters of one of the sections of the cartridge. Ampoule bomb cartridges were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long-range and near bombers.

The contact action check fuse was already made with an all-hole mechanism, which ensured its operation when the munition fell to the ground in any position. From firing in case of accidental fall, the fuse was protected by the spring of the fuse, which did not allow the drummer to pierce the igniter caps with insufficient overloads (when falling from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete).

It is probably no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in 125 mm caliber, which, according to the assurances of the developers, made it possible to use ADS from standard ampoules as well. By the way, when fired from an ampoule, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when falling from 4 m, which means that the bomb began to smoke already in flight.

Back in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that covering up your troops is much more effective if, in an attack on a firing point, it was it, and not your infantry, that was smoked. Thus, an ampoulemeter would be a very necessary thing, when before the attack it was required to throw a few checkers a couple of hundred meters to the bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoules were used at the fronts in this version ...

When firing heavy ADSH bombs from a 125-mm ampoule, its sights could only be used with amendments. However, high firing accuracy was not required: one ADS created an invisible creeping cloud with a length of up to 100 m. And since it’s adapted to the ADS
an additional knock-out charge was impossible, for firing at the maximum distance, it was necessary to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45 °.

Regimental propaganda initiative

The plot for this section of the article about the ampoule was also borrowed by me on the Internet. Its essence was that once the political commander, having come to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make an agitational mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov called out. He found the tools at the site of the destroyed forge, made the shell of ammunition from chocks, adapting a small powder charge for it to burst in the air, the fuse from a bic-ford cord, and the stabilizer from cans. However, the wooden mortar mine was light and lowered slowly into the barrel without breaking through the capsule.

Ivanov reduced its diameter so that air from the barrel came out more freely, and the capsule on the firing pin ceased to fall. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. Leaflets spun over enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampoulemeter for firing wooden mines. And in order not to cause retaliatory fire on his trenches, he carried him out into a neutral strip or to the side. Result: German soldiers once crossed to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.

This story is also quite believable. It is quite difficult to make agitation in a metal casing in the field from improvised means, and from wood it is quite possible. In addition, such ammunition, in common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what agitation is there! But the factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, to fly further and not to greatly disrupt ballistics. However, before that, the designers of the ampoule did not even think of enriching the arsenal of their offspring with this kind of ammunition ...

rechargeable, with a piston lock. The firing mechanisms are similar in systems of both calibers.
The Ampulomet easel mortars were not put into service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be attributed to hard mortars. Theoretically, the recoil force when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased compared to throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than the ADS. And the expelling charge is the same. However, in spite of the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired along more trajectory paths than the classic mortars and bomb mortars, the first ones were still much "mortar" than the Katyusha guards mortars.

findings

So, the reason for the removal of the ampulometres from the armament of the ground forces of the Red Army at the end of 1942 was officially their insecurity in handling and use. But in vain: ahead of our army was not only an offensive, but also numerous battles in the settlements. It is there that they would be fully useful
100-mm easel anti-tank mortar during loading.

By the way, the safety of using a knapsack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also very doubtful. Nevertheless, they were returned "into operation" and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memoirs of a sniper, where he claims that the enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), therefore it is better to aim him at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet of a powerful rifle cartridge pierces through both the body and the tank with a fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and the flamethrower "cannot be restored."
Exactly in the same situation could be the calculation of the ampoule when bullets or fragments hit the incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules in general could be pulled against each other by a shock wave from a close gap. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business ... And thanks to the "hussery of Generals Lelyushenko" such hasty conclusions were born about the low quality and combat inefficiency of individual weapons. Recall, for example, the pre-war ordeal of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar weapons, machine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. Our gunsmiths overwhelmingly were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and sought no less than generals to bring victory closer. And they were “dipped” like kittens. The generals are also not hard to understand - they needed reliable weapons and with "protection from the fool."

And then, the infantrymen’s warm recollections of the effectiveness of KS Molotov cocktails against tanks against the background of a rather cool attitude to the ampoules somehow seem illogical. Both that, and another - the weapon of one order. Unless the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and you could throw it 10 times further. Here it’s not entirely clear why there were more complaints “in the infantry”: to the ampoule itself or to its ampoules?

The ABK-P-500 external suspended non-dropable container for salvo use of small-caliber air bombs from high-speed and dive bombers. In the foreground are AZ-2KS ampoules of four spherical segments with edges sealed inside.

One of the options for a manual (non-Iranian) flamethrower developed by the designers of the plant No. 145 of the NKAP during the tests of 1942. At such a distance, except for the wild boar, should be smashed from this "aerosol can."

At the same time, the very “very dangerous” AM-2KS ampoules in Soviet attack aircraft were in service at least until the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945 (in any case, the MP Odintsov assault regiment used them already in German territory on tank columns sheltering in forests). And it's on the attack aircraft! With unarmored bomb bay! When from the ground all the enemy infantry pounding on them from anything! Pilots were well aware of WHAT would happen if only one stray bullet hit the cartridge with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, the timid mention on the Internet that ampoules were used in aviation when firing from sort of airplane ampoules is completely untrue.

Often we find in the land of cartridges from the Civil and Great Patriotic War. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will consider the marking of the shells, which is located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Consider some types and markings of the Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges of 1905-1916. In this type of cartridge cases, the capsule is divided into four parts with dashes, the inscriptions are squeezed out. The left, respectively, and right cell is the year of manufacture, the upper month, and the designation of the plant at the bottom.

• In Figure 1. - G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig 2. - Bello and Selye, city of Prague.
• Fig 3. - Wollersdorf plant.
• Fig 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Figure 5. - The same Hartenberg, but the Kelleri Co. plant.

The later Hungarian 1930s and 40s have some differences. Fig 6. - Chapelsky arsenal, year of issue from below. Figure 7. - Budapest. Fig 8. - Veszprem military plant.

Germany, imperialist war.

The German marking of the shells of the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) with the help of dashes into four equal parts of the capsule and with the conditional (Fig. 10). The inscription is squeezed out, in the second version the letters and numbers of the designation are directed to the capsule.

The upper part is marked S 67, in different versions: together, separately, through a point, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left side is the year, and on the right is the factory. In some cases, the year and the plant are replaced, or the location of all divisions is completely reversed.

Fascist Germany.

The cartridges and their marking in Fascist Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because cartridges were produced at factories in all occupied countries of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Figure 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: on top is the letter P with numbers, below is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In figures 15-17 we see some more varieties of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Fig. 18 we see the capsules of the supposedly Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top - Z, at the bottom is the month of manufacture, on the left and right is the year. There is an option when “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber at the bottom is 7.92.

• Fig. 19-23 German liners G. Genshov and Co. in Durly;
• Figure 24. - PBC, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Fig 25 and 26 - FEM, Karlsruhe.

More options for cartridges of Polish manufacture.

• Figure 27 - Skarzysko-Kamenna;
• Figure 28 and 29 - Pochinsk, Warsaw.

The signs on the cartridges of the Mosin rifle are not depressed, but convex. Above is usually the letter of the manufacturer, below - the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 - Lugansk plant;
• Figure 31 - a plant from Russia;
• Fig 32 - Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Fig 33 - Tula plant;
• Figure 34 - Russian factory;
• Figure 35 - Moscow;
• Figure 36 - Russian-Belgian;
• Figure 37 - Riga;
• Figure 38 - Leningradsky;
• Fig. 39, 40, 41, 42 - different plants in Russia.