Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army in WWII Red Army anti-tank artillery. The birth of artillery special forces

The anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was divided into military and RGK. Military anti-tank artillery was first introduced into the rifle forces in the early 30s of the last century as a “separate anti-tank battery” as part of the rifle division. Due to the lack of material parts, the batteries were fully introduced into rifle units in the year 1936. In 1938 A separate anti-tank division was introduced into the structure of the rifle division.The composition of anti-tank artillery divisions and units in various divisions of the Red Army as of June 11, 1441 is shown in table No. 11 (data as of June 11, 1941 ode, the application does not discuss the system of regimental artillery PTO, batteries divisional 76-mm guns, artillery regiments and separate battalions of antiaircraft artillery divisions).
Studying the experience of the combat use of Wehrmacht armored forces in 1939-1940, Soviet military experts came to the conclusion that the attacks of enemy tanks could only be resisted by massaging anti-tank fire weapons. A separate cannon artillery regiment of the RGK, armed with 76 mm F-11 guns and 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, was chosen as the experimental organizational form of this massaging. In total, four such regiments were formed in KOVO and ZAPOVO. These were the first anti-tank artillery units of the RGK. But the brigade was determined by the results of the activities of the regiments by the new structure of the military unit of anti-tank defense.
On October 14, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR turned to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with proposals to conduct NEW organizational events in the Red Army in the first half of 1941. In particular, it was proposed:

Form 20 machine-gun and artillery motorized brigades with powerful cannon and machine gun weapons, designed to fight and counter tank and mechanized enemy forces. The deployment of E teams have:
and). L VO - 5 brigades.
b) Pribovo - 4 brigades.
at). ZAPOVO - 3 brigades.
d). KOVO - 5 brigades,
e). ZabNO- 1 team.
with). FEF - 2 brigades ... ".
It was proposed that three artillery regiments of the fortified areas of KOVO and OdVO, as well as all four separate artillery regiments armed with 76-mm guns and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, created temporarily to strengthen the KOVO and ZapOVO troops, be invited to form brigades.
Permission to form was obtained, and on November 4, 1940, the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR as part of the Red Army's Armored Forces began the formation of 20 machine gun-artillery motorized brigades with a deadline for staffing the brigades with personnel and training material on January 1, 1941. The receipt of material and equipment was supposed to happen gradually as it came from industry. Soon the phrase “machine gun-artillery” was canceled, and the brigades became known as “motorized”, confusing some publications on the history of the pre-war Red Army, where they were called “motorized rifle”. brigades were formed according to the wartime states No. 05 / 100-05 / 112 (scheme 1).

In total, the brigade was supposed to have: 6199 people, 17 T-26 tanks, 19 armored vehicles, machine guns: D11 - 56, easel - 156, large-caliber anti-aircraft - 48. Mortars: 50 mm -90.82 mm - 28, 107 mm - 1 2. guns: 45 mm anti-tank - 30.76 mm F-22 - 42.37 mm automatic anti-aircraft - 12, 76 mm or 85 mm anti-aircraft - 36, tractors - 82. vehicles - 545.

The formation of the brigades were addressed: 4th (KOVO) and 5th (ZAPOVO) cannon artillery regiments. The 48th reserve artillery regiment of the OdVO, the 191st rifle regiment of the Grodekovsky UR of the Far Eastern Front. Motorized brigades were formed in the following military districts (fronts): LVO - 1. 4.7, 10th; Pribovo - 2,% 8, 11th, ZAPOVO - 3, 9, 13, 14th, KOVO - 6, 15, 18, 20, 22nd, OdVO - 12th and on the Far Eastern Front - 16 and 23 -I am.
Considering the structure of the motorized brigade, one can notice the main drawback - the 76 and 85 mm anti-aircraft guns were not quite suitable for anti-tank defense because of their overall dimensions and the absence of an armor shield. In addition, the divisions armed with these guns throughout the state did not have anti-aircraft anti-aircraft fire control devices (PUAZO) and rangefinders, which did not allow their use for air defense purposes.

As it often happened in the domestic Armed Forces, having not had time to staff and train, in February-March 1941 all the brigades were disbanded, equipment and personnel were not used for new formations - infantry divisions of 6,000 and motorized divisions of mechanized corps. For example, in the LVO on the basis of the 4th brigade, by July 1, 1941, the 237th rifle division was formed, from the 10th brigade - the 177th rifle division, in the OdVO on the basis of the 12th brigade - the 218th motorized division 18- go mechanized corps. in PribOVO on the basis of the 11th brigade - the 188th Infantry Division.

At the beginning of 1911, the head of the GAU of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Kulik, informed the leadership of the Red Army intelligence data that the German army was re-equipping its troops with accelerated tanks with increased thickness, in the fight against which all of our 45-mm artillery would ineffective. The intelligence received most likely dealt with captured French B-1 bis tanks. having armor 60 mm thick. Just in the spring of 19-11, a small number of these machines were rearmed with flamethrowers and with the K-2 index they entered service with individual Wehrmacht tank battalions.

Be that as it may, the leaders of the People’s Commissariat of Defense took this information quite seriously. As a result, before the war itself, the production of 45 mm anti-tank and 76 mm divisional guns was discontinued, and instead preparations for the production of 107-mm guns were hastily conducted.

In addition, on April 23, 1911, by decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of the Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Socialist Republic No. 1112-459ss "On new formations in the Red Army", it was planned to form ten anti-tank artillery brigades of the RUK by June 1, 1941:
- Management brigade:
- 2 artillery regiments:
- Staff battery;
- Mine sapper battalion;
- Motor transport battalion.

According to the state, the brigade had 5322 people, 48 76-mm guns of the 1936 model (F-22), 48 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, 24 107-mm M-6O guns, 16 - 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. 12 heavy machine guns, 93 light machine guns DT. 584 trucks.
123 special vehicles, 11 cars and 165 tractors (Scheme 2).

Brigades were formed in Kiev (1. 2, 3,4 and 5th). Western (6. 7.8th) and Baltic (9th and 10th) Special Military Districts. All brigades were created at the ball formed in February - April 1941, infantry divisions of the 6 thousandth staff of the state N * 4/120. The brigade management was formed from the headquarters of the chiefs of artillery divisions, the rest of the units and units from howitzer and light artillery regiments of the entire anti-aircraft artillery divisions, separate battalions of communications, separate combat engineer battalions, car companies to transport divisions. Missing personnel came from other parts of the KOVO. ZANOVO and Surf. The brigades equipped with vehicles and tractors were supposed to be locked up in the second half of 1941.

For example, in the ZapOVO, all brigades were formed on the basis of three rifle divisions that arrived in the district in the first half of May 1941 from the Moscow (22-4 and 231st regiments) and Siberian (201st regiments) military districts.

Commanders were nominated as brigade commanders, mainly to the number of artillery chiefs of rifle and mechanized corps or divisions. For example, the commander of the 1st Anti-tank artillery brigade was assigned the chief of artillery of the 2nd mechanized corps of the OdVO, major general of artillery K. Moskalenko, and the commander of the 1st brigade, the head of artillery of the 160th infantry division of the MVO, Colonel M. Nedelin. Interestingly, both of these brigade commanders were subsequently the first and second Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

It was believed that the anti-tank artillery brigade was able to create a density of 20-25 anti-tank guns per 1 km of front at the front with a width of 5-6 km and repel the attack of one or two enemy tank divisions in cooperation with other types of troops.
Apparently, the presence of ten anti-tank defense brigades seemed insufficient, therefore, to reinforce the anti-tank capabilities of the troops by a directive of the General Staff of the Red Army on May 16, 1941, 50 tank regiments and several separate reconnaissance battalions of newly formed mechanized corps before they received tanks by July 1, 1941, 76 mm n 45 mm cannons and machine guns DT from the calculation: for the tank POLK 18 45-MM and 24 76-MM guns and 14 machine guns, for the reconnaissance battalion of 18 45 mm cannons.

Verification of the implementation of the ICS) directives of the USSR conducted by the General Staff of the Red Army at the beginning of June 1911 showed that the staffing of brigades with personnel, vehicles and other propertied HOM was carried out slowly. On June 11, 194 1 year, the brigade had from 30 to 78% of the staff number of guns. So. in the 6th iptabr of the RGK, there were only about 11% of the number of cars put to it in the state and there were no tractors at all. Due to the lack of traction means, the 11th igtabr of the RGK could use only 3 divisions of IZ 11. In the 636th artillery regiment, the 9th iptabr of the rgk with 68 guns had only 15 tractors and cars.

The very first battles with the tank units of the Wehrmacht revealed a new mental illness of the soldiers of the Red Army - a disease called "tank fear". The numerous tales of the retreating soldiers about the power and the large number of German tanks, capable of suddenly, quickly producing coverings - "ticks * and surroundings - * boilers * - made an indelible impression on those leading to the front.

At the headquarters of the High Command in the last decade, the nurse made a decision On the formation of separate anti-tank artillery regiments of the RGK according to staff No. 04/133 (wartime) with a total number of 1,551 people without a junior command staff, 107-mm gun divisions and air defense divisions. On June 30, 1941, but the directives of the General Staff of the Red Army began the formation of such regiments in Oryol (753rd ap readiness for the morning of July 7. 761st ap readiness for July 7, 7b5th ap. Readiness for August 15) and Kharkiv ("64th ap. Term of readiness by August 15) military districts. Difficulties in staffing the material part led to the fact that in order to accelerate the formation of directives of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 71 / org and 72 / org of July 18, 1911, all four the regiment was reorganized according to a paid calculation as a part of five 4-gun battalion of 85-mm zeni guns. They received the name "artillery regiments VET".

On the formation of anti-tank artillery regiments, air defense units were thrown, which had 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. So, the 509th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (commander - Major V. A. Gerasimov) met the beginning of the war as part of the 4th Air Defense Division in Lviv. The batteries of the regiment on the outskirts of the city destroyed at least 11 enemy aircraft. After numerous battles, the regiment concentrated on July 7, 1941 in the Ignatopol camps near Korosten. where on July 8 it was reorganized into the 509th anti-tank artillery regiment (since 1942 - the 3rd Guards artillery regiment of the anti-tank regiment).

Decree No. 172ss of the GOKO dated July 16, 1941 “On the Mozhaisk Line of Defense”, commander of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General P. Artemyev was allowed to remove 200 85-mm guns from Moscow’s air defense and form 10 light artillery (anti-tank regiments (five batteries each) from them in each regiment.) The shelf life of these regiments (No. 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876. 877, 878.879, 880) was set to a minimum of July 18–20.

Decree No. 735cc of the GKOQ dated October 5, 1941 “On the formation of 24 VET regiments. armed with 85 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns - to strengthen the anti-tank defense of the army of the Western Front, it was prescribed to form 4 artillery regiments of the anti-terrorist operation due to the 1st air defense corps, which covered the capital from the air. Each regiment consisted of 8 - 85 mm and 8 - 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, the deadline was set on October 6. In addition, But by the same decree, another 20 artillery regiments of the NTO of the same composition were formed in the Moscow Military District, but with the possibility of replacing the 37-mm anti-tank guns with 45 mm. The deadline for the first six regiments was set on the 8th. the next four on the 10th and the remaining ten by October 15th.
In the Leningrad Direction, on July 5, 1941, the 2nd Air Defense Corps allocated 100 anti-aircraft guns with the best crews to strengthen and support the ground forces and sent them to anti-tank defense. By order of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front on August 11, 115. 189. The 194th and 351st anti-aircraft artillery regiments additionally formed four anti-tank divisions and sent them to anti-tank defense in the Southern fortified area.

All further formation of anti-tank regiments was carried out in 4 or 6-battery composition. The number of batteries in a regiment was determined mainly by the presence of the material part at the time of formation, as well as by the desire to experimentally find out the most profitable form of organization of the regiment. It was believed that a regiment of such composition was maneuverable, easily manageable, it was easier to staff, materiel and personnel due to its small size.

In total, in 1941 it was normalized and sent to the front according to some sources - 72, according to others - at least 90 NTO artillery regiments. In addition, in the Leningrad Military District in July 1941, the 14th artillery brigade of the VET of two field composition was formed, which took part in the hostilities on the Northern (subsequently Leningrad) front.

The experience of the first battles showed. that the anti-tank brigades of the RGCs are a powerful means of fighting tanks. At the same time, they also revealed shortcomings - the difficulty of managing units and subunits, the bulkiness of the organizational structure. Numerous management links (brigade-regiment - division - battery) did not allow to quickly and timely bring information to the performers, process it in a short time, making a timely decision. The maneuverable nature of the slaughterhouses gave rise to rapid changes in the situation and the balance of forces and means in certain sectors of the front. The success of repelling enemy tank attacks in many respects depended on the continuous control of brigade units and divisions on speed
their maneuver on threatened areas and the timely opening of fire.

The brigade organization of anti-tank artillery made it difficult to meet these requirements. Regiments of anti-tank brigades, as a rule, acted separately and often at a considerable distance from one another, which not only made it difficult for them to be controlled by the brigade commander, but sometimes completely excluded him. At the same time, it was very difficult for the regiment commander to manage the actions of six divisions. The brigades, having accepted the first attacks of German tanks, disappeared in the crucible of the battles of the first year of the war: 1st — in September as part of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front, 2nd — in August as part of the 12th Army of the Southern Front, 3rd — in August as part of the 6th Army of the Southern Front, 1st — in November as part of the 18th Army of the Southern Front; 5th — in October as part of the 40th Army of the South-Western Front, 6, 7 and 8th - in June-July as part of the Western Front. 9th - in September as part of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front and 10th in October as part of the North-Western Front.

In the military anti-tank artillery, in connection with the large losses of 45 mm guns, four times overlapping revenues from industry, as well as the formation of a significant number of new rifle and cavalry divisions, it was decided to reduce the number of 45 mm guns in rifle divisions. On July 29, 19-11, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the new staff of the infantry division No. 04/600 (wartime), to which newly formed divisions and divisions were restored that were recovering from the fighting. Therefore, the board was completely excluded - a platoon of 45 mm guns of the rifle battalion and a separate artillery division of the 45 mm guns of the rifle division. A total of 18 45-mm guns remained in the rifle division instead of 54 in the pre-war state. In July 1941, a new staff of light cavalry division No. 07/3 (wartime) was introduced in the cavalry, according to which the number of cavalry regiments was reduced to three, and 45 mm cannons in each regiment to two. Thus, the cavalry division had only 6 45-mm guns instead of 16 in the pre-war state. At such headquarters, 81 cavalry divisions were formed there in 1911.

To some extent, the decrease in the number of anti-tank guns was offset by the start of production in October and the arrival of Simonov and Degtyarev anti-tank rifles at the front in November. However, at first the design of anti-tank rifles went with great problems. It came to the point that on August 10, 1941, by the order of GO KO No. 453ss at the Tula Arms Plant, the German 7.92-mm anti-tank gun was launched into the series, and by the Goko resolution No. 661ss of September 11, the anti-tank cartridge of caliber 7 .92- was adopted by the Red Army. mm

The staff of a separate rifle brigade No. 04/730 (wartime) of October 15, 1941 included a separate anti-tank battalion with a three-battery composition (12- 57th anti-tank guns of the 1941 model (ZIS-2)). On December 6, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the next staff of the rifle division No. 04/750 (wartime), in which a company of anti-tank rifles (27 anti-tank guns) was introduced into the rifle regiment, a battery of 45 mm cannons (6 guns), and also the divisions were restored separate anti-tank division (12–57-MM guns. 8 PTR). In total, the new state had a 12–57-mm division, 18–45-mm guns and 89 PTR.
On January 1, 1942, in the active army and in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, there were: one artillery brigade. 57 artillery regiments and two separate artillery divisions of the VET. They were on the following fronts:
- Leningradsky - 14 apr VET, 1.2. 3.4. 5, 6.7, b90ap PTO;
- Volkhovsky - 884 AP vocational training;
- North-West - 171.698, 759 ap PTO);
- Kalininsky - 873 ap. 213 OAD VET;
- Western - 289. 296, 304, 316. 483. 509. 533, 540. 551. 593. 600. 610. 6-I, 694, 703, 766. 768.863.868,869.871,989,992 ap, 275 oad VET:
- Bryansk - 569.1002 ap PTO;
- South-West - 338. 582, 591, 595, 651. 738,760. 76-1 ap VET,
- Southern - 186.521.530.558.665.727.754. 756 ap PTO:
- 7th Separate Army - 514 ap PTO; Reserve VGK Bet - 702.765 an IITO.

More than 30 VET regiments were lost in the first year of the war. Previously known numbers of the disbanded or re-formed artillery regiments of the PTO are 18. 24, 39.79,117.121.197.367.395.421.452.453,455. 525, 559. 598. 603, 689, 696, 697. 699. 700, 704, 753. 758, 761, 872, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880. The 885th and regiment of Major Bogdanov of Leningradsky front.

For skillful hostilities, by order of the NCO of the USSR No. 4 of January 8, 1942, five artillery regiments of the NTO of the Western and one regiment of the South-Western fronts were transformed into guards; 289, 296, 509, 760, 304, 871th respectively in 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6th guards.

The release of the required number of 76-mm guns F-22USV allowed them to replace 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in anti-tank artillery units. Decree GOKO No. GOKO-1530SS of April 3, 1942 -On the replacement and removal from anti-tank regiments of the fronts of 85 mm anti-aircraft guns * during April 1942, 272 guns were withdrawn from the fronts:
- Western - 98,
- Kalininsky-20,
- North-West - 6,
- Volkhovsky - 10.
- Crimean - 8,
- South-80.
- Southwest-42.
- 7th Separate Army - 8.

All these guns were transferred to the Moscow Air Defense Corps, and in return from industry they will also receive in April the same number of SPM guns. A little later, the new GKO decision No. 1541 of April 5, 1942 “On strengthening the air defense of the mountains. Moscow to strengthen the air defense of the capital was required to transfer due to anti-tank artillery regiments of the fronts another 100 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in April, and another 80 guns - in May 1942.

On April 3, 1942, the decree of the GKOKO No. 1531ss began the formation of 20 artillery regiments of the RGK (20 76-mm cannons F-22USV each) with a deadline of April 25 (10 regiments) and May 10, 1942.
Decree GKOKO No. GKOKO-1607ss of April 16, 1942 "On the organization, staffing and armament of the fighter brigade" began to form new anti-tank formations of the combined arms type - separate fighter brigades (onbr). According to the approved organization, the brig yes included:
and). Management of the brigade (with a communications platoon and a motorcycle platoon);
b) Two anti-tank battalions (72 1GGR each);
at). Anti-tank artillery regiment (four batteries of 76-mm guns ZIS-3 (The People's Commissariat of Defense in the draft resolution proposed guns F-22USV, but with the hand and red pencil of I.V. Stalin in the text of the Resolution -USV- was corrected to * ZIS-3 * -
Note authors), three batteries of 45 mm guns, one battery of 37 mm anti-aircraft guns):
d). Separate engineering mine battalion;
e). Separate tank battalion (21 T-34 tanks, 11 T-60 or T-70 tanks);
e). Separate company of machine gunners (100 people);
g). Separate mortar division (8 -82 mm and 4 - 120 mm mortars).

In total, the fighter brigade had 1 ~ 9S people. 453 submachine guns, 10 light machine guns. 144 anti-tank rifles. 4 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. 12-45 mm anti-tank guns, 16 - 76 mm ZIS-3 guns, 8-82 mm and 4 120 mm mortars, 33 tanks, 193 cars and 22 motorcycles.

The decree prescribed the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR formed 25 fighter brigades with a deadline of the first five by May 5. ten by May 20 and ten by June 28, 1942. In the Red Army, individual fighter brigades were held in states No. 0 4/270 - 04/276 (wartime).

The following decree No. GOKO-1901 ss of June 8, 1942 introduced a new organization of anti-tank formations. Twelve formed fighter brigades were combined into four fighter divisions (id), three brigades each. The division was formed:
- in the Moscow Military District - 1st and 2nd; in the Volga Military District - 3rd;
- in the Ural Military District - 4th. Fighter divisions supposed
use: 1st — on the Southwest, 2nd — on Bryansk, 3rd — on the West, and 4th — on the Kalinin Fronts.

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Data source: quote from the magazine "Front-line illustration for 2003-5" "Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army"

Soviet anti-tank artillery played a crucial role in the Great Patriotic War, it accounted for about 70% of all destroyed German. Anti-tank warriors fighting “to the last”, often at the cost of their own lives, repelled the Panzervaffe attacks.

The structure and material of anti-tank units in the course of hostilities was continuously improved. Until the fall of 1940, anti-tank guns were part of the rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. Thus, anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were interspersed in the organizational structure of the compounds, being their integral part. The infantry battalion of the infantry regiment of the pre-war state had a platoon of 45-mm guns (two guns). The rifle regiment and the motorized rifle regiment had a battery of 45 mm cannons (six guns). In the first case, horses were the means of traction, in the second, the Komsomolets specialized tracked armored tractors. The rifle division and the motorized division included a separate anti-tank division of eighteen 45-mm guns. The anti-tank division was first introduced into the state of the Soviet infantry division in 1938.
However, maneuver with anti-tank guns was possible at that time only inside the division, and not on the scale of a corps or army. The command had very limited opportunities to strengthen anti-tank defense in tank dangerous directions.

Shortly before the war began the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGC. According to the state, each brigade had to have forty-eight 76-mm guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The staff of the brigade was 5322 people. By the beginning of the war, the formation of brigades was not completed. Organizational difficulties and the general unfavorable course of hostilities did not allow the first anti-tank brigades to fully realize their potential. However, already in the first battles, the brigades demonstrated the wide possibilities of independent anti-tank formation.

With the outbreak of World War II, the anti-tank capabilities of the Soviet troops were severely tested. Firstly, most often rifle divisions had to fight, occupying the front of defense exceeding the statutory standards. Secondly, the Soviet troops had to deal with the German tactics of “tank wedge”. It consisted in the fact that the tank regiment of the tank division of the Wehrmacht struck at a very narrow section of the defense. The density of attacking tanks was 50-60 vehicles per kilometer of the front. Such a number of tanks in a narrow section of the front inevitably saturated the anti-tank defense.

Large losses of anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war led to a decrease in the number of anti-tank guns in the rifle division. The rifle division of the state of July 1941 had only eighteen 45-mm anti-tank guns instead of fifty-four in the pre-war state. In July, a platoon of 45 mm cannons from a rifle battalion and a separate anti-tank division were completely excluded. The latter was restored to the state of the infantry division in December 1941. The lack of anti-tank guns to some extent made up for the recently adopted anti-tank guns. In December 1941, a PTR platoon was introduced at a regimental level in a rifle division. In total, there were 89 PTRs in the state division.

In the field of organizing artillery, the general tendency of the end of 1941 was to increase the number of independent anti-tank units. On January 1, 1942, the army and the reserve of the Supreme High Command had: one artillery brigade (on the Leningrad Front), 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. Following the results of the autumn battles, five artillery regiments of the anti-terrorist operation received the rank of guards. Two of them received a guard for fighting near Volokolamsk - they supported the 316th Infantry Division of I.V. Panfilov.
1942 was a period of increasing the number and enlargement of independent anti-tank units. April 3, 1942 was followed by a decree of the State Defense Committee on the formation of a fighter brigade. The staff in the brigade was 1795 people, twelve 45-mm guns, sixteen 76-mm guns, four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 144 anti-tank guns. By the next decree of June 8, 1942, the twelve formed fighter brigades were combined into fighter divisions, three brigades each.

The stage for the Red Army’s anti-tank artillery was Order No. 0528 of the USSR NCO signed by I.V. Stalin, according to which: the status of fighter-anti-tank units was increased, a double cash salary was established for the personnel, a cash bonus was established for each tank that was wrecked, the entire command and personnel fighter-anti-tank artillery units were put on a special account and was to be used only in these parts.

A distinctive sign of anti-tankers was the sleeve sign in the form of a black rhombus with a red edging with crossed gun trunks. The increase in the status of anti-tankers was accompanied by the formation in the summer of 1942 of new anti-tank regiments. Thirty light (twenty-76 mm guns) and twenty anti-tank artillery regiments (twenty-45 mm guns each) were formed.
The regiments were formed in a short time and immediately thrown into battle on the threatened sections of the front.

In September 1942, ten more anti-tank regiments of twenty 45 mm cannons were formed. Also in September 1942, an additional battery of four 76-mm guns was introduced into the most distinguished regiments. In November 1942, part of the anti-tank regiments was merged into fighter divisions. By January 1, 1943, the Red Army's fighter-anti-tank artillery consisted of 2 fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, 2 heavy fighter-anti-tank regiments, 168 fighter-anti-tank regiments, 1 fighter-anti-tank division.

The improved system of anti-tank defense of the Red Army was given the Germans the name "Pakfront" (Pakfront). CANCER is the German abbreviation for anti-tank gun - Panzerabwehrkannone. Instead of the linear arrangement of the guns along the defended front at the beginning of the war, they were united by groups under the same control. This made it possible to concentrate the fire of several guns on one target. The basis of anti-tank defense were anti-tank areas. Each anti-tank area consisted of separate anti-tank strongholds (PTOs), which are in fire communication with each other. “To be in fire communication with each other” - means the ability to conduct neighboring fire-fighting weapons on one target. The TVET was saturated with all types of firearms. The basis of the PTOP fire system was 45-mm guns, 76-mm regimental guns, partially cannon batteries of divisional artillery and anti-tank fighter artillery units.

The finest hour of the anti-tank artillery was the battle on the Kursk in the summer of 1943. At that time, 76-mm divisional guns were the main means of anti-tank fighter units and formations. "Forty-five" accounted for about a third of the total number of anti-tank guns on the Kursk Bulge. A long pause in hostilities at the front made it possible to improve the condition of units and formations due to the receipt of equipment from industry and the re-equipment of anti-tank regiments with personnel.

The last stage in the evolution of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the enlargement of its parts and the appearance of self-propelled guns as part of the anti-tank artillery. By the beginning of 1944, all fighter divisions and individual combined-arms fighter brigades were reorganized into fighter anti-tank brigades. On January 1, 1944, 50 fighter anti-tank brigades and 141 fighter anti-tank regiments were in the anti-tank artillery. By order of the NPO No. 0032 of August 2, 1944, one each SU-85 regiment (21 self-propelled guns) was introduced into the composition of fifteen fighter anti-tank brigades. In reality, only eight brigades received self-propelled guns.

Particular attention was paid to the training of anti-tank brigade personnel, and targeted combat training of artillerymen was organized to combat new German tanks and assault guns. Special instructions appeared in the anti-tank units: “Memo to the artilleryman - fighter of enemy tanks” or “Memo to combat the Tiger tanks”. And in the armies, special rear firing ranges were equipped, where gunners trained in firing at mock tanks, including moving ones.

At the same time as the artillery mastery improved, tactics improved. With the quantitative saturation of troops with anti-tank weapons, the “fire bag” method has increasingly been used. The guns were placed in "anti-tank nests" of 6-8 guns in a radius of 50-60 meters and were well camouflaged. Nests were located on the ground to achieve flanking over long distances with the possibility of concentration of fire. Passing tanks moving in the first echelon, fire opened suddenly, on the flank, at medium and short distances.

In the offensive, anti-tank guns were quickly pulled up after the advancing units in order to support them with fire if necessary.

Anti-tank artillery in our country began in August 1930, when a secret treaty was signed with Germany in the framework of military-technical cooperation, according to which the Germans pledged to help the USSR organize gross production of 6 artillery systems. For the implementation of the contract in Germany was created a shell company "BYTAST" (limited liability company "Bureau for technical works and studies").

Among the other guns proposed by the USSR was an anti-tank 37 mm gun. The development of this tool, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, was completed at the company Rheinmetall Borzig in 1928. The first samples of the gun, which received the name So 28 (Tankabwehrkanone, i.e., anti-tank gun - the word Panzer came into use later), were put to the test in 1930, and in 1932 deliveries to the troops began. The So 28 gun had a 45-gauge barrel with a horizontal wedge bolt that provided a fairly high rate of fire - up to 20 rds / min. The carriage with sliding tubular beds provided a large horizontal angle of 60 °, but the running gear with wooden wheels was designed only for horse traction.

In the early 30s, this gun pierced the armor of any tank, perhaps it was the best in its class, far ahead of developments in other countries.

After the modernization, having received wheels with pneumatic tires that can be towed by a car, an improved carriage and an improved sight, it was put into service under the designation 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 (Panzerabwehrkanone 35/36).
Remaining until 1942 the main anti-tank weapon of the Wehrmacht.

The German gun was launched for production at the plant near Moscow. Kalinina (No. 8), where she received the factory index 1-K. The company mastered the production of a new gun with great difficulty, the guns were made semi-artificially, with manual adjustment of parts. In 1931, the factory presented 255 guns to the customer, but did not deliver a single one due to the poor build quality. In 1932, 404 guns were delivered, in 1933 - another 105.

Despite problems with the quality of the manufactured guns, the 1-K was a fairly advanced anti-tank gun for 1930. Its ballistics made it possible to hit all tanks of that time, at a distance of 300 m, an armor-piercing projectile normally pierced 30 mm armor. The gun was very compact, its light weight allowed the calculation to easily move it around the battlefield. The disadvantages of the guns, which led to its rapid discontinuation, were the weak fragmentation effect of the 37-mm projectile and the absence of suspension. In addition, the released guns were notable for their low build quality. The adoption of this weapon was considered a temporary measure, since the leadership of the Red Army wanted to have a more versatile gun combining the functions of an anti-tank and battalion gun, and 1-K, due to its small caliber and weak fragmentation shell, did not fit this role well.

1-K was the first specialized anti-tank gun of the Red Army and played a large role in the development of this species. Very soon, it began to be replaced by a 45 mm anti-tank gun, becoming almost invisible against its background. In the late 30s, 1-K began to be withdrawn from the troops and transferred to storage, remaining in operation only as training.

At the beginning of the war, all the guns available in the warehouses were thrown into battle, since in 1941 there was a shortage of artillery to equip a large number of newly formed formations and make up for huge losses.

Of course, by 1941, the armor penetration characteristics of the 37-mm 1-K anti-tank gun could no longer be considered satisfactory, it could confidently hit only with light tanks and armored personnel carriers. Against medium tanks, this gun could only be effective when firing on board at close (less than 300 m) distances. Moreover, Soviet armor-piercing shells were significantly inferior in armor penetration to German ones of a similar caliber. On the other hand, this gun could use captured 37 mm ammunition, in this case its armor penetration increased significantly, even exceeding the similar characteristics of the 45 mm gun.

It was not possible to establish any details of the combat use of these guns, probably almost all of them were lost in 1941.

The very great historical significance of 1-K lies in the fact that it became the founder of the series of the most numerous Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns and Soviet anti-tank artillery as a whole.

During the "liberation campaign" in western Ukraine, several hundred Polish 37-mm anti-tank guns and a significant amount of ammunition were captured.

Initially, they were sent to warehouses, and at the end of 1941 they were transferred to the army, because of the large losses of the first months of the war, there was a large shortage of artillery, especially anti-tank. In 1941, for this gun GAU issued a "Short Description, Operating Instructions."

The 37-mm anti-tank gun developed by Beaufors was a very successful weapon, capable of successfully fighting armored vehicles protected by bulletproof armor.

The gun had a sufficiently high initial velocity of the projectile and rate of fire, small dimensions and weight (which facilitated the task of masking the gun on the ground and rolling it on the battlefield by calculation forces), and was also adapted for fast transportation by mechanical traction. Compared to the German 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun, the Polish gun had better penetration, due to the higher initial velocity of the projectile.

In the second half of the 30s there was a tendency to increase the thickness of tank armor, in addition, the Soviet military wanted to get an anti-tank gun capable of providing fire support to the infantry. To do this, it was necessary to increase the caliber.
The new 45 mm anti-tank gun was created by applying a 45 mm barrel to the carriage of the 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1931 year. The carriage was also improved - the suspension of the wheel drive was introduced. The semi-automatic shutter basically repeated the 1-K scheme and allowed to do 15-20 rds / min.

The 45 mm shell had a mass of 1.43 kg and was more than 2 times heavier than the 37 mm. At a distance of 500 m, an armor-piercing shell normally pierced 43 mm armor. At the time of adoption, the 45 mm anti-tank gun arr. 1937 penetrated the armor of any existing tank then.
The fragmentation 45-mm grenade at break gave about 100 fragments that retained destructive force when flying along the front 15 meters and 5-7 meters deep. When fired, the projectile bullets form a striking sector along the front up to 60 m and a depth of 400 m .
Thus, the 45-mm anti-tank gun had good anti-personnel capabilities.

From 1937 to 1943, 37,354 guns were produced. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the 45-mm gun was discontinued, as our military leadership believed that the new German tanks would have an impenetrable thickness of the frontal armor for these guns. Shortly after the outbreak of war, the gun was again launched into production.

The 45-mm cannon of the 1937 model relied on the state for anti-tank platoons of infantry battalions of the Red Army (2 guns) and anti-tank divisions of infantry divisions (12 guns). They were also armed with separate anti-tank regiments, which included 4-5 four-gun batteries.

For its time in terms of armor penetration, the Forty-five was quite adequate. Nevertheless, the insufficient penetration ability on the 50 mm frontal armor of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf H and Pz Kpfw IV Ausf F1 tanks is beyond doubt. Often this was due to the low quality of armor-piercing shells. Many consignments of shells had a technological defect. If the heat treatment regime was violated in production, the shells turned out to be too hard and as a result cracked on the armor of the tank, however, in August 1941 the problem was solved - technical changes were made to the production process (localizers were introduced).

To improve armor penetration, a 45-mm projectile with a tungsten core was used, which pierced 66 mm armor at a distance of 500 m normal, and 88 mm armor when firing at a dagger fire distance of 100 m.

With the advent of sub-caliber shells, the “forty-five” became “tough” with the later modifications of the Pz Kpfw IV tanks. The thickness of the frontal armor, which did not exceed 80 mm.

At first, new shells were specially registered and issued individually. For the unjustified consumption of sub-caliber shells, the gun commander and gunner could be brought to the tribunal.

In the hands of experienced and tactically skilled commanders and trained crews, the 45-mm anti-tank gun posed a serious threat to enemy armored vehicles. Its positive qualities were high mobility and ease of disguise. However, for a better defeat of the armored shells, a more powerful gun was urgently needed, which became the 45-mm arr. 1942 M-42, developed and adopted for service in 1942.

The 45-mm anti-tank gun M-42 was obtained by modernizing the 45-mm gun of the 1937 model at plant No. 172 in Motovilikha. The modernization consisted in lengthening the barrel (from 46 to 68 calibers), strengthening the propellant charge (the mass of gunpowder in the sleeve increased from 360 to 390 grams) and a number of technological measures to simplify mass production. The thickness of the shield shield armor was increased from 4.5 mm to 7 mm for better protection of the calculation from rifle armor-piercing bullets.

As a result of modernization, the initial velocity of the projectile increased by almost 15% - from 760 to 870 m / s. At a distance of 500 meters normal, an armor-piercing projectile pierced 61 mm, and a sub-caliber projectile pierced -81 mm armor. According to the memoirs of veterans - anti-tankers, the M-42 had very high accuracy and relatively low recoil when fired. This made it possible to fire with a high rate of fire without correction of aiming.

Serial production of 45 mm guns mod. 1942 was started in January 1943 and was carried out only at the factory number 172. In the most stressful periods, the factory produced 700 of these guns per month. In total for the years 1943-1945, 10 843 guns of the arr. 1942 year. Their production continued after the war. The new guns, as they were released, went to rearm anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades, which had 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937 year.

As it soon became clear, the M-42 armor penetration for fighting German heavy tanks with powerful Pz anti-shell armor. Kpfw. V Panther and Pz. Kpfw. VI "Tiger" was not enough. More successful was the firing of ammunition shells at the sides, stern and chassis. Nevertheless, due to the established mass production, mobility, ease of camouflage and low cost, the gun remained in service until the very end of the war.

In the late 30s, the issue of creating anti-tank guns capable of hitting tanks with anti-shell armor became an acute issue. Calculations showed the futility of the 45-mm caliber in terms of a sharp increase in armor penetration. Various research organizations examined caliber 55 and 60 mm, but in the end, it was decided to stay on the caliber 57 mm. Tools of this caliber were used in the tsarist army and (guns of Nordenfeld and Hotchkiss). A new shell was developed for this caliber - a standard cartridge case from a 76-mm divisional gun with re-compression of the cartridge barrel to a 57 mm caliber was adopted as its cartridge case.

In 1940, the design team led by Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin set about designing a new anti-tank gun that met the tactical and technical requirements of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). The main feature of the new gun was the use of a long barrel with a length of 73 calibers. The gun at a distance of 1000 m pierced armor-piercing shell armor 90 mm thick

A prototype gun was made in October 1940 and passed factory tests. And in March 1941, the gun was adopted by the official name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941 " In total, from June to December 1941, about 250 guns were delivered.

57-mm guns from experimental parties took part in the hostilities. Some of them were mounted on the Komsomolets light crawler tractor - this was the first Soviet anti-tank self-propelled gun, which, due to the imperfection of the chassis, was not very successful.

The new anti-tank gun easily penetrated the armor of all then existing German tanks. However, due to the position of the GAU, the release of the gun was discontinued, and the entire production reserve and equipment were mothballed.

In 1943, with the advent of the Germans heavy tanks, the production of guns was restored. The 1943 model gun had a number of differences from the 1941 guns, aimed primarily at improving the manufacturability of the gun. Nevertheless, the restoration of mass production was difficult - there were technological problems with the manufacture of trunks. Mass production of guns under the name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1943 " ZIS-2 was organized by October - November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities, provided with equipment supplied by Lend-Lease.

From the moment of the resumption of production until the end of the war, more than 9,000 guns entered the troops.

With the restoration of ZIS-2 production in 1943, the guns entered the fighter-anti-tank artillery regiments (iptap), 20 guns per regiment.

Since December 1944, the ZIS-2 was introduced into the states of the guards rifle divisions - into regimental anti-tank batteries and into the fighter-anti-tank division (12 guns). In June 1945, conventional rifle divisions were transferred to a similar state.

The capabilities of the ZIS-2 allowed it to confidently hit the 80-mm frontal armor of the most common German Pz.IV medium tanks and StuG III assault SPGs, as well as the side armor of the Pz.VI Tiger tank at typical battle distances; at distances less than 500 m the frontal armor of the Tiger was also affected.
By the combination of cost and manufacturability, combat and operational-operational characteristics, the ZIS-2 became the best Soviet anti-tank gun of the time of the war.

According to the materials:
http://knowledgegrid.ru/2e9354f401817ff6.html
Shirokorad A. B. The genius of Soviet artillery: Triumph and tragedy of V. Grabin.
A. Ivanov. Artillery of the USSR in the Second World War.

Active work on the creation of self-propelled artillery installations began in the USSR in the early 30s of the XX century, although they were still being designed in 1920. At the end of 1933, the Red Army Mechanization and Motorization Directorate together with the Main Artillery Directorate developed recommendations for including self-propelled artillery installations into the developed "Red Army Artillery Arms System for the second five-year period 1933 - 1938. The new weapons system, approved by the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on January 11, 1934, determined the widespread development and introduction of self-propelled artillery into the troops, and it was planned to start mass production of self-propelled guns already in 1935.

The main work on the creation of self-propelled guns was carried out at plants No. 174 named after Voroshilov and number 185 to them. Kirov under the leadership of talented designers P. Sjachintov and S. Ginzburg. But despite the fact that in 1934 - 1937. a large number of prototypes of self-propelled guns for various purposes were manufactured; they practically did not enter service. And after P. Syachintov was repressed at the end of 1936, the work on creating self-propelled artillery was almost completely curtailed. However, until June 1941, the Red Army received a number of self-propelled artillery mounts for various purposes.

The first to enter the army were SU-1-12 (or SU-12), developed at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. They were a 76-mm regimental cannon mod. 1927, installed on GAZ-ALA or Moreland trucks (the latter were purchased in the United States in the early 1930s for the needs of the Red Army). The gun had an armor shield and armor plate at the rear of the cockpit. In total, from 1934 to 1935 The Kirov plant manufactured 99 of these machines, which were part of the artillery divisions of some mechanized brigades. SU-1-12 were used in battles near Lake Hasan in 1938, on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 - 1940. Their operational experience has shown that they have poor terrain and low survivability on the battlefield. By June 1941, most of the SU-1-12 was badly worn out and needed repair.

In 1935, the Kurchevsky self-propelled gun (SPK), a 76-mm recoilless (in the terminology of the time, dynamo-reactive) gun on the GAZ-TK chassis (a three-axle version of the GAZ-A passenger car), began to enter service with the reconnaissance battalions of the Red Army. The 76-mm recoilless gun was developed by the inventor Kurchevsky among a large range of cannons of a similar design in caliber from 37 to 305 mm. Despite the fact that some of the Kurchevsky guns were produced in large quantities - up to several thousand pieces - they had a lot of design flaws. After Kurchevsky was repressed in 1937, all work on dynamoreactive guns was curtailed. Until 1937, 23 SECs were transferred to the Red Army. Two such installations participated in the Soviet-Finnish war, where they were lost. By June 1941, the troops had about 20 SECs, most of which were faulty.

The only serial pre-war self-propelled artillery mount on a tank chassis was the SU-5. It was developed in 1934 - 1935. at the factory number 185 named. Kirov in the program of the so-called "small triplex." The latter was a single base created on the chassis of the T-26 tank, with three different artillery systems (76 mm cannon model 1902/30, 122 mm howitzer model 1910/30 and 152 mm mortar mod. 1931). After the manufacture and testing of three self-propelled guns, designated SU-5-1, SU-5-2 and SU-5-3, respectively, the SU-5-2 (with a 122mm howitzer) was adopted by the Red Army. In 1935, an assembly batch of 24 SU-5-2 was made, which entered service with the tank units of the Red Army. SU-5 was used in hostilities near Lake Hasan in 1938 and during the Polish campaign in September 1939. They turned out to be quite efficient vehicles, but had small ammunition load. By June 1941, all 30 SU-5s were in the army, but most of them (with the exception of those in the Far East) were lost in the first weeks of the war.

In addition to the SU-5, the armament of the tank units of the Red Army was another machine that can be classified as a class of self-propelled artillery at a tank base. We are talking about the tank BT-7A (artillery), developed at the Kharkov factory number 183 named. The Comintern in 1934, BT-7A was intended for artillery support of linear tanks on the battlefield, the fight against firepower and enemy fortifications. It differed from the BT-7 linear tank in installing a larger turret with a 76-mm KT-27 gun. Total in 1935 - 1937 units of the Red Army received 155 BT-7A. These machines were used in battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 - 1940. During these conflicts, the BT-7A, but the reviews of the command of the tank units, proved to be from the very best side as an effective means of supporting tanks and infantry on the battlefield. As of June 1, 1941, there were 117 BT-7A tanks in the Red Army.

In addition to self-propelled guns, by the beginning of the war, there were also anti-aircraft self-propelled guns in the Red Army. First of all, these are 76K 3K anti-aircraft guns mounted on YAG-K trucks manufactured by the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant. In 1933 - 1934 the troops received 61 such installations, which at the beginning of the war were part of the units of the Moscow military district. In addition, there were about 2,000 anti-aircraft machine-gun mounts (ZPUs) - four Maxim machine guns mounted in the back of a GAZ-AAA car.

Thus, by June 1941, the Red Army had about 2,300 self-propelled artillery installations for various purposes. Moreover, most of them were cars with weapons installed on them without any armor protection. In addition, it should be borne in mind that ordinary civilian trucks were used as a base for them, having very low cross-country traffic, not to mention rough terrain. Therefore, these machines could not be used to directly support troops on the battlefield. There were only 145 full-fledged self-propelled guns on the tank chassis (28 SU-5 and 117 BT-7A). In the very first weeks of the war (June - July 1941), most of them were lost.

During the very first battles of the Great Patriotic War, the question arose of the need for the speedy development of an anti-tank self-propelled artillery mount capable of quickly changing positions and fighting German tank units, which were significantly superior in mobility to units of the Red Army. July 15, 1941 at the factory number 92 in Gorky urgently developed a self-propelled gun ZIS-30, which was a 57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2 mounted on the chassis of the armored tractor "Komsomolets". Due to the lack of tractors, the production of which was discontinued in August, they had to search and seize the Komsomol members from military units, repair them, and only after that install guns on them. As a result of this, the production of the ZIS-30 began in mid-September and ended on October 15. During this time, the Red Army received 101 units. They entered the arsenal of anti-tank batteries of motorized rifle battalions of tank brigades and were used only in battles near Moscow as part of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the South-Western fronts.

Due to large losses in tanks in the summer of 1941, the leadership of the Red Army adopted a decree “On the screening of light tanks and the reservation of tractors”. Among other measures, the manufacture of armored tractors under the KhTZ-16 index was prescribed at the Kharkov Tractor Plant. The KhTZ-16 project was developed at the Scientific Auto-Tractor Institute (NATI) in the month of July. The KhTZ-16 was a somewhat modernized chassis of the STZ-3 agricultural tractor with an armored hull of 15 mm armor mounted on it. The armament of the tractor consisted of a 45-mm tank gun mod. 1932, installed in the front sheet of the hull and having limited angles of fire. In this way. The KhTZ-16 was an anti-tank self-propelled gun, although in the documents of that time it was referred to as an “armored tractor”. The volume of production of the KhTZ-16 was planned to be quite large - upon the delivery of Kharkov in October 1941, at the KhTZ there were 803 chassis ready for armor. But due to problems with the supply of armored plates, the plant manufactured from 50 to 60 (according to various sources) the KhTZ-16, which were used in the battles of the fall - winter of 1941, and some, judging by the photographs, "survived" until the spring of 1942. .

In the summer and autumn of 1941, work on the creation of self-propelled guns was actively carried out at the enterprises of Leningrad, primarily at the factories of Izhorsky, Kirovsky, Voroshilov and Kirov. So, in August, 15 self-propelled guns were made with the installation of a 76-mm regimental gun arr. 1927 on the chassis of the T-26 tank with the tower removed. The gun was installed behind the shield and had a circular fire. These vehicles, which were documented under the index as T-26-self-propelled guns, entered service with tank brigades of the Leningrad Front and functioned quite successfully until 1944.

On the basis of the T-26, anti-aircraft installations were also manufactured. For example, in early September, the 124th Tank Brigade received "two T-26 tanks with 37 mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on them." These machines operated as part of the brigade until the summer of 1943.

In July - August, the Izhora plant manufactured several dozen armored trucks ZIS-5 (the cabin and sides of the cargo platform were completely protected by armor). From the machine, mainly received by the armies of the divisions of the Leningrad People’s Militia Army (LANO), they were armed with a machine gun in the front of the cabin and a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1932, which rolled into the body and could fire forward in the direction of travel. It was supposed to use these "brontasaurs" primarily for fighting from ambushes with German tanks. Judging by the photographs, individual vehicles were still used in the troops when lifting the blockade of Leningrad in the winter of 1944.

In addition, the Kirov plant manufactured several self-propelled guns of the SU-1-12 type with the installation of a 76-mm regimental cannon behind a shield on the chassis of ZIS-5 trucks.

All self-propelled guns created in the first months of the war, had a large number of design flaws due to the fact that they were created in a hurry using available tools and materials. Naturally, there was no question of talking about the mass production of machines created under such conditions.

On March 3, 1942, the People’s Commissar of Tank Industry signed an order to create a special bureau of self-propelled artillery. The special bureau was to promptly develop a single chassis for self-propelled guns using units of the T-60 tank and cars. On the basis of the chassis, it was supposed to create a 76-mm self-propelled assault gun and a 37-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun.

On April 14-15, 1942, a plenary session of the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was held with the participation of representatives from the troops, industry and the People's Commissariat of Armaments (NKV) of the USSR, which discussed the creation of self-propelled artillery. In its decision, the plenum recommended the creation of self-propelled guns for infantry support with a 76-mm gun ZIS-3 and 122-mm howitzer M-30, as well as self-propelled guns with a 152-mm gun-howitzer ML-20 to combat fortifications and a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun to combat air targets.

The decision of the plenum of the GAU Artillery Committee was approved by the State Defense Committee and in June 1942 the People’s Commissariat of the Tank Industry (NKTP), together with the NKV, developed a "self-propelled artillery system for arming the Red Army." At the same time, the NKV was developing and manufacturing the artillery part of the self-propelled guns, and the NKTP was engaged in the design of the chassis. The overall coordination of work on self-propelled guns was carried out by the special bureau of the NKTP, led by the talented designer S. Ginzburg.

In the summer of 1942, the first samples of self-propelled guns were put to the test. It was a 37-mm anti-aircraft and 76-mm assault self-propelled guns of plant No. 37 NKTP. Both cars were made on a single chassis, which was created using units of the T-60 and T-70 tanks. Testing of the machines was successful, and in June 1942 the State Defense Committee ordered the preparation of serial production of self-propelled guns after eliminating the identified shortcomings. However, the beginning of the German attack on Stalingrad required an urgent increase in the production of tanks and work on the creation of self-propelled guns was turned off.

In addition, at the plant No. 592 NKN (in Mytishchi near Moscow), the design of self-propelled guns for the 122 mm M-30 howitzers was carried out on the chassis of the captured German StuG III installation. The prototype, which received the designation assault self-propelled howitzer "Artsturm" or SG-122A, was not tested until September.

On October 19, 1942, with its Decree No. 2429ss, the GKO adopted a decision on the preparation of mass production of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns of the caliber 37 - 122 mm. The lead enterprises for assault self-propelled guns became the factory number 38 named. Kuibyshev (Kirov) and GAZ them. Molotov (Gorky), a 122-mm self-propelled howitzer was developed by Uralmashzavod and plant No. 592 of the NKV. The design deadlines were set rather stringent - by December 1, it was required to report GKOs on the results of testing new ACS samples.

And in November, the first prototypes of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns went to the test. These were the SU-11 (anti-aircraft) and SU-12 (assault) plants No. 38, as well as the GAZ-71 (assault) and GAZ-72 (anti-aircraft) Gorky automobile plants. When creating them, we used the already worked out layout scheme, proposed back in the summer of 1942 by the special bureau of self-propelled guns PKTP - two paired engines located in parallel in front of the machine and the fighting compartment in the stern. The armament of the vehicles consisted of a 76 mm ZIS-3 divisional gun (assault self-propelled guns) and 37 mm 31K guns (anti-aircraft self-propelled guns).

On November 19, the commission that conducted the tests drew up a report on the testing of self-propelled guns of Plant No. 38 and GAZ. In it, the GAZ-71 and GAZ-72 were characterized as vehicles that did not meet the requirements for them and it was recommended to adopt the self-propelled guns of plant No. 38.

At the same time, self-propelled samples of the 122 mm M-30 howitzer: U-35 Uralmashzavod, created on the chassis of the T-34 and SG-122 tank of plant No. 592 NKV, developed on the basis of the captured Pz.Kpfw tank, were tested. III (the last sample was an improved version of CT-122A).

On December 9, 1942, tests of the SU-11, SU-12, SG-122 and U-35 began at the Gorokhovetsky training ground. As a result, the government commission that conducted the tests recommended the adoption of the self-propelled guns SU-76 (SU-12) and SU-122 (U-35) for the armed forces. The SU-11 could not stand the test due to the unsuccessful layout of the fighting compartment of the unfinished installation of the sight and the shortcomings of a number of other mechanisms. The SG-122 was abandoned due to its trophy base (at that time the number of captured tanks was still not large enough).

Even before the completion of the tests of prototypes of self-propelled guns, the GKO decree of November 25, 1942 created the Office of mechanical traction and self-propelled artillery in the system of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. The duties of the new management included control over the production, supply and repair of self-propelled artillery installations. On December 2, 1942, the State Defense Committee made a decision on the development of the production of self-propelled artillery systems SU-12 and SU-122 for arming the Red Army.

At the end of December 1942, the People’s Commissar of Defense, by directives No. 112467ss and 11210ss, demanded the formation of 30 self-propelled artillery regiments of the Headquarters Reserve of the Supreme High Command, armed with new types of installations. By January 1, 1943, the first batch of 25 SU-76 and the same number of SU-122 was sent to the newly formed self-propelled artillery training center.

But already on January 19, in connection with the operation that broke through the blockade of Leningrad, the first two self-propelled artillery regiments formed (1433th and 1434th) were sent to the Volkhov Front by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In March, two new self-propelled artillery regiments were sent to the Western Front - the 1485th and 1487th.

The very first experience of the combat use of self-propelled artillery showed that it was able to provide substantial support with artillery fire for the advancing infantry and tank units. The memorandum of the chief of staff of the artillery of the Red Army to the State Defense Committee member V. Molotov dated April 6, 1943 said: “Experience has shown that self-propelled guns are needed, since no other type of artillery has given such an effect in the continuous tracking of infantry and tank attacks and interaction with them in close combat. Material damage caused to the enemy by self-propelled guns, and the results of the battle pay for the losses ”.

At the same time, the results of the first combat use of self-propelled guns revealed major flaws in their design. For example, in SU-122, frequent breakdowns of the gun mount stopper in the marching and lifting mechanism occurred. In addition, the unsuccessful layout of the combat compartment of self-propelled guns greatly tired of calculating the guns during operation, and insufficient visibility made it difficult for the machine to operate during the battle. But most of the shortcomings of the SU-122 were eliminated quite quickly. Things were much more complicated with the SU-76.

During the very first battles, most of the SU-76s failed due to damage to the gearboxes and main shafts. It was not possible to solve the matter by simply strengthening the design of the shafts and gears of the gearboxes - such self-propelled guns failed just as often.

It soon became clear that the cause of the accidents was the parallel installation of two twin engines running on a common shaft. Such a scheme led to the appearance of resonant torsional vibrations on the shaft and its rapid breakdown, since the maximum value of the resonant frequency fell on the most loaded mode of operation of the engines (this corresponded to the movement of self-propelled guns in second gear over snow and mud). It became clear that it takes time to eliminate this structural defect. Therefore, on March 21, 1943, the production of SU-12 was suspended.

To compensate for the reduction in production of the SU-76, which the front urgently needed, on February 3, plant No. 37 was given an order to produce 200 self-propelled guns based on the captured Pz.Kpfw tank. III. By that time, according to trophy services, after the Battle of Stalingrad, about 300 German tanks and self-propelled guns had been delivered to repair enterprises. Using the experience of work on SG-122, Plant No. 37 developed, tested and put into production a self-propelled gun SU-76I (“foreign”) based on the Pz.Kpfw slipper in a short time. III and armed with a 76-mm gun F-34, adapted for installation in self-propelled guns. In total, until December 1945, the Red Army received 201 SU-76Is. after which their release was discontinued.

Meanwhile, plant number 38 in a hurry worked to eliminate the lack of SU-76 (SU-12). In April, the SU-12M was created. distinguished from SU-12 by the presence between the motors, gearboxes and main gears of additional elastic couplings. These measures made it possible to sharply reduce the accident rate of the SU-76 and since May they have been sending them to enter the troops.

Technical difficulties in eliminating structural deficiencies in the chassis and inadequate study of the issues of technical operation of self-propelled artillery installations caused the appearance of the GKO decree of April 24, 1943, in which issues of factory acceptance of self-propelled guns. the formation of self-propelled artillery units was transferred from the GAU KA to the Commander of the Red Army's armored and mechanized troops. All further work on the creation of new and improvement of existing self-propelled guns was carried out through the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA).

In May 1913, Plant No. 38 manufactured a modernized model of a self-propelled artillery mount under the index SU-15. In it, the layout of the engine-transmission compartment was made according to the type of the T-70 tank: the engines stood sequentially one after another, and the crankshafts were interconnected. The self-propelled gun had only one gear change box, and the roof over the fighting compartment was dismantled to improve the working conditions of the crew (in SU-12, there were cases when the crews were killed due to poor ventilation of the fighting compartment). Tests of the installation, which received the army designation SU-76M, showed quite reliable operation of the transmission, and since June 1943 the machine was put into mass production. In the autumn of 1943, GAZ and Plant No. 40 joined the production of SU-76M (it was created on the basis of Plant No. 592 NKV). The production of this machine was carried out until November 1945.

GKO Decree No. 2692 dated January 4, 1943 to the NKTP Plant No. 100 (Chelyabinsk) and the NKV Plant No. 172 (Molotov) ordered for 25 days to design and manufacture a prototype self-propelled artillery mount based on KB-1C gun with 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun. Despite a number of difficulties, the task was completed on time, and by February 7 at the Chebarkul test site tests of the prototype that received the factory index KB-14 were completed. By a resolution of the State Defense Committee of February 14, the installation of KB-14 under the index SU-152 was adopted by the Red Army and put into mass production. The first SU-152 regiments took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943.

To combat the new German Tiger ganks captured near Leningrad at the beginning of 1943, the GKO by Decree No. 3289 of May 5, 1943 ordered the NKTP and NKV to make a prototype of a medium self-propelled artillery installation with an 85-mm gun based on the T tank -34, intended for the direct escort of medium tanks in their battle formations.

The development of the new self-propelled guns was assigned to Uralmashzavod, and the tools for it were assigned to the design bureau of plant No. 9 and the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB). At the beginning of August 1943 at the Gorokhovets artillery range, two types of installations were tested - with an 85-mm gun D-5C of plant No. 9 and S-18 TsAKB. The D-5C gun turned out to be more successful, and GKO decree No. 3892 of August 7, 1943, the new machine was adopted by the Red Army under the index SU-85. In the same month, the serial production of the SU-85 began, and the production of the SU-122 was discontinued.

In connection with the adoption by the Red Army of a new heavy IS tank in the fall of 1943 and the discontinuation of KB-1C, Plant No. 100 developed on the basis of the new heavy tank a 152-mm self-propelled artillery mount, which was adopted under the ISU- 152 and since November put on mass production, with the simultaneous cessation of production of SU-152.

The design of the ISU-152 was made some design changes made based on the experience of the combat use of self-propelled artillery installations SU-152.

Due to the fact that the ISU-152 self-propelled artillery production program was not provided with the required number of 152 mm ML-20S howitzers, in 1944, ISU-122 units armed with a 122 mm gun were launched in parallel with ISU-152 A-19. Subsequently, the A-19 gun was replaced by the 122-mm D-25C gun mod. 1943 (similar to that installed by IS-2) and the installation was named ISU-122S.

In connection with the arming of the T-34 85-mm gun in the autumn of 1943 and the need to strengthen the armament of medium-sized self-propelled artillery installations, the GKO, by Decree No. 4851ss of December 27, 1943, ordered the TsAKB to develop a project for the installation of a 100-mm gun based on the existing average self-propelled gun artillery mount SU-85.

Plant No. 9, on its own initiative, joined this work and, before the deadline, designed, tested and presented the 100-mm D-10S gun to Uralmashzavod for installation in a self-propelled installation. On February 15, 1944, the Uralmashzavod manufactured two prototype SU-100 units, one of which was armed with a D-10C gun of plant design No. 9, and the second with a 100-mm S-34 gun developed by TsAKB. After conducting factory tests of the samples with firing and mileage, on March 9, the plant introduced self-propelled installations of the state commission for field tests. The best results were shown by a self-propelled artillery mount with a D-10C gun of the design of plant No. 9, which in July 1944 was adopted by the Red Army under the index SU-100. However, due to problems with organizing the serial production of D-10S guns, the production of the SU-100 began only in September 1944. Until that time, Uralmashzavod launched the SU-85M, which differed from the SU-85 in the use of a new armored hull (with a commander’s turret and more thick armor) developed for the SU-100.

It should be said that according to the experience of summer battles, which showed that not all serial self-propelled artillery installations of the Red Army can successfully deal with new German tanks and heavy self-propelled guns. The State Defense Committee in December 1943 proposed the KBTU KA and NKV to design, manufacture and, by April 1944, submit for testing self-propelled artillery installations with high-power guns of the following types:
   - with an 85 mm gun having an initial projectile speed of 1050 m / s;
   - with a 122 mm gun having an initial projectile speed of 1000 m / s;
   - with a 130 mm gun having an initial projectile speed of 900 m / s;
   - with a 152 mm gun having an initial projectile speed of 880 m / s.

All these guns, except for the 85-mm gun, had to penetrate armor up to 200 mm at ranges of 1500 - 2000 m.Tests of these installations took place in the summer of 1944 - in the spring of 1945, however, not a single silt of these guns was put into service.

Along with self-propelled guns of domestic production, in the parts of the Red Army, the American ones delivered to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program were also actively used.

The first at the end of 1943 began to arrive self-propelled artillery mounts T-18 (and in Soviet documents pass as SU-57). The T-48 was a 57-mm gun mounted on an M3 semi-tracked armored personnel carrier. An order for the manufacture of these machines was given by Great Britain, but due to the weakness of armament some of the vehicles were transferred to the Soviet Union. SU-57 was not popular in the Red Army: the car had large overall dimensions, weak armor protection and weapons. However, with proper use, these self-propelled guns could act quite effectively.

In 1944, the Red Army received two anti-aircraft self-propelled guns: self-propelled guns M15 and M17. The first was a combined installation of a 37 mm M1A2 automatic gun and two 12.7 mm Browning M2 machine guns on an M3 half-track armored personnel carrier. The M17 differed from the M15 base (M5 armored personnel carrier) and armament - it had four 12.7-mm Browning M2 machine guns on it. M15 and M17 were the only self-propelled anti-aircraft installations, which were armed with units of the Red Army during the war. They proved to be an effective means of protecting tank formations on the march from an air attack, and were also successfully used for fighting in cities, firing on the upper floors of buildings.

In 1944, a small batch of M10 Wolverine anti-tank self-propelled guns (Wolverine), created on the basis of the medium American M4A2 tank, came from the United States. The armament of the M10 consisted of a 76 mm M7 gun mounted in an open circular turret. During the fighting, the M10 proved to be a powerful anti-tank weapon. They could successfully fight with heavy German tanks.

Used in the Red Army and captured German self-propelled guns. However, their number was small and hardly exceeded 80 units. The most frequently used assault guns StuG III, called in our army "artillery assaults."

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The history and heroes of the elite type of troops born during the Great Patriotic War

The soldiers of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathized. “The trunk is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Goodbye, Motherland!” - All these nicknames, alluding to high mortality, went to soldiers and officers who fought in the fighter-anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The calculation of the anti-tank guns of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the crew destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is the return shot of a German tank.

All this is true: the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the staff of the IPTA units, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality rate among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located nearby, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth and the fact that the share of anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, one in four is a soldier or officer in fighter-anti-tank units. In absolute terms, it looks like this: out of 1744 gunners - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are on the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank fighter units, the main and only task of which was direct fire on German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

The very concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this kind of troops appeared shortly before World War II. In the years of the First World War, conventional field guns quite successfully fought with slow-moving tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were developed quite quickly. In addition, tank reservations until the early 1930s remained largely bulletproof and began to intensify only with the approach of a new world war. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapon were required, which became the anti-tank artillery.

In the USSR, the first experience of creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37-mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet 45-mm semi-automatic cannon was mounted on the gun’s carriage, and thus a 19-mm 19-mm 19-K anti-tank gun appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, eventually receiving a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model - 53-K. She also became the most massive domestic anti-tank gun - the famous "forty-five."

The calculation of the anti-tank gun M-42 in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

These guns are the main means of fighting tanks in the Red Army of the pre-war period. It was they who from 1938 armed themselves with anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions, which until the fall of 1940 were part of the rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, the anti-tank defense of the infantry battalion of the pre-war state was ensured by a platoon of 45-mm guns - that is, two guns; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a battery of "forty-five", that is, six guns. And since 1938, as part of the rifle and motorized divisions, a separate anti-tank division was provided - 18 cannons of 45 mm caliber.

Soviet gunners are preparing to open fire from a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

But the way the hostilities of the Second World War began, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level may not be enough. And then the idea came up to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the High Command. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the standard armament of a 5322-person unit consisted of 48 76-mm guns, 24 107-mm guns, as well as 48 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and another 16 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, there were no anti-tank guns in the state of the brigades, but non-specialized field guns that received regular armor-piercing shells more or less successfully coped with their tasks.

Alas, the country did not manage to complete the formation of the anti-tank brigades of the RGCs by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. But also underdeveloped, these units, which were at the disposal of the army and front command, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the staff of rifle divisions. And although the start of the war led to catastrophic losses throughout the Red Army, including in the artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which pretty soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

The birth of artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that regular divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting the Wehrmacht’s tank wedges, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber compelled them to roll out light field guns for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary preparation, which means that sometimes they acted insufficiently effectively even in conditions favorable to them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive loss of the first military months, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen are rolling the 45-mm M-42 anti-tank guns, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

In such circumstances, the only right decision was the formation of special reserve anti-tank units, which could not only be put on the defensive on the front of divisions and armies, but maneuvered by them, throwing them at specific tank dangerous directions. The experience of the first war months spoke of the same thing. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the army and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad Front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. Moreover, they really existed, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that five anti-tank regiments following the results of the battles of the fall of 1941 were awarded the title "Guards", which was just introduced in the Red Army.

Soviet artillerymen with a 45-mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg

Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a resolution of the State Defense Committee was issued, introducing the concept of a fighter brigade, the main task of which was the fight against Wehrmacht tanks. True, her staff was forced to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. At the disposal of the command of such a brigade was three times less people - 1795 fighters and commanders against 5322, 16 guns of caliber 76 mm against 48 in the pre-war state and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-mm guns and 144 anti-tank rifles appeared on the list of standard armaments (they armed two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, in order to create new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the week to review the lists of personnel of all branches of the armed forces and "withdraw all junior and rank-and-file personnel that had previously served in artillery units." These fighters, having undergone a short retraining in reserve artillery brigades, formed the backbone of anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be equipped with fighters who did not have combat experience.

Crossing the artillery crew and the 53-mm 53-K anti-tank gun across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon from A-3 landing boats

By early June 1942, the Red Army already had twelve newly formed fighter brigades, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar division, an engineering mine battalion and a company of machine gunners. And on June 8 a new GKO decree appeared that brought these brigades into four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, rapidly moving to the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous decree No. 0528 “On renaming anti-tank artillery units and units in fighter-anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanding and rank-and-file composition of these units” came out.

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a lot of preparatory work concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber new parts should have and what advantages their composition will enjoy. It was quite clear that the fighters and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives daily in the most dangerous sectors of the defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also moral incentive. When forming the guard’s rank, as they did with the Katyusha rocket launcher units, they didn’t assign new units to the formation, but decided to leave the well-known word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. As far as one can judge now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of the fighter-anti-tank artillery - a black diamond with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov "unicorns" was calculated.

All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. Special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders, were also prescribed in the same separate paragraphs. So, the bosses of these units and subunits were set one and a half, and the younger and ordinary - a double salary. For each destroyed tank the calculation of the guns also relied on a monetary bonus: to the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially in the text of the document other amounts appeared: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As regards the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding composition of anti-tank fighter units, up to the division commander, had to be kept special records, while the entire composition after treatment in hospitals was required to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the same battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not be in any other units except the anti-tank fighter.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankers into the artillery elite of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was significantly higher than in other artillery units. It was no accident that the anti-tank units became the only subspecies of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns at unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry front and fired with direct fire often died before their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

New artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which was spreading just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the Red Army's fighter-anti-tank artillery consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy fighter-anti-tank regiments, 168 fighter-anti-tank regiments and one fighter-anti-tank division.

Fighter-anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. The order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense No. 0063 of April 10, 1943 introduced at least one fighter-anti-tank regiment of the military state of war time in the army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts: six 76-millimeter batteries guns, that is, only 24 guns.

By the same order, the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts organizationally introduced one 1215 fighter-anti-tank artillery brigade, which included an anti-tank fighter regiment of 76 mm cannons - only 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-mm guns, which was armed with 20 guns.

Guards artillery rolls a 53-mm 53-K anti-tank gun (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

The relatively calm time that separated the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad from the start of the battle on the Kursk Bulge was used by the Red Army command to the fullest extent possible to complete, retool and retrain the fighter-anti-tank units. No one doubted that the impending battle would rely largely on the massive use of tanks, especially new German vehicles, and this needed to be prepared.

Soviet gunners at the 45-mm anti-tank gun M-42. In the background is the T-34-85 tank.

History has shown that fighter-anti-tank units have been prepared. The battle on the Kursk Bulge became the main test of the artillery elite for strength - and it withstood it with honor. And the invaluable experience for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank fighter divisions had to pay a very high price, was soon comprehended and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but unfortunately already too weak for armor of new German tanks, the “forty” began to gradually remove from these units, replacing them with 57-mm anti-tank guns ZIS-2, and where these guns were not enough, to the well-proven divisional 76-mm guns ZIS-3. By the way, it was the universality of this weapon, which showed itself well both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with the simplicity of design and manufacture that allowed it to become the most massive artillery gun in the world in the history of artillery!

Masters of the Firebags

In an ambush, “forty-five”, a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K).

The last major change in the structure and tactics of using fighter-anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into fighter-anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were already fifty such brigades in the composition of the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them another 141 anti-tank artillery regiments. The main weapons of these units were the very 76-mm guns ZIS-3, which the domestic industry produced at an incredible speed. In addition to them, the armament of the brigades and regiments was 57-mm ZIS-2 and a number of "forty-five" and guns of 107 mm caliber.

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a disguised position. In the foreground: a 53-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: a 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.

By this time, the principal tactics of the combat use of anti-tank fighter units had been fully developed. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strongholds developed and tested before the Battle of Kursk was rethought and refined. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops was more than sufficient, experienced personnel were enough for their use, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was managed to be made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of “fire bags” arranged on the routes of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and camouflaged with all care. And they did not open fire when the first line of enemy tanks appeared in the zone of confident defeat, but only after almost all attacking tanks entered it.

Unknown Soviet ordinary girls from the fighter-anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

Such "firebags", given the characteristics of the fighter-anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat distances, which means that the risk for gunners increased many times. It was necessary to show not only remarkable endurance, watching how German tanks were passing almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire, and conduct it as quickly as possible, as the capabilities of equipment and the strength of the calculations allowed. And at the same time be ready at any moment to change position, as soon as it was under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of confident defeat. And as a rule, they had to do this in battle literally on their hands: they simply simply didn’t have time to drive horses or cars, and the loading and unloading process of the guns took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with advancing tanks allowed.

The calculation of Soviet gunners fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) against a German tank on the street of the village. The calculation number gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Heroes with a black rhombus on the sleeve

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units. Among them were real gunners, snipers. Such as, for example, the gun commander of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who accounted for almost three dozen fascist tanks, and he knocked out ten of them (including six Tigers!) In one the battle. For this, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, gunner of the 493rd anti-tank artillery regiment, sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, marched to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where he destroyed four German tanks in one battle, and in just a few January days of 1945, nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April, the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union gun commander of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Antitank Artillery Regiment guards senior sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Antitank Artillery command 19 reading a letter. In the background, Soviet gunners at the 76 mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov at the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyryshchensky district of Cherkasy region), the gun under the command of the senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the enemy’s attacking column to the range of a direct shot, the gun’s calculation opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger-type tanks. The guard himself, senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, using a personal weapon, destroyed one officer and ten soldiers. When the gun failed, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, repelling a new massive attack by the enemy, destroyed two Tiger tanks and up to sixty Hitler soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the calculation of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, six of them were of the “tiger” type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the awarding of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich was awarded by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. In the artillery school received a specialty gunner. Since July 1943, at the front, he fought as part of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Regiment gunner. He received baptism of fire on Kursk. In the first battle he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave the military post. Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin for his courage and steadfastness in battle and accuracy in defeating tanks. He particularly distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in the area at a fork in the roads near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyryshchensky district of Cherkasy region, the calculation of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which the gunner was sergeant Permyakov, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov accurately destroyed 8 tanks, of which four Tiger tanks. When the enemy landing approached the positions of the artillerymen, he entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having beaten off the attack of machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guardsmen switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, repelling a new massive attack by the enemy, destroyed two more Tiger tanks and up to sixty Hitler soldiers and officers. During the raid of enemy bombers, the gun was destroyed. Permyakov wounded and shell-shocked sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, the Guard, Sergeant Permyakov Veniamin Mikhailovich was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant-General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the anti-tank gun commander, Sergeant Ivan Spitsin. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. The direct calculation of Sergeant Spitsin destroyed three enemy machine guns. Crossing the bridgehead, the gunners fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. The gunners joined the infantry, in the course of the battle captured enemy positions along with guns and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, for the exemplary performance of command missions at the front of the struggle against Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism shown to Sergeant Spitsin Ivan Yakovlevich, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes, among the soldiers and officers of the fighter-anti-tank artillery the feat of the only twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Petrov stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, he immediately graduated from the Sumy Artillery School on the eve of the war, and met the Great Patriotic War as lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery division in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first “Golden Star” of the Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest were two orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for injuries. The decree on assigning Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both hands in one of the last battles. And if it were not for the legendary order No. 0528, ordering the return of the wounded to anti-tank fighter units, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, who was always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes disgruntled subordinates and superiors said that he was stubborn), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already begun to be called the 248th Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov came to the Oder, forced him and distinguished himself by holding the bridgehead on the west bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by a decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring feats on the Oder of the Guard, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in service. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and the Military Academy, received a Ph.D. in military sciences, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief of missile forces and artillery of the Carpathian Military District. As the grandson of one of the colleagues of General Petrov recalls, from time to time, getting out for a walk in the Carpathians, a middle-aged military commander managed to literally drive his adjutants who did not keep up with him on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery firing completely repeated the fate of all the USSR Armed Forces, changing in accordance with changes in the challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of units and subunits of fighter-anti-tank artillery, as well as anti-tank rifle units, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, which anti-tankers were so proud of, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: the next order to introduce a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.

Gradually, the need for specialized anti-tank artillery units also disappeared. The cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missile shells; in the state of motorized rifle units, units armed with these weapons appeared. In the mid-1970s, the word "fighter" disappeared from the name of fighter-anti-tank units, and twenty years later the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared along with the Soviet army. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never undo the courage and feats that fighters and commanders of the Red Army fighter-anti-tank artillery glorified their kind of troops during the Great Patriotic War.