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What is a collective security system in Europe? USSR policy on creating a collective security system (1930) Creating a collective security system in Europe

After the end of the First World War, issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which incurred countless casualties and losses as a result of the war.

After the end of the First World War, issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which incurred countless casualties and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new war of this kind and to create a system of international law that regulates relations between states at a fundamentally different level than it was before, the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.

Attempts to find a definition of the attacking side began almost from the moment of creation of the League of Nations. The charter of the League of Nations applies the concept of aggression and aggressor, however, the concept itself is not deciphered. So, for example, Art. 16 of the League Charter speaks of international sanctions against the attacker, but does not give the definition of the attacker. Over the years of the League’s existence, various commissions have worked, which have unsuccessfully tried to define the concept of an attacker. In the absence of a universally accepted definition, the right to establish an attacker in each individual conflict belonged to the Council of the League of Nations.

In the early 1930s. The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of a conflict between the USSR and any other country. Based on these considerations, already during this period, the Soviet Union put forward a number of European countries proposals for concluding non-aggression treaties with the goal of "strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the context of the "current deep global crisis." The Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact and the peaceful settlement of conflicts are accepted and implemented by far from all countries (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey, the Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). All these treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; the obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.

Over time, given the intensification of aggressive trends in international politics, the question arises of the need to define the concepts of aggression and the attacking side. For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the need to conclude a special convention on determining the attacker at a conference on disarmament in December 1932. The Soviet draft definition of the attacker provided for recognition of such a state in an international conflict, which “will be the first to declare war on another state; whose armed forces, even if without declaring war, will invade the territory of another state; the ground, sea or air forces of which will be landed or brought into the borders of another state or deliberately attack the ships or aircraft of the latter without the permission of his government or violate the terms of such permission; which will establish a sea blockade of the coasts or ports of another state ”, while“ there is no consideration of a political, strategic or economic order, as well as a reference to the significant amount of invested capital or other special interests that may exist in this territory, nor a denial of distinctive features signs of the state cannot justify the attack. "

On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally submitted to the Conference Bureau. According to the decision of the general commission of the conference, a special subcommittee was formed under the chairmanship of the Greek delegate of the famous lawyer Politis, which worked in May 1933. The Soviet draft, with some relatively small amendments, was adopted by this subcommission on May 24, 1933. The Soviet government decided to use a number of foreign ministers in London during the Economic Conference and proposed to sign the said convention. On July 3 and 4, 1933, an identical convention was signed between the USSR and Lithuania. Finland later joined the convention of July 3, 1933. Thus, eleven states adopted the definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union. The participation of Turkey and Romania in two conventions of identical content is explained by the desire of the countries that were part of the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece) and Malaya Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) to sign a special convention as a single complex of states. This was the next step in an attempt to create an effective security system in Europe.

However, at this time, there is an ever greater destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive trends in international relations. Very little time is required for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the theme of creating a new system of international security, which would be able to prevent the already real threat of war, is of particular relevance.

For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933. On December 29, 1933, in a speech at the IV session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, outlined new areas of Soviet foreign policy for the coming years, the essence of which was as follows:

non-aggression and neutrality in any conflict. For the Soviet Union of 1933, broken by a terrible famine, passive resistance of tens of millions of peasants (conscripts in the event of war), party purges, the prospect of being drawn into a war would mean, as Litvinov made it clear, a real catastrophe;

pacification policy towards Germany and Japan, despite the aggressive and anti-Soviet course of their foreign policy in previous years. This policy should be followed until it becomes evidence of weakness; in any case, state interests should have prevailed over ideological solidarity: “We, of course, have our own opinion about the German regime, we, of course, are sensitive to the suffering of our German comrades, but least of all, we Marxists can be reproached for letting us feeling to dominate our politics ”

free from the illusions of participating in efforts to create a collective security system with the hope that the League of Nations “will be able to more effectively than in previous years play its role in preventing or localizing conflicts”;

openness to Western democracies - also without special illusions, given the fact that in these countries, due to the frequent change of governments, there is no continuity in foreign policy; moreover, the presence of strong pacifist and defeatist currents, reflecting the distrust of the working people of these countries to the ruling classes and politicians, was fraught with the fact that these countries could "sacrifice their national interests in favor of the private interests of the ruling classes."

The collective security project was based on the equality of all parties to the proposed regional treaty and on universalism, consisting in the fact that all the states of the region covered were included in the system being created. Participants in the pact should have enjoyed equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of \u200b\u200bany opposition of one country to another, exclusion of someone from the collective security system or gaining advantage by any of the participating countries compared to other states at their expense.

The Soviet Union, in pursuit of its idea of \u200b\u200bcollective security, came up with a proposal to conclude an Eastern Pact that would guarantee security for all European countries and eliminate the "universally felt feeling of insecurity, insecurity of peace in general and in Europe in particular." The Eastern Pact was to include Germany, the USSR, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Czechoslovakia. In the event of an attack on one of them, all parties to the pact should automatically render military assistance to the attacked side. France, without signing the Eastern Pact, assumed the guarantee of its implementation. This meant that if any of the parties to the pact were to comply with the decree on helping the attacked side, France would have been obliged to speak up. At the same time, the USSR assumed the obligation of guaranteeing the Locarno Pact, in which he did not participate. This meant that in the event of its violation (meaning violation by Germany) and the refusal of one of the guarantors of the Locarno Pact (Great Britain and Italy) to come to the aid of the attacked side, the USSR should act on its part. Thereby, the flaws and one-sidedness of the Locarno Treaties were “fixed”. With such a system, it would be difficult for Germany to violate its western and eastern borders.

Soviet proposals also provided for mutual consultations of pact participants in the event of a threat of attack on any of the participants.

The political atmosphere in early 1934, in connection with the continuous growth of Hitler aggression, gave a significant number of reasons to fear that the independence of the Baltic states could be threatened by Germany. The Soviet proposal of April 27 on obligations “to invariably take into account in your foreign policy the obligation to preserve the independence and inviolability of the Baltic republics and to refrain from any actions that could harm this independence” was thus aimed at creating a calmer atmosphere in Eastern Europe and at the same time to reveal the real intentions of Nazi Germany. These intentions, in particular, were disclosed in the Hugenberg memorandum, announced at the world economic conference in London in 1933. The German government’s refusal to accept the proposal of the USSR on the basis of the lack of the need to protect these states for lack of such a threat revealed Hitler’s real goals with regard to the Baltic countries.

The statement of the Soviet government on the agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany made in London and Berlin is also relevant to the draft Eastern Regional Pact. The proposal made by Germany back in the spring of 1934 received an answer only on September 12, 1934. Germany categorically refused to participate in the draft pact, referring to its unequal position on the arms issue. Two days after the German refusal, followed by the refusal of Poland. Of the participants in the draft pact, only Czechoslovakia unconditionally joined this project. As for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, they took an unsteady position, and Finland generally shied away from any response to the Franco-Soviet proposal. The negative position of Germany and Poland foiled the signing of the Eastern Pact. Laval, who inherited the portfolio of the French Foreign Minister after Bartu’s murder, also played an active role in this disruption.

Laval's foreign policy was very different from the foreign policy of his predecessor. On the question of the Eastern Pact, Laval’s tactics were as follows: given the mood of French public opinion, which at that time, for the most part, spoke in favor of bringing the negotiations on the Eastern Pact to the end, Laval continued to make reassuring public assurances in this direction. At the same time, he made it clear to Germany that he was ready to enter into a direct agreement with her and simultaneously with Poland. One of the options for such an agreement was the Laval project on a triple guarantee pact (France, Poland, Germany). It goes without saying that such a guarantee pact would be directed against the USSR. The intentions of the French Foreign Minister were clear to the Soviet Union, which aimed to neutralize such intrigues: on December 11, 1934, Czechoslovakia joined the Franco-Soviet agreement of December 5, 1934. This agreement involved informing other parties to the agreement about any proposals from other states to hold negotiations "that could prejudice the preparation and conclusion of the Eastern Regional Pact, or an agreement contrary to the spirit that guides both governments."

According to the plan of the Eastern Pact, the security system created by him was also to be supplemented by the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. The position of the USSR in this matter was determined in a conversation by I.V. Stalin with the American correspondent Duranti, which took place on December 25, 1933. Despite the colossal shortcomings of the League of Nations, the USSR, in principle, did not object to its support, because, as Stalin said in this conversation, “the League will be able to turn out to be some kind of tubercle on the way to somewhat complicate the cause of war and ease to some extent the cause of peace” .

The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations acquired a special character, due to the fact that in 1933 two aggressive states withdrew from the League - Germany and Japan.

The usual procedure for individual states to join the League, namely the request of the corresponding government for admission to the League, was naturally unacceptable to the Soviet Union as a great power. That is why from the very beginning it was agreed in the relevant negotiations that the USSR could enter the League of Nations only as a result of a request from the Assembly addressed to the Soviet Union. In order to be sure of the result of the subsequent vote, it was necessary that this invitation be signed by at least two-thirds of the members of the League of Nations, because a two-thirds majority is required for admission to the League. In view of the fact that 51 states were in the League at that time, it was necessary, therefore, that the invitation be signed by 34 states. As a result of negotiations conducted by French Foreign Minister Barthe and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Benes, an invitation signed by representatives of 30 states was sent.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, referring to their position of neutrality, declined to sign a general invitation sent by the USSR, and limited themselves to declaring that their delegates in the League would vote for the USSR to be accepted into the League, and separate notices expressing their favorable attitude to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. In this case, a reference to the position of neutrality covered the fear of these countries of Germany, which might consider the invitation of the USSR to join the League of Nations after Germany itself left the League, as an unfriendly step towards it. In September 1934, the USSR was officially admitted to the League of Nations. At the same time, during negotiations, the issue of giving the USSR a permanent seat in the League Council was not aroused doubt.

In parallel with the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, the so-called “strip of diplomatic recognition” of the Soviet Union takes place. During this period, the USSR establishes diplomatic relations with a number of states. November 16, 1933 established normal diplomatic relations with the United States, in 1934 - with Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other countries.

This was a direct result of both the general international situation of 1934 and the increasing role and importance of the Soviet Union as a factor in peace. One of the direct reasons that influenced, for example, the decision of Romania and Czechoslovakia to establish normal relations with the USSR was the Franco-Soviet rapprochement of 1933-1934. For several years, France not only did not contribute to the normalization of relations between the USSR and the countries of the Little Entente, but, on the contrary, in every possible way prevented any attempts to achieve this normalization. In 1934, France was interested not only in its own rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but also in the creation of an entire security system, a system that would include both the allies of France in the person of the Little Entente and the USSR. Under these conditions, French diplomacy not only does not prevent the normalization of relations between the countries of the Little Entente and the USSR, but, on the contrary, intensifies these relations in every way. Under the direct influence of French diplomacy, the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Lesser Entente, held in Zagreb (Yugoslavia) on January 22, 1934, issued a decision “on the timely renewal by the member states of Lesser Entente of normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as soon as the necessary diplomatic and political conditions. ”

Despite the fact that the agreement was received by some participating countries to conclude an Eastern Regional Pact, as a result of open opposition from Germany, the objections of Poland and the maneuvers of England, which continued the policy of German aspirations to the East, this idea in 1933-1935. failed to implement.

Meanwhile, convinced of the reluctance of several Western countries to conclude the Eastern Pact, the Soviet Union, in addition to the idea of \u200b\u200ba multilateral regional agreement, made an attempt to sign bilateral mutual assistance agreements with a number of states. The significance of these treaties in terms of the fight against the threat of war in Europe was great.

In 1933, in parallel with negotiations on the Eastern Pact and on the question of the USSR joining the League of Nations, negotiations began on the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty. The TASS report on the conversations of the Soviet leaders with the French Foreign Minister indicated that the efforts of both countries were directed "towards one substantial goal - to maintain peace by organizing collective security."

Unlike Bartoux, his successor, the new French Foreign Minister, who took office in October 1934, Laval did not seek collective security and looked at the Franco-Soviet Pact only as an instrument in his policy of a deal with the aggressor. After his visit to Moscow during the passage of Warsaw, Laval explained to the Polish Foreign Minister Beck that "the Franco-Soviet Pact is not so much to attract assistance from the Soviet Union or to help it against possible aggression, but to prevent rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union." Laval needed this in order to frighten Hitler with rapprochement with the USSR and force him into an agreement with France.

During the negotiations that Laval conducted (October 1934 - May 1935), the latter tried in every possible way to eliminate the automatism of mutual assistance (in case of aggression), which the USSR insisted on, and to subordinate this assistance to the complicated and complicated procedure of the League of Nations. The result of such lengthy negotiations was the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 2, 1935. The text of the treaty stipulated the need “to begin immediate consultations with a view to taking measures in case the USSR or France would be the subject of threat or danger of attack from any European state; mutually provide each other with help and support if the USSR or France were the subject of an un summoned attack by any European state. ”

However, the true policy of Laval was also found in the systematic evasion of the conclusion of a military convention, without which the mutual assistance pact lost its specific content and would run into a number of significant obstacles if applied. Such a convention was not signed either at the time of the conclusion of the pact, or during the entire period of its validity. Finally, it is important to note that, having signed the mutual assistance pact, Laval was in no hurry to ratify it. He made the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact a new means of blackmail in an attempt to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany. The pact was ratified after the resignation of Laval by the cabinet of Sarro (the Chamber of Deputies ratified the Franco-Soviet Pact on February 27, 1936, and the Senate on March 12, 1936).

In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs said in June 1935 that “we can, not without pride, congratulate ourselves that we were the first to fully implement and bring to the end one of those collective security measures without which at present, peace in Europe cannot be ensured.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty of May 16, 1935 was completely identical to the Soviet-French pact of May 2, 1935, with the exception of Art. 2, introduced at the request of the Czechoslovak side, which stated that the parties to the treaty would come to help each other only if France came to the aid of a state that had been the victim of aggression. Thus, the effect of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was made dependent on the behavior of France. The then Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Benes, sincerely strove for rapprochement with the USSR and believed that such a rapprochement was entirely in the fundamental security interests of Czechoslovakia. That is why, unlike the Franco-Soviet Pact, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was ratified almost immediately and an exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Moscow on June 9, 1935, during a visit by Benes to the capital of the USSR.

Mutual assistance agreements represented a further stage (compared with non-aggression agreements) in the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states in different social systems and could become important elements in creating a collective security system aimed at preserving the European world. However, unfortunately, these treaties could not play a role in preventing war. The Soviet-French treaty was not supplemented by the corresponding military convention, which would allow for military cooperation between the two countries. The agreement also did not provide for automatic actions, which significantly reduced its capabilities and effectiveness.

As for the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, its implementation was complicated by the clause that made the entry into force of mutual obligations of both parties dependent on the actions of France. In France, in the late 30s. the tendency of striving not to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, but to compromise with it, to connivance with the actions of German fascism, was becoming increasingly established.

The attempts of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with England and mobilize the League of Nations were equally unsuccessful. Already at the beginning of 1935 Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles (clause on the prohibition of armaments), which did not lead to any serious consequences for it. Regarding the Italian attack on Abyssinia at the end of 1934-1935, although an urgent conference of the League of Nations was convened, it also did not decide anything. Accepted later, at the insistence of several countries, sanctions against Italian aggression, provided for by Art. 16 of the Charter of the League were too soft, and in July 1936 were canceled. Also, a number of incidents remained almost without attention.

As a result of these unlawful actions of the aggressor countries and the lack of a corresponding reaction to them, the entire Versailles-Washington system of international relations was actually destroyed. All attempts by the USSR to influence the course of events in any way did not lead to anything. So, Litvinov made a series of accusatory speeches at conferences of the League of Nations, which stated that “although the Soviet Union is not formally interested in cases of violation by Germany and Italy of international agreements due to their non-participation in violated treaties, these circumstances do not prevent him from finding his place in among those members of the Council who most resolutely record their indignation with a violation of international obligations, condemn him and join the most effective means of preventing further violations in the future. " The USSR, therefore, expressed its disagreement with the attempts to “fight for peace, while not defending the inviolability of international obligations; fight for a collective security organization, without taking collective measures against the violation of these obligations "and disagreeing with the possibility of preserving the League of Nations," if it does not comply with its own decisions and accustoms the aggressors not to reckon with any of its recommendations, nor with any warnings of it, with any of her threats ”and“ passing by violations of these treaties or escaping with verbal protests and not taking more valid measures ”. But this did not have any effect. It was obvious that the League of Nations had already ended its existence as an effective instrument of international politics.

The culmination of a policy of connivance in aggression was the Munich Pact of the leaders of England and France with the leaders of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The text of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 established certain methods and conditions for the exclusion of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in favor of Germany “according to the agreement reached in principle” of the heads of four states: Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. Each of the parties "declared itself responsible for carrying out the necessary measures" to fulfill the contract. The list of these measures included the immediate evacuation of the Sudeten region from October 1 to 10, the release of all Sudeten Germans from military and police duties for four weeks, etc.

In September 1938, taking advantage of the difficult situation of Czechoslovakia during the so-called Sudeten crisis, the Polish government decided to seize some areas of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, 1938, the Polish envoy in Prague presented the Czechoslovak government with demands to tear away from Czechoslovakia and annex to Poland areas that the Polish government considered Polish. On September 23, the Polish envoy demanded an immediate response from the Czechoslovak government to this demand. On September 24, railway communication between Poland and Czechoslovakia was completely discontinued.

The speech of the Soviet government was aimed at providing diplomatic support to the Czech government. Despite the defiant tone of the response of the Polish government to representations of the government of the USSR, Poland did not dare to immediately oppose Czechoslovakia. Only after the Munich Conference, namely on October 2, Poland captured the Teshensky district. This was due to the fact that at the Munich Conference Chamberlain and Daladier completely “capitulated” to Hitler.

The inevitable immediate result of the Munich Agreement was the capture of Czechoslovakia by Hitler in March 1939. On March 14, with the help of Hitler, an “independent” Slovak state was created. Czech troops were removed from Slovakia. On the same day, the Hungarian government announced that it insisted on the annexation of the Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary (by the beginning of 1939, Hungary had completely entered the wake of the foreign policy of Germany and Italy, having completely lost the independence of its policy). Germany demanded that the Czechoslovak government recognize the separation of Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, the dissolution of the Czechoslovak army, the abolition of the post of president of the republic and the establishment of a regent governor instead.

On March 15, Czechoslovak President Gaha (replacing the retired Benes) and Foreign Minister Khvalkovsky were summoned to Hitler in Berlin. While they were going there, German troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia began to occupy one city after another. When Gakha and Khvalkovsky came to Hitler, the latter, in the presence of Ribbentrop, invited them to sign an agreement on Czech annexation to Germany.

On March 16, 1939, Slovak Prime Minister Tisso sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to take Slovakia under his protection. In addition to the USSR and the USA, all countries recognized the accession of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Hitler’s capture of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, a sharp aggravation of Polish-German relations and the economic agreement imposed on Romania, which turned Romania into a vassal of Germany, led to some change in Chamberlain’s position, and after that Daladier. Stubbornly refusing in the previous period the negotiations repeatedly proposed by the Soviet government on strengthening the collective security system, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier in mid-April 1939 themselves made the USSR a proposal to begin negotiations on the creation of a tripartite peace front. The Soviet government accepted this proposal. In May 1939, negotiations between representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and France began in Moscow. These negotiations continued until August 23, 1939 and yielded no results. The failure of these negotiations was caused by the position of the Chamberlain and Daladier governments, which in reality did not at all strive to create a peace front directed against the German aggressor. With the help of the Moscow talks, Chamberlain and Daladier proposed not to bring political pressure to Hitler and force him to compromise with England and France. Therefore, the negotiations begun in Moscow in May 1939 lasted so long and ended in failure. Specifically, the negotiations encountered certain difficulties, namely, Great Britain and France demanded that the USSR participate in treaties that provided for the immediate entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the event of aggression against these two countries and completely did not imply their obligatory assistance in the event of an attack on the USSR allies - the Baltic states . And this despite the fact that Chamberlain in his speech on June 8 admitted that "the requirements of the Russians for these states to be included in the triple guarantee are well founded." Further, it was strange that Poland, which could have been the direct object of German aggression and whose security guarantee was discussed during the negotiations, itself stubbornly refused to participate in these negotiations, and the Chamberlain and Daladier governments did nothing to bring it to them attract.

The position of the USSR during the negotiations in Moscow was determined and recorded in a speech by V.M. Molotov at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1939. These conditions remained unchanged throughout the negotiation process and were as follows: “The conclusion between England, France and the USSR of an effective pact on mutual assistance against aggression, which is exclusively defensive in nature; guarantee on the part of England, France and the USSR of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including, without exception, all European countries bordering the USSR against attack of the aggressor; concluding a concrete agreement between England, France and the USSR on the forms and sizes of immediate and effective assistance provided to each other and guaranteed to states in the event of an aggressor attack. ”

In the second stage of the negotiations, Chamberlain and Daladier were forced to make concessions and agree to a guarantee against Hitler’s possible aggression against the Baltic countries. However, making this concession, they agreed only to a guarantee against direct aggression, i.e. Germany’s direct armed attack on the Baltic countries, at the same time refusing any guarantees in the event of the so-called “indirect aggression”, that is, a Hitler’s coup, which could result in the actual seizure of the Baltic countries “peacefully”.

It should be noted that while in negotiations with Hitler in 1938 Chamberlain traveled to Germany three times, negotiations in Moscow from England and France were entrusted only to the respective ambassadors. This could not but affect the nature of the negotiations, as well as their pace. This suggests that the British and French did not want an agreement with the USSR based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, that is, the whole severity of obligations was formed in the USSR.

When during the last stage of the negotiations, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, special negotiations were simultaneously launched on the issue of a military convention between the three states, then from England and France they were entrusted to unauthorized military representatives who either did not have mandates to sign a military convention or their mandates were clearly inadequate.

All these and a number of other circumstances led to the fact that the negotiations in Moscow in the spring and summer of 1939 - the last attempt to create a system that guarantees European countries against the aggression of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy - failed.

Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement, as a whole or in individual elements, a collective security system to prevent the outbreak of war.

The policy of appeasing the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to agree with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust, led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.

In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system made a significant contribution to the development of the theory and to the practical adoption of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is determined and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, it implies collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and save the world.

The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.

1. Where were the centers of military danger in the 1930s? What explains their appearance? Make a synchronous table "hotbeds of military danger."

2. Describe the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor according to the plan: which countries carried out; what goals pursued; what expressed itself; what consequences did it have.

The policy of "appeasement" was carried out by England, the USA, and France. The goals of politics: to protect themselves, to push Germany and the USSR together, as they were equally afraid of fascism and communism. The policy was expressed in the Anschluss of Austria, to the presentation of territorial claims against Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement of 1938 was the apogee of the policy of “appeasement”. The consequences of the policy were the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany, the presentation of territorial claims against Poland, the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and the USSR, the agreement between them on the division of spheres of influence. A favorable moment to prevent the Second World War was lost. Western countries did nothing to stop A. Hitler.

3. Describe the process of folding the blocks of aggressive states in the 1930s. Build the circuit.

Germany and Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936. In 1937, Italy joined them. Thus, the aggressive “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis” block appeared

Scheme scheme of the process of folding the block of aggressive states.

4. What is a collective security system? What measures have been taken to create it in Europe? Why wasn’t it created?

The collective security system is an attempt by Western countries to protect themselves from aggression by fascist states. European countries began to sign bilateral non-aggression and mutual assistance agreements. The first to be signed by France and the USSR. The USSR proposed signing an agreement on mutual assistance with the participation of other countries. A draft of the Eastern Pact was even developed, which could become the basis of a collective security system in Europe. But Germany, Poland and some other countries refused to participate in the Eastern Pact. With the USSR, even the United States began to try to establish diplomatic ties. In 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations. In May 1935, the USSR and France signed a mutual assistance agreement, and in May 1935 the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

When the inconsistency of the policy of "appeasement" appeared, England and France also signed a bilateral agreement on mutual assistance, and also guaranteed the protection of the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. A little later, the same guarantees were given to Poland, Romania, Greece, Turkey. It was supposed to sign a tripartite pact of mutual assistance between the USSR, France and England. But the last two did their best to drag out negotiations; they hoped to come to an agreement with A. Hitler. They also hoped that A. Hitler would take over the USSR, destroy the threat of communism, and would not lay claim to their territory. Then I. Stalin also tried to negotiate with A. Hitler. Germany and the USSR quickly reached an agreement; on the first day of negotiations they signed a non-aggression agreement on August 23, 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). There was also a secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence. The attempt to create a collective security system failed.

5. What made the leadership of the USSR agree to an agreement with Germany? Could a non-aggression pact with Germany prevent the Second World War?

The leadership of the USSR was forced to sign an agreement with Germany, since France and England in every possible way delayed negotiations on the creation of a collective security system and at the same time tried to negotiate with Germany. In this situation, the USSR also tried to negotiate with Germany. Hitler immediately agreed, as he was not ready to wage war on two fronts, and the neutrality of the USSR was extremely convenient for him. A non-aggression pact with Germany could not have prevented World War II. Since a convenient moment had already been missed when the Western countries pursued a policy of "appeasement," they made concessions to Hitler.

We offer to discuss. The League of Nations was created in 1919 with the aim of developing cooperation between peoples and preventing war. How effective was her activity and why?

The activities of the League of Nations were not effective. This organization did not include all the states of the world. Also, the United States, a leading world power, did not recognize this organization and did not support it. The countries that are members of the League of Nations did not carry out actions aimed at supporting peace, the policy of "appeasement" showed the failure of this organization. Its failure manifested itself already in 1933, when Germany and Japan emerged from it. And also the organization itself was called upon to defend the foundations of the Versailles-Washington system, which was extremely unjust and did not solve the basic problems of the world’s organization. And the fact of the Second World War, says that she did not cope with her main task - maintaining peace.

Answer to questions to the historical document p. 51.

What did A. Hitler see Germany’s main foreign policy goal? How did he expect to reach it?

The main foreign policy goal is the capture of new lands, to reduce the army of the unemployed; conquering new markets. He intended to achieve it by creating a huge battle-worthy army - the Wehrmacht. The path of direct capture of territories and the Germanization of peoples.

COLLECTIVE SAFETY

joint state measures to ensure peace, prevent aggression and fight against it, carried out through the international. organization or in accordance with the international. agreements. K. b. based on the principle of international. rights, according to Krom, an attack on at least one country is a violation of world peace and aggression against all other state-states that have taken upon themselves. obligations. Treaties on K. b. contain such important obligations as the prohibition of aggression, abstinence from the threat of force or its use, the peaceful resolution of disputes, mutual consultations in the event of a threat of aggression, refusal of assistance to the aggressor, mutual assistance in combating aggression, including the use of arms. forces, etc. Of great importance are the obligations to reduce armaments and armaments. forces, on the withdrawal of foreign. troops from the ter. other state-in, on the elimination of foreign. military man. bases and aggressive military. blocs on the creation of demilitarized and nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world (see Disarmament).

Owls The Union has consistently advocated and advocates the creation of an effective K. system. Desiring to use every opportunity in its struggle for collective security, the USSR in 1928 joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact (see Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928) to ban the war as an instrument of the nat. politics, and then the first (Aug. 29, 1928) ratified it. In 1933-34 owls. diplomacy actively fought for the creation of a K. system. in Europe against the Nazis. Germany, for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. Owls The Union, decisively defending the idea of \u200b\u200bK. b. in the League of Nations, in 1936 introduced a draft of measures to strengthen the K. system. within this organization. During the Second World War, 1939-45 owls. diplomacy has done a great job to create the foundations of K. b. in Europe and the provision of international Peace: the Soviet Union concluded with a number of Europe. mutual assistance treaties and was one of the main participants in the creation of the United Nations. In the postwar. Owl period The Union made a number of constructive proposals aimed at creating a K. system. in Europe (at the Berlin Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers of 1954, the Geneva Conference of Heads of the Prospect of the Four Powers of 1955, etc.). In connection with the ref. Powers to accept these proposals and the creation of their military. aggressive blocs (North Atlantic Pact 1949, West European Union, SEATO (1954), etc.), USSR and other European countries. socialist countries were forced to conclude the Warsaw Pact of 1955, which is defended. character, serves the security of the peoples of Europe and the maintenance of international peace and is fully consistent with the UN Charter. In order to weaken the international. tension of the state - the Warsaw Pact parties have repeatedly made proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact between the parties to the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Pact.

B.I. Poklad. Moscow.

Soviet historical encyclopedia. - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ed. E. M. Zhukova. 1973-1982 .

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- (collective security) A system for maintaining peace and security on a global or regional scale, provided by the joint coordinated efforts of all states. The central idea of \u200b\u200bcollective security is to constantly maintain ... ... Political science. Dictionary.

State cooperation in maintaining international peace and suppressing acts of aggression. The term collective security has entered the practice of international relations since 1922 within the framework of the League of Nations. After World War II, the principle of collective ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

COLLECTIVE SAFETY - a system of joint actions by states to maintain international peace and security, established by the UN Charter and implemented within the framework of this world organization, regional security organizations, organizations and agreements on ... ... Legal Encyclopedia

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English security, collective; him. kollektive sicherheit. State cooperation in maintaining international peace; the principle of international law, according to rum, a violation of peace by at least one state is a violation of universal ... Encyclopedia of Sociology

State cooperation in maintaining international peace and suppressing acts of aggression. The term "collective security" has entered the practice of international relations since 1922 in the framework of the League of Nations. After World War II, the principle of collective ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

A system of joint actions by states to maintain international peace and security, established by the UN Charter and implemented within the framework of this world organization, regional security organizations, organizations and agreements on ... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary of Economics and Law

Cooperation of states in maintaining international peace, preventing and eliminating threats to peace and, if necessary, suppressing acts of aggression. Agreement on K. b. should include a system of measures aimed at providing ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

One of the categories of international law, involving the implementation of a system of joint measures by states and (or) international organizations with the aim of: preventing the occurrence of a threat to peace and security: stopping cases of violation thereof; ... ... Encyclopedia of Lawyer

collective security - a system of joint actions by states to maintain international peace and counter acts of aggression, established by the UN Charter and implemented within the framework of this world organization, regional security organizations, organizations and ... ... Great Law Dictionary

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Ensuring life safety Book 2 Collective security, Mikryukov V .. Book 2 "Collective security" of the training manual "Ensuring life safety" includes two sections: "National Security" (this section includes chapters on ...

The collective security system is a joint action of all the states included in it, aimed at supporting world peace, as well as suppressing aggression. This system includes several components.

Firstly, it is based on generally accepted international principles, of which the most important are the allegations that the borders and territorial integrity of all states are inviolable, as well as that they interfere in other people's internal affairs, especially by using force.

Secondly, these are collective measures from all states that are part of the system, directed against acts of aggression and threats to peace. Thirdly, these are disarmament measures, and ideally, bringing all states to complete disarmament.

Collective security systems have the right to carry out armed actions aimed at pacifying aggression.

European collective security systems: history and modernity

At different times in Europe, attempts have been made to create various collective security systems, and so far the most serious of them can be considered the formation of the UN, which is to global systems.

In recent decades, after two devastating world wars and the invention of extremely effective mass destruction, the need to create a collective security system has become more acute than ever.

The first theoretical projects of international collective security were proposed back in the 18th century, and since then ideas have been constantly improved, but “eternal peace” does not come.

In 1919, the League of Nations was created, which was to become a collective security system. But she had a flaw from the very beginning: the system did not have a mechanism against the fight against aggression. The Second World War showed the complete failure of this system.

After it, the United Nations was created in 1945. The sad features of the previous collective security system were taken into account. Currently, the UN is indeed capable of becoming the basis for creating an effective security system. The activities of the UN, according to the charter, should be based on regional peacekeeping organizations. It was assumed that in this way problems can be solved in the simplest way.

Attempts to create a collective security system based on the UN have been made for many decades. The mutual claims of European states to each other, and in many ways, the tension in relations with the USSR, constantly served as a stumbling block in many issues that could not be agreed upon.

In 1973, a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was held in Helsinki. The views of 35 states on the creation of a collective security system were discussed. In 1975, agreements were reached on a number of issues. In 1991, it was decided to establish a "CSCE Dispute Resolution Mechanism." Since then, meetings and negotiations have not stopped, but a new system of collective security in Europe, satisfying the requirements put forward by it, does not yet exist.

Attempts to find a definition of the attacking side began almost from the moment of creation of the League of Nations. The charter of the League of Nations applies the concept of aggression and aggressor, however, the concept itself is not deciphered. So, for example, Art. sixteen
The Charter of the League speaks of international sanctions against the attacker, but does not give the very definition of the attacker. Over the years of the League’s existence, various commissions have worked, which have unsuccessfully tried to define the concept of an attacker. In the absence of a universally accepted definition, the right to establish an attacker in each individual conflict belonged to the Council of the League of Nations.

In the early 1930s. The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of a conflict between the USSR and any other country. Based on these considerations, already during this period the Soviet Union put forward a number of European states proposals for concluding non-aggression treaties, with the aim of
"Strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the context of the "ongoing deep global crisis." The Soviet proposals for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and the peaceful settlement of conflicts are accepted and implemented at that time by not all countries (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey,
Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). All these treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; the obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.

Over time, given the intensification of aggressive trends in international politics, the question arises of the need to define the concepts of aggression and the attacking side. For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the need to conclude a special convention on determining the attacker at a conference on disarmament in December 1932. The Soviet draft definition of the attacker provided for recognition of such a state in an international conflict, which “will be the first to declare war on another state; whose armed forces, even if without declaring war, will invade the territory of another state; the ground, sea or air forces of which will be landed or brought into the borders of another state or deliberately attack the ships or aircraft of the latter without the permission of his government or violate the terms of such permission; which will establish a sea blockade of the coasts or ports of another state ”, while
"No consideration of a political, strategic or economic order, as well as a reference to the significant amount of invested capital or other special interests that may exist in this territory, nor denial of the hallmark of the state behind it, can justify the attack."

On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally introduced into
Conference Bureau. According to the decision of the general commission of the conference, it was formed under the chairmanship of the Greek delegate of a famous lawyer
Politis special subcommittee, which worked in May 1933. The Soviet draft, with some relatively small amendments, was adopted by this subcommission on May 24, 1933. The Soviet government decided to use a number of foreign ministers in London during the Economic Conference and proposed to sign the said convention. On July 3 and 4, 1933, an identical convention was signed between the USSR and Lithuania. Finland later joined the convention of July 3, 1933. Thus, eleven states adopted the definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union.
The participation of Turkey and Romania in two conventions of identical content is explained by the desire of the countries that were part of the Balkan Entente (Turkey,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece) and Lesser Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia), sign a special convention as a single complex of states. This was the next step in an attempt to create an effective security system in Europe.

For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933.
December 29, 1933 in a speech at the IV session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
M. Litvinov outlined the new directions of Soviet foreign policy for the coming years, the essence of which was as follows:
1. non-aggression and neutrality in any conflict. For Soviet

The 1933 Union, broken down by terrible famine, passive resistance of tens of millions of peasants (conscripts in the event of war), party purges, the prospect of being drawn into the war would mean, as Litvinov made it clear, a real catastrophe;
2. The policy of appeasement in relation to Germany and Japan, despite the aggressive and anti-Soviet course of their foreign policy in previous years. This policy should be followed until it becomes evidence of weakness; in any case, state interests should have prevailed over ideological solidarity: “We, of course, have our own opinion about the German regime, we, of course, are sensitive to the suffering of our German comrades, but least of all, we Marxists can be reproached for letting us feeling to dominate our politics ”
3. free from illusions of participating in efforts to create a collective security system with the hope that the League of Nations “will be able to more effectively than in previous years play its role in preventing or localizing conflicts”;
4. openness towards Western democracies - also without special illusions, given that in these countries, due to the frequent change of governments, there is no continuity in the sphere of foreign policy; moreover, the presence of strong pacifist and defeatist currents, reflecting the distrust of the working people of these countries to the ruling classes and politicians, was fraught with the fact that these countries could "sacrifice their national interests in favor of the private interests of the ruling classes."

The Soviet Union, in pursuit of its idea of \u200b\u200bcollective security, came up with a proposal to conclude an Eastern Pact that would guarantee security for all European countries and eliminate the "universally felt feeling of insecurity, insecurity of peace in general and in Europe in particular." The Eastern Pact was supposed to include Germany, the USSR, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Finland and Czechoslovakia. In the event of an attack on one of them, all parties to the pact should automatically render military assistance to the attacked side. France, without signing the Eastern Pact, assumed the guarantee of its implementation. This meant that if any of the parties to the pact were to comply with the decree on helping the attacked side, France would have been obliged to speak up. At the same time, the USSR assumed the obligation of guaranteeing the Locarno Pact, in which he did not participate. This meant that in the event of its violation (meaning violation by Germany) and the refusal of one of the guarantors of the Locarno Pact (Great Britain and Italy) to come to the aid of the attacked side, the USSR should act on its part. Thereby, the flaws and one-sidedness of the Locarno Treaties were “fixed”. With such a system, it would be difficult for Germany to violate its western and eastern borders.

Soviet proposals also provided for mutual consultations of pact participants in the event of a threat of attack on any of the participants.

The statement of the Soviet government on consent to guarantee the borders is also related to the draft Eastern Regional Pact.
Germany made in London and Berlin. The proposal made by Germany back in the spring of 1934 received an answer only on September 12, 1934. Germany categorically refused to participate in the draft pact, referring to its unequal position on the arms issue. Two days after the German refusal, followed by the refusal of Poland. Of the participants in the draft pact, only Czechoslovakia unconditionally joined this project. As for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, they took an unsteady position, and Finland generally shied away from any response to the Franco-Soviet proposal. The negative position of Germany and Poland foiled the signing of the Eastern Pact. In this disruption, an active role was played by
Laval, who inherited the portfolio of the French Foreign Minister after Bartoux’s murder.

Laval's foreign policy was very different from the foreign policy of his predecessor. On the question of the Eastern Pact, Laval’s tactics were as follows: given the mood of French public opinion, which at that time, for the most part, spoke in favor of bringing the negotiations on the Eastern Pact to the end, Laval continued to make reassuring public assurances in this direction. At the same time, he made it clear to Germany that he was ready to enter into a direct agreement with her and simultaneously with Poland. One of the options for such an agreement was the Laval project on a triple guarantee pact (France, Poland, Germany).
It goes without saying that such a guarantee pact would be directed against the USSR. French Foreign Minister’s intentions understood
The Soviet Union, which aimed to neutralize such intrigues: December 11, 1934 to the Franco-Soviet agreement of December 5
Czechoslovakia joined in 1934. This agreement involved informing other parties to the agreement about any proposals from other states to hold negotiations "that could prejudice the preparation and conclusion of the Eastern Regional Pact, or an agreement contrary to the spirit that guides both governments."

According to the plan of the Eastern Pact, the security system created by him was also to be supplemented by the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. Position
The USSR in this matter was determined in a conversation by I.V. Stalin with the American correspondent Duranti, which took place on December 25, 1933. Despite the colossal shortcomings of the League of Nations, the USSR, in principle, did not object to its support, because, as Stalin said in the said conversation, “the League can turn out to be some kind of tubercle on the way to somewhat complicate the cause of war and to lighten to some extent the cause of peace” .

The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations acquired a special character, due to the fact that in 1933 two aggressive states withdrew from the League -
Germany and Japan.

The usual procedure for individual states to join the League, namely the request of the corresponding government for admission to the League, was naturally unacceptable to the Soviet Union as a great power. That is why from the very beginning it was agreed in the relevant negotiations that the USSR could enter the League of Nations only as a result of the request of the Assembly addressed to the Soviet
To the union. In order to be sure of the result of the subsequent vote, it was necessary that this invitation be signed by at least two-thirds of the members of the League of Nations, because a two-thirds majority is required for admission to the League. In view of the fact that 51 states were in the League at that time, it was necessary, therefore, that the invitation be signed by 34 states. As a result of the negotiations conducted by the French Foreign Minister Barthe and the Foreign Minister
Czechoslovakia Benes, an invitation signed by representatives of 30 states, was sent.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, referring to their position of neutrality, declined to sign a general invitation sent by the USSR, and limited themselves to declaring that their delegates in the League would vote for the USSR to be accepted into the League, and separate notices expressing their favorable attitude to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. In this case, a reference to the position of neutrality covered the fear of these countries.
Germany, which could consider the invitation of the USSR to join the League of Nations after Germany itself left the League, as an unfriendly step towards it. In September 1934, the USSR was officially adopted in
League of Nations. At the same time, during negotiations, the issue of giving the USSR a permanent seat in the League Council was not aroused doubt.

In parallel with the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, the so-called
"Strip of diplomatic recognition" of the Soviet Union. During this period, the USSR establishes diplomatic relations with a number of states. November 16, 1933 established normal diplomatic relations with the United States, in 1934 - with Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other countries.

This was a direct result of both the general international situation of 1934 and the increasing role and importance of the Soviet Union as a factor in peace. One of the direct reasons that influenced, for example, the decision of Romania and Czechoslovakia to establish normal relations with the USSR was the Franco-Soviet rapprochement of 1933-1934. For a number of years
France not only did not contribute to the normalization of relations between the USSR and the countries of the Little Entente, but, on the contrary, in every possible way prevented any attempts to achieve this normalization. In 1934, France was interested not only in its own rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but also in the creation of an entire security system, a system that would include both the allies of France in the person of the Little Entente and the USSR. Under these conditions, French diplomacy not only does not prevent the normalization of relations between the countries of the Little Entente and the USSR, but, on the contrary, intensifies these relations in every way. Under the direct influence of French diplomacy, the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Lesser Entente, held in
Zagreb (Yugoslavia) January 22, 1934, issued a decision "on the timely renewal by the member states of Malaya Entente of normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as soon as the necessary diplomatic and political conditions are in place."

In 1933, in parallel with the negotiations on the Eastern Pact and on the question of the USSR joining the League of Nations, negotiations began on the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty. The TASS report on the conversations of the Soviet leaders with the French Foreign Minister indicated that the efforts of both countries were directed "towards one substantial goal - to maintain peace by organizing collective security."

Unlike Bartu, his successor, the new foreign minister
France, which took office in October 1934, Laval was not at all striving for collective security and looked at the Franco-Soviet Pact only as an instrument in his policy of a deal with the aggressor. After his visit to Moscow during the passage of Warsaw, Laval explained to the Polish Foreign Minister Beck that “the Franco-Soviet Pact is not so much to attract assistance from the Soviet Union or to help it against possible aggression, but to prevent rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet
Union ". This was necessary for Laval in order to frighten Hitler with rapprochement with
USSR, force him into an agreement with France.

However, the true policy of Laval was also found in the systematic evasion of the conclusion of a military convention, without which the mutual assistance pact lost its specific content and would run into a number of significant obstacles if applied. Such a convention was not signed either at the time of the conclusion of the pact, or during the entire period of its validity. Finally, it is important to note that by signing a mutual assistance pact,
Laval was in no hurry to ratify it. He made the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact a new means of blackmail in an attempt to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany. The pact was ratified after the resignation of Laval by the cabinet of Sarro (the Chamber of Deputies ratified the Franco-Soviet Pact on February 27, 1936, and the Senate on March 12, 1936).

The Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty of May 16, 1935 was completely identical to the Soviet-French pact of May 2, 1935, with the exception of Art. 2, introduced at the request of the Czechoslovak side, which stated that the parties to the treaty would come to help each other only if France came to the aid of a state that had been the victim of aggression. Thus, the effect of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was made dependent on the behavior of France. The then Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Benes, sincerely strove for rapprochement with the USSR and believed that such a rapprochement was entirely in the fundamental interests of security
Czechoslovakia. That is why, unlike the Franco-Soviet Pact, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was ratified almost immediately and an exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Moscow on June 9, 1935, during Benes' visit to the capital of the USSR.

Mutual assistance agreements represented a further stage (compared with non-aggression agreements) in the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states in different social systems and could become important elements in creating a collective security system aimed at preserving the European world. However, unfortunately, these treaties could not play a role in preventing war. The Soviet-French treaty was not supplemented by the corresponding military convention, which would allow for military cooperation between the two countries.
The agreement also did not provide for automatic actions, which significantly reduced its capabilities and effectiveness.

The attempts of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with England and mobilize the League of Nations were equally unsuccessful. Already at the beginning of 1935
Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles (clause on the prohibition of weapons), which did not lead to any serious consequences for it. Regarding the Italian attack on Abyssinia at the end of 1934-1935, although an urgent conference of the League of Nations was convened, it also did not decide anything. Accepted later, at the insistence of several countries, sanctions against Italian aggression, provided for by Art. 16 of the Charter of the League were too soft, and in July 1936 were canceled. Also, a number of incidents remained almost without attention.

As a result of these unlawful actions of the aggressor countries and the lack of a reaction corresponding to them, the entire Versailles-Washington system of international relations was actually destroyed. All attempts by the USSR to influence the course of events in any way did not lead to anything. So,
Litvinov made a series of accusatory speeches at conferences of the League of Nations, which stated that “although the Soviet Union is not formally interested in cases of violation by Germany and Italy of international agreements due to their non-participation in violated treaties, these circumstances do not prevent him from finding his place among those members of the Council who most resolutely record their indignation with a violation of international obligations, condemn it and join the most effective means of preventing such violations in the future. " The USSR, therefore, expressed its disagreement with the attempts
“Fight for peace, while not defending the inviolability of international obligations; fight for a collective security organization, without taking collective measures against the violation of these obligations "and disagreeing with the possibility of preserving the League of Nations," if it does not comply with its own decisions and accustoms the aggressors not to reckon with any of its recommendations, nor with any warnings of it, with any of her threats ”and“ passing by violations of these treaties or escaping with verbal protests and not taking more valid measures ”. But this did not have any effect. It was obvious that the League of Nations had already ended its existence as an effective instrument of international politics.

The culmination of a policy of connivance in aggression was the Munich Pact of the leaders of England and France with the leaders of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The speech of the Soviet government was aimed at providing diplomatic support to the Czech government. Despite the defiant tone of the response of the Polish government to the representations of the government of the USSR,
Poland did not dare to immediately oppose Czechoslovakia. Only after the Munich Conference, namely on October 2, Poland captured
Teshensky district. This was due to the fact that at the Munich Conference Chamberlain and Daladier completely “capitulated” to Hitler.

The inevitable immediate result of the Munich Agreement was the capture of Czechoslovakia by Hitler in March 1939. On March 14, with the help of Hitler, an “independent” Slovak state was created. Czech troops were removed from Slovakia. On the same day, the Hungarian government announced that it was insisting on the accession of the Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary
(by the beginning of 1939, Hungary had completely entered the wake of foreign policy
Germany and Italy, completely losing the independence of their policies).
Germany demanded that the Czechoslovak government recognize the secession
Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, the dissolution of the Czechoslovak army, the abolition of the post of president of the republic and the establishment of a regent-ruler instead.

March 15, Czechoslovak President Gaha (replacing the resigned
Benes) and Foreign Minister Khvalkovsky were called to Berlin to
Hitler. While they were traveling there, German troops crossed the border
Czechoslovakia began to occupy one city after another. When Gakha and Khvalkovsky came to Hitler, the latter, in the presence of Ribbentrop, invited them to sign an agreement on Czech annexation to Germany.

On March 16, 1939, Slovak Prime Minister Tisso sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to take Slovakia under his protection. Besides
The USSR and the USA all countries recognized the accession of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Hitler’s capture of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, a sharp aggravation of Polish-German relations and the economic agreement imposed on Romania, which turned Romania into a vassal of Germany, led to some change in Chamberlain’s position, and after that Daladier. Stubbornly refusing in the previous period the negotiations repeatedly proposed by the Soviet government on strengthening the collective security system, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier in mid-April 1939 themselves made the USSR a proposal to begin negotiations on the creation of a tripartite peace front. The Soviet government accepted this proposal. In May 1939, negotiations between representatives of the USSR, Great Britain, and
France. These negotiations continued until August 23, 1939 and yielded no results. The failure of these negotiations was caused by the position of the Chamberlain and Daladier governments, which in reality did not at all strive to create a peace front directed against the German aggressor. With the help of the Moscow talks, Chamberlain and Daladier proposed not to bring political pressure to Hitler and force him to compromise with England and France. Therefore, negotiations started in
Moscow in May 1939, lasted so long and ended in failure. Specifically, the negotiations encountered certain difficulties, namely, Great Britain and France demanded that the USSR participate in treaties that provided for the immediate entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the event of aggression against these two countries and completely did not imply their obligatory assistance in the event of an attack on the USSR allies - the Baltic states . And this despite the fact that Chamberlain in his speech on June 8 admitted that "the requirements of the Russians for these states to be included in the triple guarantee are well founded." Further, it was strange that Poland, which could have been the direct object of German aggression and whose security guarantee was discussed during the negotiations, itself stubbornly refused to participate in these negotiations, and the Chamberlain and Daladier governments did nothing to bring it to them attract.

The position of the USSR during the negotiations in Moscow was determined and recorded in a speech by V.M. Molotov at the Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR
May 31, 1939. These conditions remained unchanged throughout the negotiation process and were as follows: “Conclusion between
England, France and the USSR effective pact on mutual assistance against aggression, which is exclusively defensive in nature; guarantee by
England, France and the USSR of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including, without exception, all European countries bordering the USSR, from attack by the aggressor; concluding a specific agreement between England,
France and the USSR on the forms and sizes of immediate and effective assistance provided to each other and to guaranteed states in the event of an aggressor attack. ”

All these and a number of other circumstances led to the fact that negotiations in
Moscow in the spring and summer of 1939 - the last attempt to create a system that guarantees European countries against aggression by Nazi Germany and Nazi Italy - failed.

Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of aspiration
The Soviet Union to implement, as a whole or in certain elements, a collective security system to prevent the outbreak of war.

The policy of appeasing the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to come to an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in
Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.

1. Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents, M, 1946, vol. 3-4

2. Chubaryan A.O. Peaceful Coexistence: Theory and Practice, M, 1976
-----------------------
Foreign policy of the USSR, a collection of documents. People's statement
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Litvinova to representatives of the press in Berlin, vol. 3, p. 504
Foreign policy of the USSR, a collection of documents. Definition of the attacker, draft declaration, vol. 3, p. 582
Russian foreign policy, a collection of documents. Conversation of Litvinov with a French journalist on the issue of regional pacts, vol. 3, p. 722
In the same place. Exchange of memoranda with Germany on guaranteeing the borders of the Baltic states, vol. 3, p. 709
Foreign policy of the USSR, a collection of documents. Franco-Soviet Agreement, signed at Geneva, vol. 3, p. 761
Foreign policy of the USSR, a collection of documents. Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, vol. 4, pp. 30-31
M. Litvinov. Foreign policy of the USSR, p. 382.
Foreign policy of the USSR, a collection of documents. Speech M.M. Litvinova at the plenum of the League of Nations, vol. 4, p. 60
In the same place. Munich Agreement, vol. 4, pp. 593-594

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After the end of the First World War, issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which incurred countless casualties and losses as a result of the war.

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