8th Guards Rifle Division composition 1944. The salty wind of the Baltic. In the fire of the Civil War

8th Guards Rifle Order of the Order of Lenin; Red Banner Order of Suvorov; Division named after Major General I.V. Panfilova.
It was created on November 18, 1941 by converting the 316th Infantry Red Banner Division (I f) into a guards unit.
The 316th Infantry Red Banner Division (I f) in the army twice:
- from August 25 to October 5, 1941;
- from October 14 to November 18, 1941.
On November 18, 1941, for military prowess, it was transformed into a guards unit — the 8th Guards Rifle Red Banner (later, in addition, the Rezhitskaya Orders of Lenin and Suvorov named after Major General I.V. Panfilov) division.
By the Decree of the GKO on November 23, 1941, the 8th Guards Rifle Red Banner Division was named after Major General Panfilov.
From the 2005 List: "Dr. there was no decision to rename the division. Therefore, the subsequent names of the 8th Guards. sd with the name of the Hero of Owls. The Panfilov Union, even if they were used in decrees of the PVS of the USSR and the orders of the Supreme High Command, is evidence of inaccurate execution of the decision of the highest state. body during the period. Father war. "
8th Guards Rifle Order of the Order of Lenin; Red Banner Order of Suvorov; Division named after Major General I.V. Panfilov in the army twice:
- from November 18 to December 15, 1941;
- from January 30, 1942 to May 9, 1945 ...

  & nbsp & nbsp & nbsp During the war years, the 316th Infantry Division was part of the 52nd, 16th Army, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the Northwest, then Kalinin Fronts, the 3rd Shock, 22nd and from April 1944 10 Guards Army. Participated in battles in the area of \u200b\u200bMalaya Vishera, in the Moscow battle, in battles against the demy group of fascist German forces, on the Lovat river, in the Novgorod-Luga, Rezhitsko-Dvinsky, Madona and Riga offensive operations, the blockade of enemy troops on the Courland Peninsula.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp The division was formed in July - August 1941 in Alma - Ata. in August 1941 was included in the 52nd Army of the North-Western Front. On August 27, the regiments of the division were unloaded at a small station Borovichi, Novogorodskaya Oblast. As soon as the head of the artillery regiment reached the forest, enemy planes flew in. The personnel suffered the first losses. On September 8, the division, crossing the Ust-Volma river, arrived in Kresttsy, where an order was received from a representative of the headquarters of the 52nd Army: on the move, take positions in the second echelon of the army. For almost a month, the division stood in the second echelon, preparing for hostilities.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp But the division did not have to take part in the battles near Leningrad. At the very beginning of October, by order of the Headquarters, she was urgently transferred to another front - the Western, to the Volokolamsk direction. Here, by that time, an extremely difficult situation had developed.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp The 316th division, which became part of the 16th army, received a fairly wide defense line - 41 kilometers. On the right flank, the 1077th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Z. S. Shekhtman equipped it with its positions, in the center - the 1073th Regiment of Major G. E. Elin and on the left flank - the 1075th Infantry Regiment, Colonel I. V. Kaprov The 857th artillery regiment of Lieutenant Colonel G.F. Kurganov in the initial period took up defense on the right flank of the division and covered the orders of the 1077th regiment. But in the following days, the command was forced to distribute it between divisions of infantry units.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp At this stage, the army command gave the division two more artillery regiments and a tank company. One of them -45 mm guns is located in the center, directly in the battle formations of the 1073rd Infantry Regiment. Another, five-battery train, armed with 16 76-mm guns and 4 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, took up positions on the left flank. The tank company (only 2 T-34 tanks and the same number of tankettes) became the reserve of General I.V. Panfilov. The group (by number of members - battalion) of captain M. A. Lysenko also entered the same reserve.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp The defense line allotted to the division was one-echelon and stretched from the village of Lvovo to the state farm Bolychevo. With an average density of artillery of 4 guns per kilometer, in some directions it increased to 14 guns.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp In addition to everything, by order of the commander of the 16th Army, anti-tank detachments were created in the regiments of the division, consisting of a platoon and a company of sappers in vehicles with a supply of anti-tank mines and bottles with a combustible mixture. This was to significantly increase the ability to maneuver explosive barriers.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp During the Moscow battle at Dubosekovo junction, an unprecedented feat was made by a group of tank destroyers of the 1075th rifle regiment led by junior political instructor V. G. Klochkov - Diev. In the days of the heroic defense of the capital of the division, the name of its deceased commander I.V. Panfilov was given.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp For military merits, she was transformed into the 8th Guards Rifle Division (November 1941), awarded the honorary title "Rezhitskaya" (August 1944), awarded the Orders of Lenin, Red Banner and Suvorov 2nd degree; over 14 thousand of its soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 33 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp In the post-war period of the regiment of the 8th Guards. Panfilov’s divisions were deployed in Estonia (Klooga).
The division was commanded by:
Panfilov Ivan Vasilievich (07/12/1941 - 11/19/1941), Major General (GSS, died at the village of Guskovo, Volokolamsk District, Moscow Region, was buried in Moscow, from the book "Military Personnel in the Second World War", 1963)
Revyakin Vasily Andreevich (11/20/1941 - 01/18/1942), Major General
Chistyakov Ivan Mikhailovich (01/19/1942 - 04/03/1942), Major General
Serebryakov Ivan Ivanovich (04/04/1942 - 10/18/1942), Colonel
Chernyugov Spiridon Sergeevich (10/19/1942 - 03/12/1944), Colonel, from 10/14/1942 Major General
Dulov Dmitry Arsentyevich (03/13/1944 - 05/28/1944), Colonel
Sedulin Ernest Zhanovich (05/29/1944 - 06/07/1944), Major General
Kuleshov Andrey Danilovich (06/08/1944 - 08/17/1944), Major General
Panishev Grigory Ivanovich (08/18/1944 - 09/07/1944), Colonel
Lomov Georgy Ilyich (09/08/1944 - 09/09/1945), Colonel. 1073th (19th guards.) Joint venture: 1075th (23rd guards.) Joint venture: 1077th (30th guards.) Joint venture: 857th (27th guards.) Up:
Kurganov G.F., lieutenant colonel
Anokhin N.I., major
Literature:
"A feat at the walls of Moscow", Alma - Ata, 1967
Kuznetsov A. I., "Heroes do not die", Alma - Ata, 1963
"The Great Does Not Die," Frunze, 1981
"Unknowns are known", Moscow, 1983
Markov V. I. in the book "On Earth, in Heaven and at Sea", collection No. 1, Moscow, Military Publishing, 1979, p. 162 - 232.

Taking up the study of the history of the 316th (later 8th Guards) Panfilov division, one encounters a paradox. The recognition of this compound is almost absolute, even the people who are completely unfamiliar with military history heard the word "Panfilov". However, judging by the publications in the media, the attention of researchers and writers, we can conclude that the entire division was formed solely for the sake of one battle in November 1941. Thanks to the efforts of the writer Alexander Bek and the Panfilov’s battalion commander Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, the defense of the Volokolamsk Highway is quite widely known, and the battle at the Dubosekovo stronghold received scandalous fame.

Meanwhile, having taken up the history of the Panfilov division in detail, we find that only the fighting near Volokolamsk is widely known. But the Panfilov Division went through several iconic battles of the Great Patriotic War, and one of the most acute episodes in its history took place in the spring of 1945. Life studied the combat path of the 316th Infantry Division, which later became the 8th Guards.

The brainchild of 1941

The outbreak of war turned out, as you know, a grand catastrophe of the country and the army. The pre-war plans did not envisage the mass formation of new formations, but not only battalions and regiments, but entire armies, disappeared in the chain of "boilers". Already in July 1941, in the depths of the country, the creation of new divisions began to replace the defeated ones. The mobilization mechanism worked without interruption. Fresh formations lacked full-fledged command personnel; they were often led by precocious officers or, conversely, commanders who quietly met old age in rear positions. Chronically was not enough time for training and putting together.

The Stavka’s decision on the mass commissioning of new formations was as cruel as devoid of alternatives: troops were required as soon as possible. This new cohort also included the 316th division. It began to form in July 1941 from conscripts and volunteers from among the residents of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR. The national composition of the division does not give much reason for speculation: out of more than 11 thousand soldiers and officers, Russians made up about 4.5 thousand, Kazakhs - 3.5 thousand, Ukrainians - 2 thousand people. Subsequently, the division was actively replenished by Kyrgyz draftees.

The division was headed by Major General Ivan Panfilov. Previously, he held an unbecoming post of military commissar of Kyrgyzstan. However, it was a battle-hardened soldier with World War I, Civil War and experience in fighting the Basmachis in the 1920s. He had not previously had to lead the division into battle, but it cannot be said that the formation was led by a random person. His eighteen-year-old daughter, a nurse, also served in the division. She survived the war and was discharged after a severe wound at the very end.

Colonel Ivan Serebryakov became a little-known, but very important officer for the division. Qualified and energetic chief of staff of the division, he went with the division through all the key battles of 1941 and 1942, leaving it only in the middle of the war for the post in the army headquarters.

Panfilov began, in fact, with the formation of the division, which he was to command. He participated in the selection of commanders from the battalion commander and higher, so many officers with good official or military experience accumulated in the division.

However, a serious problem remained: there was only about a month to train, although most of the soldiers of the division still did not even have basic combat training. And she had to fight against the most skilled, not forgiving mistakes, powerful opponent. Already in August, the fresh 316th Infantry Division went into the army.

Writers rarely mention what Panfilov’s did in August and September. The fact is that the division was in the depths of the battle formations of the Red Army east of Novgorod. However, these were the most important weeks. Panfilov got the opportunity to train subordinates in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, without throwing them on the move in a meat grinder. For the remaining time, Ivan Vasilievich trained the soldiers and officers at a furious pace.

Training sessions were daily for 8 hours or more. Commanders were trained in battlefield planning, field fortification, orientation, and interaction. The rank and file were trained in the use of weapons, especially carefully - which would prove extremely important subsequently - preparations were made for the battle in difficult conditions, at night and in the forest. Then in the orders there are references to the development of actions against tanks. Incidentally, the order of construction of the fortifications established by Panfilov’s order is characteristic: it was the first anti-tank obstacles that were erected.

Separately, officers were prepared for action in a situation where they would have to defend themselves on a wide front. In general, Ivan Vasilyevich looked into the water: even near Novgorod, his soldiers and officers worked out actions in precisely such a situation in which they had to really fight some time later.

The result was worth the effort: the 316th Infantry entered the battle prepared much better than many others.

On a wide front

The military idyll near Novgorod broke off in early October. Near Moscow, Operation Typhoon began — a Wehrmacht spurt toward Moscow. In essence, its first stage was “harvesting” for the Germans: the Soviet troops weakened by previous battles did not have a real opportunity to thwart this attack and were quickly overturned. Immediately several armies fell into the "cauldrons" at Vyazma and Bryansk, and Army Group Center began to quickly move to the capital.

The 316th Infantry became one of the divisions that was supposed to save the situation. The battles near Moscow became the finest hour of the division. Although her most famous battle dates from mid-November, her most successful battle dates back to October 41st.

On October 10, the division left echelons in Volokolamsk. She had to fight in the 16th army of Konstantin Rokossovsky on Volokolamsk highway. Since there was a catastrophic shortage of troops near Moscow, the front line of defense of the division was several times longer than it should be in a normal situation - 41 kilometers.

In a normal situation, this in itself would mean inevitable defeat. However, a specific feature of the Red Army was the flexible structure of artillery: many separate artillery units made it possible to quickly strengthen the desired direction. Rokossovsky was well aware that the Panfilov’s defend a key area, so he handed over to the 316th division simply colossal by the standards of the fall of 41st force - 7 artillery regiments in addition to the only full-time one.

In total, Panfilov now had 207 guns, and it was on gunfire that the division’s defense system was built. The division commander himself came to the field of the future battle before the soldiers, and even before that a group of staff officers went to the future defense area to study the terrain. So upon arrival, the battalions and regiments received detailed instructions on where and how to equip defense units.

Already on October 16, the Panfilov’s positions were tested for strength. The Wehrmacht’s 2nd Armored Division became an “examiner”: a powerful, well-equipped force, for which the Typhoon was the first operation on the Eastern Front. Before the start of the attack on Moscow, the division had 194 tanks, and by the middle of the month many vehicles were unlikely to be out of order. This power was concentrated on a narrow front against one of Panfilov’s rifle regiments - the 1075th. In theory, the impact of such a mass of tanks was irresistible.

However, the attacks of October 16 and 17 unexpectedly failed. The advancing stuck in front of the anti-tank ditches under fire, suffered heavy losses from artillery batteries not detected in time. On the third day of the fighting, the Germans felt a weak spot in the ranks of the defenders. However, the throw to the near rear turned out to be fatal: behind the front edge was found "Rokossovsky's gift" - heavy direct-fire guns. Of course, the Wehrmacht remained the Wehrmacht, and these battles were worth a lot of blood. In addition, the small number of infantry led to large losses among the gunners. The hot pursuit report contained the following remark:

The artillery had absolutely no losses from tanks and had absolutely insignificant losses from enemy aircraft (despite the intensive bombing of 25 aircraft) both in personnel and in the material part, until it suffered heavy losses from infantry and machine gunners of the enemy, who went on flanks and rear of the battle formations of artillery. With the normal presence of our infantry to cover the guns, artillery would not have had such heavy losses. Due to their small numbers, the infantry units could not provide the front, flanks and even the rear of the artillery battle formations.

However, by the standards of the fall of 1941, what happened looked amazing: a full-blooded tank division of the Wehrmacht rescued in front of the infantry division of the Red Army. On October 23, the German tank division was overtaken by the infantry, and in the reinforced squad Panfilov was moved away from Volokolamsk by the 27th, but the onslaught of three divisions (tank + 2 infantry) was supposed to lead to this result. However, the withdrawal was no more than 15 kilometers (in some sections Panfilov’s division retreated and only a kilometer at all) in seven days of fighting - this was a completely unexpected and encouraging result.

In addition, the division was not torn, did not lose control, retained combat potential - and this is one in three in the battle. It was this battle on the Volokolamsk highway that brought the 316th division glory and soon the guard rank.

Between Volokolamsk and Moscow

Soon the division was to survive the second phase of the Typhoon. The successes of individual units (Panfilov’s near Volokolamsk, 4th Panzer Brigade near Mtsensk) looked like bright flashes against a general joyless background. In the fall of the 41st Red Army, it had a huge drawback: it completely lacked large mobile units. The mechanized corps, which made it possible to maintain the front in the summer of 1941, were burned down in battle and disbanded, only tank brigades of direct infantry support remained on the battlefield, while there were three tank armies among the Center armies attacking Moscow. All of them were seriously worn out, but the energy of the next blow was still to be repaid.

For Panfilov’s situation, the situation was complicated by the fact that artillery was partly lost in the October battles, partly withdrawn in favor of other directions. In addition, after heavy fighting, the staffing of the division left much to be desired. The defense was built on a chain of company strongholds capable of supporting each other on a limited scale with small arms fire. At the same time, the site, which was defended by the 316th and the cavalry group of Dovator, south of the unit, was attacked by units of 5 Wehrmacht divisions at once. In other conditions, this would mean instant defeat, but the word "units" was used for a reason: the Wehrmacht experienced interruptions in supply, and therefore could not attack with full force.

Nevertheless, the situation did not become simple. The entire 16th army planned a counterattack, but on November 16 the division’s positions were attacked violently. Actually, on this day the most famous Panfilov battle took place.

Around this particular battle, spears are breaking with might and main. Meanwhile, if we abandon a priori sympathies and assessments, we will see the following.

November 16 was not the most successful battle for the Panfilov’s. The battle group of the German 2nd Panzerdivisia - the one that broke its teeth about the Soviet redoubts in October - this time managed to succeed. The Germans did not attack the stronghold of Dubosekovo itself, protected by the 4th company, but the neighboring position.

On the part of Dubosekovo, she was supported by fire, but soon the battle moved beyond the forest on the flank, and for more than the 4th company could not help her comrades. The flank of the division was bypassed, and the 4th company itself was soon attacked. At this point, not only in the company, but in the entire 1,075 rifle regiment, there were almost no anti-tank weapons: one light anti-tank gun and 4 anti-tank guns were frankly unimportant defense.

At least two companies, including the 4th, retreated to the forest edges and continued the battle there. During the day, the regiment was dispersed, suffered heavy losses, the results of its actions (the entire regiment, not only the 4th company) were modest: 4-5 tanks according to their own requests. The moderation of the stated successes indirectly may indicate the veracity of the report.

On the one hand, this battle is very different from the canonical legend. On the other hand, tanks are much less likely to be knocked out with hand weapons than you might think if you imagined a war on films. The battle was unsuccessful, while the soldiers and officers did what they could.

Actually, the German review of the battle does not allow us to say that it was not there at all or that the Germans did not notice the Panfilov’s: " A not too strong adversary stubbornly defends himself using forestlands ". However, success in defense was also not achieved, the history of the battle also healed its own life.

The workers of the Red Star Koroteev, Ortenberg and Krivitsky, without going to the front line, formed a classic legend, which featured 28 fighters and 18 destroyed German tanks, and a successful defense of the line, actually hacked by the Germans. In fact, the "Red Star" has served the poor service of the entire division. Without exaggeration, the Panfilovites covered themselves with glory near Volokolamsk.

Actually, on November 16, the fighters of the 1075th regiment did everything in their power to at least detain the enemy, however, given the actual circumstances of the event, they simply could not do anything outstanding against the general background of the war (we emphasize - against the general background of the war).

However, sticking out the battle at Dubosekovo led to a kind of darkening of other combat episodes. It was the glorification of 28 people to the detriment of everything else that became the reason why later officers of the Panfilov division reacted rather sourly to questions about this battle. Note that 28 defense participants of OP Dubosekovo were presented to the highest award of the country - the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of, say, Podolsk cadets, who actually destroyed a dozen and a half of “pansers” near Ilyinsky the same fall, but who did not receive a single Golden Star for their feat, or the much less well-known panfilov’s fights in October, this is really a political decision.

In November, the Panfilovites did not have time for discussions with reporters. The battle went on. The commander of the 1075th regiment Kaprov gathered around himself the remains of the regiment and retreated to the east. The battalion of Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, who was surrounded, made his way through the forests. The division retreated, but retained control and did not allow to completely destroy its front. The most severe losses concerned not only ordinary soldiers. A day later, Ivan Panfilov was killed by an accidental mine. The divisions were soon named after her deceased commander, respected and beloved by both soldiers and command. His colleagues were to fight themselves.

What did Panfilov’s achieve near Volokolamsk? The Wehrmacht did not reach Moscow quite a bit. Access to the outskirts of the city automatically meant terrible civilian casualties and enormous difficulties associated with the transformation of the Moscow transport hub into a battlefield. It was impossible to stop the colossus of Army Group Center at one time, but the soldiers and officers who fought and died in the fall of 1941 depended on how quickly the enemy stopped, at what point the flow of wounded, killed and damaged equipment would make it impossible to continue the offensive.

Stiff Hostility

The battle near Volokolamsk made the name of the division - not the 316th, but the 8th Guards. Now she had to confirm the title.

At the end of November, the exhausted division was removed from the Volokolamsk direction, but was not transferred to the rear at all. Panfilov’s, led by the new commander Vasily Revyakin, moved to the village of Kryukovo (now within the boundaries of Zelenograd). Revyakin's pre-war career did not contain sharp turns. At the beginning of the war, he was deputy commander of the 43rd Army, and now received an independent appointment. Newly made guardsmen were given the task of returning the Kryukovo station, lost on November 30. The Wehrmacht ran out of strength in the offensive, and German troops dug in on the outskirts of Moscow. The division proved to be excellent, and success was expected from it.

However, the absence of Panfilov immediately showed how much depends on one person. In addition, fresh replenishment did not always meet all the requirements for a soldier. Intelligence before the attack was carried out carelessly, tactically the offensive quickly degenerated into frontal attacks, so from December 3 to 6 it was not possible to take Kryukovo.

Unfortunately, on average, the Wehrmacht at that time showed significantly better tactical efficiency than the Red Army. However, Revyakin quickly showed the ability to learn from mistakes. In addition, Panfilov’s reinforced with cavalry (formally - a division, in reality - in numbers - a complete battalion), artillery regiment and tank battalion (14 tanks). An air regiment of night bombers was allocated for air support. At that time, the division had a very small number - only 3800 people. From 11 thousand in October there was not a trace left.

However, the enemy was not in the best condition: intelligence counted 7 depleted battalions in the Kryukovo region. This time, Revyakin planned Kryukovo coverage from two sides.

This plan brought success. 1077 and 1075 rifle regiments bypassed from the north-west the defense knot near Kryukovo, attached rifle brigade swept it from the south. In the division, assault groups were formed from the most trained infantrymen, and they were used non-trivially for a night attack. In the morning, the Russians broke into Kryukovo. The Germans counterattacked off, throwing their few tanks into action. Kryukovo remained with the Red Army.

A significant application for trophies is interesting: Panfilov’s announced the capture of 29 tanks. This might seem implausible, but for December 1941, such a relativity looks quite realistic. The fact is that in the immediate rear of the Wehrmacht a huge amount of equipment accumulated with damage not fatal, but excluding military operations without repair, maintenance or even basic refueling.

Army Center deployed all its forces into the rush to Moscow and now had neither fuel reserves nor spare parts reserve. This circumstance made the rollback from Moscow catastrophic: the departure meant that all the equipment that could not be evacuated remained the winners. The analytical report on the results of the battles for Kryukovo particularly notes the mass of abandoned equipment. It is characteristic, by the way, that in the battle of Kryukovo the Germans used tanks as fixed firing points - precisely because of the impossibility of maneuvering them. Well, the creation of specialized assault groups became a tactical device universally used in the Red Army already much later, so here the guard really showed the class.

Kryukovo was the last operation of the 8th Guards in the suburbs. Since the start of the war, the division has lost 3,620 people killed, missing and captured, and 6,300 wounded. In fact, almost all the soldiers of the first draft were out of order. The division had to be taken to the rear for understaffing. The rest lasted until the end of January 1942. The next destination of the division was the area of \u200b\u200bthe Hill.

By January 1942, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht stood against each other as two boxers ready to knock out. Near Demyansk there was a struggle to encircle the German group. Here Panfilov had to act again with a new commander at the head. In general, the leaders of the division changed quite often. Under the Hill, the 8th Guards became, in fact, a raid group.

The blow of the fresh division in itself was unstoppable: the enemy’s front kept its last strength. In the depths of the defense of the Wehrmacht, the Panfilovites had to meet with units of an equally well-known German division - the SS men from The Dead Head. The confrontation did not work head-to-head: The “Head” moved into the resulting cauldron. The Germans will keep the cauldron thanks to skillful and energetic resistance and efficient air supply, however, the head became really dead: during the demian siege, it lost more than 2/3 of the composition.

Panfilov’s marched south. They were also able to participate in the formation of a small environment near the Hill. In general, the 1942 winter campaign looked bizarre: parts of the warring parties were mixed up, the front line on the map looked like the fruit of an abstract artist’s work, and the Germans and Russians constantly fell into large and small environments.

This page of the 8th Guards War is almost unknown to the general reader, but meanwhile it was a huge success, and if Kholm and Demyansk were subsequently defeated, then it would be this raid that the 8th Guards would go down in the history of the war in the first place. However, what happened happened: the fruits of the Guardsmen’s success were never ripped off, because the Germans kept Demyansk and Kholm Hill.

The time when the "boilers" were quickly and efficiently trashed came much later. The hill was defensively defended, and, as was usual with the Germans, was supplied by air. In positional battles near the Hill, the 8th Guards got stuck for a very long time. Until mid-1944, she led almost exclusively local positional battles without much success. In the spring of the 44th, she was transferred to another site, but the situation did not change there either.

For more than two years, the division almost did not conduct active operations. Private operations ended in relatively small losses - the meat grinder Volokolamsk highway, thank God, did not happen again. But the successes looked very modest. Some breakthrough was outlined only in January 1944, when Panfilov’s liberated more than a hundred settlements and formerly settlements. The grand battles of the turning point in the war passed it. It seemed that the Panfilov’s would remain the “canned goods” of the front.

Baltic salty wind

Everything changed in the summer of 1944, when the German front in the east collapsed within literally several months throughout the space from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Baltic states seemed to both sides a “bearish corner”. Soldiers of the German Army Group Sever, with rude humor as usual for the military, hung out on one of the roads behind their positions a poster “The ass of the world begins here” - an endless trench seat languished with them. In the summer of the 44th, however, no one was bored.

July 10 Panfilov went into battle in Latvia. The Dvinsko-Rezhitsky operation remained in the shadow of the grand offensives of that summer, but it was a major battle. The goal of the Russians was the city of Rezekne in the east of the republic. Here, the guards quickly demonstrated that they had not lost their grip.

In the courtyard was 1944, the level of training of the Red Army grew significantly, and the technical equipment - radically. Hacking the Wehrmacht defenses was quick and clean. This time, the boilers did not work, but within three weeks the Soviet troops covered 200 kilometers, which was a pretty good rate of advance for the infantry. The enemy of the Red Army in this battle turned out to be interesting.

Latvia managed to break through the cold corpses of the 2nd Latvian SS Division (it is also the 19th Grenadier). For Panfilov’s, this operation became an accurate solution to standard tasks: offensive, hacking field defense, pursuit, storming small towns. It was the 8th Guards that stormed the final goal of the operation - the city of Rezekne, otherwise Rezhitsa. Now the division had to solve a new serious problem: to fight in the swamps of the Baltic states.

The Luban-Madon operation was also a private battle of the 2nd Baltic Front. She walked in difficult conditions: she had to break into the Wehrmacht defense in continuous swamps. Breaking through the swamps was not expected to be easy. This time, such a spectacular breakthrough, as under Rezhitsa, did not work out. Tasks were often not so much combat as engineering: the division constantly made rounds through the quagmire, making its way through the ghats and pontoons. By circumventing German maneuvers, they were gradually forced to retreat from their usual borders, but the advance was slow and did not bring any loud successes. In a word, the guardsmen acted as a kind of laborers of the war: they slowly squeezed out the enemy from convenient positions.

Rest Panfilov did not give. Two weeks later, the division gnaws at the front line in the Baltic operation. This time we are talking about one of the largest offensives of the war. The common goal of the front was Riga. The battle, however, developed slowly. In October, Panfilov’s participated in the capture of Riga, but this time not in the first roles.

After the sweeping of Latvia, the Wehrmacht's major bridgehead - Kurland - remained in the Baltic states. In this area, German units pressed to the sea defended themselves until the very end of the war and surrendered only after May 9, 1945. Supply went by sea. The Courland Cauldron, in the words of one of the modern historians, has become a "battle of disabled people on rough terrain."

Neither for the USSR, nor for Germany, this impasse was a priority. The headquarters strengthened the troops in Courland on a residual basis, but nonetheless periodically attempts were made to drop the Germans into the Baltic Sea. One of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the division took place here.

The one who considers sharp situations and fighting in the environment as an attribute exclusively of the initial period of the war will be deeply mistaken. Just as parts of the Wehrmacht happened to get into local surroundings in the summer of 1941, the Red Army found itself in similarly acute situations in the spring of 1945. The last military March is the case of the entire encirclement of the 8th Guards Division, the only one in the entire war. Another local offensive in an attempt to break into the defense of the Army Group Kurland gradually got stuck in the swamps. The command of the front decided on a risky step: Panfilov’s men were ordered to advance, without looking back at their neighbors. A breakthrough was achieved, but very narrow. On the night of March 18, the Germans in the Kaupini area cut off the main forces of the division in the depths of their defense.

However, the year was 1945, and the collapse of those surrounded in the boiler did not take place. Marshal Govorov personally came to the command of the 10th Guards Army. The main forces of the army focused on saving the guards division. One of the regiments remained outside the boiler, and it was he who, with the help of neighbors, took the first step to breaking through the ring. However, the situation was simply critical: although there was no continuous front of encirclement, all the paths along which the supply went remained under Wehrmacht fire control.

Fortunately, the Panfilov’s advance to the encirclement was so successful that the encirclement could shoot quite actively with the help of captured weapons and ammunition. However, they did not succeed in rescuing the surrounding, and the situation was heating up. On March 25, the Germans attempted to crush the cauldron. Due to the extreme degree of exhaustion of both sides, these attacks failed, and by the second of March, after filling up the Germans with a mass of steel (large artillery forces took part in the counterattack), the Russians made their way to the encircled units. The week-long epic of the struggle in the circle was over.

At this the war of the Panfilov division, in fact, ended. After May 9, Army Group Kurland began to lay down their arms.

The 316th, then the 8th Guards Division with full justification became one of the most illustrious in the Red Army. A kind of recognition of merit was the introduction of the actions of this division in post-war collections to summarize the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War. These materials were intended for cadets of military educational institutions and acting army officers, and they did not relate to propaganda, but to military analytics. Of course, the 8th Guards did not always succeed, but even emphatic critics of the legend of the 28 fighters of November 41 agree that the division as such deserved the eternal memory of grateful posterity.

A prominent place in our country is occupied by the Red Banner Panfilov Division, the composition of which was manned from representatives of almost thirty nationalities inhabiting the USSR. Their role in protecting Moscow from the fascist hordes torn to it is indelible in people's memory. But the people of the older generation are also reminded of the propaganda hype that was raised around the “feat of 28 Panfilov’s”, which later turned out to be just an idle fiction of a journalist.

Legendary Division Commander

Ivan Vasilyevich Panfilov began to master military science as early as the years of the Imperialist War - in 1915 on the Southwestern Front. Participating in the fighting as part of the 638th Olpinsky regiment, he rose to the rank of sergeant major, which corresponds to the modern army. When in February 1917 the autocracy was overthrown and processes began in the country aimed at democratizing society, Panfilov joined the committee of his regiment.

In the very first days of the Civil War, he became a Red Army soldier. It should be noted that Ivan Vasilievich was waiting for unspeakable luck - the infantry regiment, to which he was enlisted, became part of the Chapaev division, and thus Panfilov, commanding at first a platoon and then a company, was able to gain combat experience under the command of one of the most famous and legendary military leaders in the history of the Red Army. This experience was useful to him in future battles.

In the fire of the Civil War

In the period from 1918 to 1920, he had the opportunity to participate in battles with the Czechoslovak Corps formations, White Poles, as well as the armies of Kolchak, Denikin and Ataman Dutov. Panfilov ended the civil war in Ukraine, leading units that were tasked with fighting numerous gang units formed mainly from local nationalists. In addition, in those years, Ivan Vasilievich was instructed to command one of the platoons of the border guards battalion.

In 1921, the command sent Ivan Vasilyevich to study at the Kiev school of higher command staff of the Red Army, which he graduated with honors from two years later. By this time, Soviet power had already been established in the European part of the country, but fierce fighting continued in the Central Asian republics, and a young graduate was sent to the Turkestan front to fight the Basmachi.

It was in Central Asia that the career of the future legendary divisional commander was further developed. For ten years (1927-1937) he led the regiment school of the 4th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, commanded the rifle battalion, mountain rifle regiment, and in 1937 became the chief of staff of the Central Asian military district. The next important step is his appointment in 1939 to the post of military commissar of Kyrgyzstan. In the last pre-war year, Ivan Vasilyevich was awarded the rank of Major General for his services in strengthening the country's defense capabilities.

Formation of a division and sending it to the front

In July 1941, by order of the military commissar of Kyrgyzstan, Major General I.V. Panfilov began to be staffed. She soon became one of the two who in the history of the Red Army was named after their commanders. The first was the Chapaevskaya, and the second was the Panfilov division. She was destined to go down in history as an example of the mass heroism of soldiers and commanders.

Formed in July 1941, the Panfilov Division, the national composition of which included almost all the representatives of the Central Asian republics, a month later entered into battle with the Nazis in the Novgorod region, and in October was redeployed to Volokolamsk. There, as a result of stubborn battles, she was able not only to defend her position, but also completely defeat four German divisions, including two infantry, tank and motorized, with heroic counterattacks. Panfilov’s during this period destroyed about 9 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and also shot down about 80 tanks.

Although the general situation at the front forced the division headed by I.V. Panfilov to abandon the defended positions and retreat in accordance with the general tactical plan of the command, she was one of the first at the front to be awarded the honorary right to be called the guards.

A very curious document has survived to this day, upon reading which one involuntarily overflows with pride for those people who once blocked the way to the Nazis. This is the report of the commander of the 4th German tank brigade. In it, he calls the Panfilov’s “wild division” and reports that it is absolutely impossible to fight these people: they are real fanatics and are not at all afraid of death. Of course, the German general was mistaken: they were afraid of death, but duty was put above life.

The official version of the event

In November of the same year, events occurred that, outlined by means of Soviet propaganda, made the division and its commander famous throughout the country. We are talking about the famous battle in which the fighters managed to destroy 18 enemy tanks near Dubosekovo junction in a short time, despite the fact that there were only 28 of them.

In those days, the Panfilov division fought fiercely with the enemy, who tried to surround her and destroy the headquarters. According to the version widely circulated by Soviet propaganda, on November 16, soldiers of the 4th company, commanded by political instructor V.G. Klochkov, defending Dubosekovo, located 8 kilometers from Volokolamsk, and repelling the attack by fifty enemy tanks, performed an unprecedented feat. In a battle lasting four hours, they succeeded in destroying 18 enemy vehicles, and forcing the rest to turn back.

All of them, according to the same version, died the death of the brave. The political instructor Klochkov himself, dying, allegedly uttered a phrase that later became a propaganda cliche: “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat: Moscow is behind!” Having fulfilled his duty, the Panfilov division stopped the further advance of the enemy in the Volokolamsk direction. In those days, falling under heavy enemy mortar fire, the division commander, Lieutenant General I.V. Panfilov, also died.

The dispelled myth

Unfortunately, this story, when examined in detail, raised some doubts among researchers. After the war - in 1948 - a prosecutor’s investigation of the incident was carried out. As a result, the chief of the USSR Armed Forces, Lieutenant General of Justice Afanasyev, was forced to state that the feat attributed to 28 Panfilov heroes is fiction.

Risen from the Dead Traitor

The impetus for the start of the investigation was very curious circumstances. The fact is that a year earlier in Kharkov they managed to arrest the traitor of the Motherland and the former Nazi accomplice I.E. Dobrobabin. During a search, among other things, he discovered a book popular at that time and published in mass circulation about the exploit of 28 Panfilov’s men.

Turning over its pages, the investigator stumbled upon information that plunged him into amazement: it turned out that his person under investigation appeared in it as one of the main participants in the events. Moreover, the book said that he died heroically and was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. It is quite clear that after this “discovery” it was necessary to verify the remaining facts set forth by the authors of the popular publication.

Exposed rigging

Documents were immediately requested that made it possible to draw up an objective picture of the hostilities in which the Panfilov division then participated. The list of those who died at the end of November 1941, reports of all clashes with the enemy, reports of unit commanders and even intercepted German radiograms immediately laid down on the table of the investigator of the military prosecutor's office of the Kharkov region.

As a result, as was said above, the investigation proved with all conviction that the facts presented in the book are fiction and there is a deliberate falsification of the events that have occurred. In May 1948, Lieutenant General Afanasyev personally reported on these findings to the USSR Prosecutor General G. N. Sofonov, who, in turn, drew up a document sent by him

The myth born of the pen of a journalist

The initiator of the historical falsification, as it was established by the investigation, was the editor of the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda Ortenberg. At his direction, an article was published in the next issue by a newspaper reporter Krivitsky, which contained partially unverified, and partially deliberately fictitious material. As a result of this, the myth of a small handful of heroes who managed to stop the tank armada of the enemy was born.

During the interrogation, Krivitsky, who had by then taken one of the leading posts in the editorial office of the newspaper Krasnoye Znamya, admitted that the famous dying phrase of political instructor Klochkov “Great Russia, but nowhere to retreat ...” was invented by himself, as, by the way, everything else written in a book. But even without his recognition, the lie was obvious: from whom could he hear those words, because, according to him, all the participants in the battle were killed and there were no witnesses left?

Thanks to the story he made up, the author of falsification himself managed to create a name for himself in literary circles, write and publish several books, become the author or at least co-author of several poems and poems about the unparalleled heroism of 28 Panfilov’s people. And besides everything else, this story gave a tangible impetus to his further career growth.

Historical forgery

What really happened? This question is answered by further studies of the historians of World War II. It can be seen from them that at that time the Panfilov division really fought in this area with several German corps. Moreover, at the Dubosekovo junction area they took on a particularly fierce character.

However, neither our, nor even the enemy’s military reports mention the battle described in the sensational newspaper article, due to which the Panfilov division became the center of general attention then. The death toll in those days also does not match the data cited by Krivitsky. There were many killed: there were heavy battles, but these were completely different people.

The former commander of the rifle regiment stationed in that area at the time of the events described showed that the Dubosekovo detachment was defended by a company that was completely destroyed during the fighting, but that, according to him, there were 100 people, not 28. The Panfilov division in those days suffered heavy losses, and this company replenished their number. However, only 9 tanks were destroyed, of which 3 were burned in place, and the rest turned back and left the battlefield. In addition, he emphasized the absurdity of the assumption that 28 lightly armed fighters could successfully withstand 50 enemy tanks on flat terrain.

This myth in the postwar years was widespread thanks to Soviet propaganda. The materials of the 1948 prosecutor’s inspection were kept secret, and the attempt made in 1966 by an employee of the New World magazine, E. V. Kardin, to identify the inconsistency of the official version in his article, received a sharp rebuke from L. I. Brezhnev. The CPSU Secretary General called the published materials slandering the party and the heroic history of our country.

Only in the years of perestroika, when the materials of the 1948 investigation were finally declassified, was it possible, without detracting from the glory that the Panfilov division deservedly deserved, to bring to the general public the fact of distortion of the events of the past war.

However, in spite of such an unfortunate incident, the culprits of which were the excessively zealous Soviet propagandists, the great contribution of Panfilov’s to the victory over the fascists should be recognized. In November of that year, their division became officially called Panfilov. Only in the Volokolamsk direction from November 16 to 21 did it, in conjunction with other units and formations, stop the advancement of two German corps and one tank division.

The subsequent fate of the division

The further combat path of the Panfilov division was difficult, full of losses, but, as before, was covered with glory. In the first months of 1942, she, along with other Soviet units, participated in battles against the SS Dead Head division. The fighting took place with an unusual bitterness on both sides and caused numerous losses both in the ranks of Panfilov’s and their opponents.

Having fought with honor up to 1945, that is, almost until the end of the Second World War, the Panfilov division during the attack on the Latvian city of Saldus was surrounded. As a result, almost all of its personnel died, and only 300 people were able to break through the enemy ring. Subsequently, the surviving members of the Panfilov division were assigned to other units and already in their composition ended the war.

Post-war years

In the post-war years, the division, which, due to its high combat qualities and partly due to the propaganda hype raised around it, was known to the whole country, was completely restored. The territory of Estonia was chosen as its location. However, in 1967, the leadership turned to the government of the country with a request that the personnel of the Panfilov division with all weapons and equipment should be transferred to them in the republic. This appeal was prompted by national security considerations and therefore met with support in Moscow.

Having joined the Turkestan military district, the Panfilov division, which by that time had replenished to a large extent recruits from the Central Asian republics, was partially stationed in the Kyrgyz SSR, and partially in the Kazakh. For the state, which included various republics, this was quite normal. But in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the history of the Panfilov division underwent several dramatic moments.

Suffice it to say that, being part of the Northern Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan, in 2003 it was completely unexpectedly abolished and completely disbanded. It is difficult to say who and by what political or other interests made such a decision. However, the illustrious division ceased to exist.

Only eight years later, when the seventieth anniversary of its founding was celebrated, it was re-formed and received its former name. Today, its place of deployment is the city of Tokmok, located near Bishkek. The Panfilov division, the national composition of which today is mainly a conglomeration of the peoples living in Kyrgyzstan, serves under the command of Colonel Nurlan Isabekovich Kiresheev, a native of those places.

The Eighth Guards Rifle Brigade until September 6, 1942 was called the 4th Airborne Brigade. It was formed in late 1941 in Grozny. In August 1942, when Hitler’s troops approached the North Caucasus, the brigade received a combat mission - to defend Mozdok; on August 6, it, along with the 582nd artillery regiment, motorized detachment of the 24th army, the Rostov artillery school and a reserve communications regiment, occupied the Terek 36-kilometer defense. On August 23, the brigade entered the fray. During the day, her 3rd battalion, reinforced by a battery of anti-tank guns and a machine-gun platoon, under the command of the captain D.P. Kovalenko along with a motor squad and two armored trains stubbornly defended the city. Towards evening, enemy infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the left flank of the battalion. Faced with persistent resistance, the enemy began to bypass the battalion, trying to capture the crossing across the Terek. But the bridge was mined. When the first fascist tank appeared on the bridge, there was an explosion. The bridge collapsed.

At the same time, the enemy launched an offensive from the northwest. On August 24 at 2 p.m. his attacks resumed with increasing force. The Nazis brought in several dozen tanks to the infantry battalion. A stubborn battle broke out. The 9th company took the main blow. Artillery and tank destroyers acted vigorously. The enemy has not reached the goal.
  However, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy broke into the city and blocked a number of our strongholds. By order of the command, part of the brigade left Mozdok, in battles for which hundreds of enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed within three days, a lot of enemy military equipment was burned. From September 3 to 8, the enemy continued to crowd out brigade units with superior forces, losing up to 1,200 people dead and wounded, about 20 tanks, two artillery batteries and other technical equipment at the Terek border. On September 6, by order of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, the 4th Airborne Brigade was transformed into the 8th Guards Rifle Brigade. Five days later, all its units were assigned to a new defensive line under the Chechen beam. The enemy, pulling up large tank forces, sought to develop success in the direction of Kizlyar - Malgobek - Nizhny Kurp and go into the valley south of the Tersky Range. With a force of up to 20 tanks, he attacked the positions of the brigade on September 17, but did not succeed and rolled back.
On October 7, the 8th Guards Rifle Brigade received orders to enter the Gaersk-Yurt region. There she became an insurmountable obstacle to the Nazi troops. And on October 17, the brigade was transferred to the Tuapse region, where it became part of the 18th army.
   During the winter offensive of the Red Army of 1943, the 8th Guards was transferred to the area northeast of Novorossiysk. On January 11, its battalions decided to go on the offensive, having taken a number of enemy strongholds, and significantly improved their positions. in the 18th army.
  On January 30, by order of the Military Council of the 47th Army, the brigade was moved under Gelendzhik. Where I began to prepare for the landing of naval landing. On February 21-23, she was transferred to the Malaya Land on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and immediately entered the battle as part of the 20th Airborne Rifle Corps. Having entered into direct contact with the enemy at an unnamed height, the brigade, adjacent to the 51st Infantry Brigade and the 176th Red Banner Infantry Division, fought for the expansion of the bridgehead, moving forward a bit by the end of February 27, as a result of which the front line stabilized. On April 17, the brigade was heavily bombarded from the air, after which a flurry of artillery and mortar fire fell upon it. By the end of the day, the enemy managed to break into our defenses at the junction of two brigades.

To eliminate the breakthrough, the corps commander threw the 83rd brigade out of his reserve of machine gunners. But these forces were not enough. The 591st Infantry Regiment of the 176th Infantry Division, the 144th Battalion of the 83rd Brigade and the battalion of the 111th Infantry Brigade came to the rescue. Together with the 8th Guards and 51st Rifle Brigades, they destroyed the enemy units that had wedged into our defense and again reached the previously occupied line.
  After the regrouping of troops on the Malaya Zemlya, the brigade occupied the defense line between the 176th Rifle Division and the 107th Separate Rifle Brigade. At this milestone, she waged active hostilities for four months. On September 4, the brigade received the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses and, in cooperation with parts of the right flank of the 18th Army, occupy the northwestern outskirts of Novorossiysk. On the morning of September 10, after artillery preparation, the guards battalions went on the attack, but the brigade could not reach the intended line. The enemy fiercely resisted and tightened reserves.
Only on September 13, interacting with the 176th Red Banner Rifle Division, brigade units broke into German trenches and captured the battle line by the morning of September 16: Great October Square - water pumping station - quarter 572 - Sixth Slot beam. And by 10 a.m. Novorossiysk was completely cleared. Chasing the enemy along the Novorossiysk-Abrau-Durso-Anapa highway, by the end of September 21 the brigade had reached Anapa. There was a short respite, filled to the limit with preparations for the landing on the Bugaz spit, which was carried out on September 26. On the night of October 3, the enemy began a retreat in a northeast direction, but the Guardsmen pursued them, and by morning the 4th battalion took control of the southeastern part of Taman.